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2. Programme 
The Role of African States & Governments in the Development of Arbitration 
in Africa 
Third SOAS University of London Arbitration in Africa Conference 
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, 3-5 April 2017 
 
 
 
Day 0: 03 April 2017 
Programme 
 
1200-1700: Registration at Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) 
 
1830-2030: Welcome Reception at Salon Vert, Cairo Marriott Hotel & Omar Khayyam Casino, 
sponsored by WilmerHale LLP London 
Day 1: 04 April 2017 
 
0800-0930: Registration at Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) 
0930-0945: Welcome by Dr Ismail Selim, Director, CRCICA 
0945-1000: Welcome by Dr Nabil El Araby, President, Board of Trustees, CRCICA 
 
1000-1010: Welcome by  Ambassador Mahmoud Nayel, Deputy Director of African Management, 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1015-1025: SOAS Arbitration in Africa Research Project: Dr Emilia Onyema, SOAS 
 
1030-1100: Keynote address by Judge Mohammad Amin El Mahdi, Former Minister of transitional 
Justice & National Reconciliation; Former President of the Egyptian State Council; Former President 
of the High Administrative Court of Egypt; Vice President CRCICA Board of Trustees. 
 
1100-1120: Tea Break and Group Photo 
 
1130-1330: Panel 1: Year 2 Update from Arbitration Institutions in Africa 
 
Chair: Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
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1120-1330: Panel 4: Legal Environment for Investment Arbitration 
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After dinner speech by Ms Smrithi Ramesh, Assistant Director (on behalf of Datuk Professor Sundra 
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Dr Emilia Onyema (SOAS) 
Discussion Paper 
 
Introduction 
This is the third conference in the series of four  identified  themes in  our  research  project on 
transforming and enhancing the use of arbitration as the dispute resolution of choice within the 
African continent. The four year research project itself is titled ‘Creating a Sustainable Culture of 
Arbitration as a mechanism for Commercial Dispute Resolution in Africa’. This research project is 
necessary because as stated in my introduction to the Addis Ababa Discussion Paper for our first 
conference in this series which examined the role of arbitration institutions in this process1: 
there is no viable empirical research in this field in the continent to inform decisions, revision 
of laws, and knowledge and practice sharing across the continent. 
The primary purpose of this research project is to “increase the visibility (of arbitration practitioners 
in Africa) and the viability of arbitration  in the domestic, intra-Africa and  international  dispute 
resolution market”. To achieve this, 
This project will pull together stakeholders in the sector of dispute resolution, articulate and 
monitor their practices and (measure the) impact of the outcome of our conferences and 
research output, to find a measurable change in all aspects of arbitration in the continent. The 
various aspects are arbitration specific laws and rules and their reviews; courts and judges; 
arbitration institutions; arbitration practitioners; and the state. The second (goal) of this 
research (project) is knowledge sharing between researchers and academics, arbitration 
practitioners, and arbitration institutions outside and within the continent.2 
Our second conference which was hosted by the Lagos Court of Arbitration (22-24 June 2016) focused 
on the role of judges and courts in the promotion and viability of arbitration in Africa. The conference 
papers and discussions critically examined the disposition of various African courts towards 
arbitration.3 In 2016, our Lagos Conference Paper partly concluded: 
Clearly African governments need to do more to make cities in their countries attractive 
venues; their courts accessible and credible, ensure security of lives and property, among 
others, to attract not just investors but to ensure that when these investors and their own 
citizens have disputes, they choose such cities as seats of arbitration and appoint arbitrators 
of African origin as their dispute resolvers. In addition and even more viable is the importance 
of creating an enabling legal environment for domestic and intra-Africa arbitration references 
to thrive. 
 
 
 
 
1 Our first conference held in the premises of the African Union in Addis Ababa on 23 July 2015. The 
conference papers are available online at: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/20421/ (hereafter, ‘Addis Ababa 
 Confer ence Pap er’)  
2 Addis Ababa Conference Paper, page 23. 
3 For more information see the SOAS/LCA Conference Booklet available for download 
at: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22727/ (hereafter, ‘Lagos Conference Paper’) 
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This third conference will interrogate these concluding words in greater depth. 
 
Aims of the conference 
This conference primarily aims to examine how African States and governments can better support 
the growth of domestic and international arbitration in their individual countries and collectively 
across the continent. 
This third conference will therefore focus on the role of African governments (executive and legislative 
branches) in creating efficient legal and regulatory environments for arbitration (and its support 
industries) to thrive. The papers and discussions will interrogate the role of African States and 
governments in arbitration. It is important to clearly define this role especially with the private nature 
of the arbitration process. Having identified these generic roles governments play in arbitration, the 
discussions will closely interrogate the performance of various African States and explore how they 
can contribute to the promotion and growth of arbitration in their various states and across the 
continent. 
The role states and governments play in arbitration can be conveniently divided into legal and non- 
legal regimes. The legal or regulatory regime will focus primarily on the legislative arm of government 
by examining the process and content of laws relevant to arbitration. In this context there will be a 
Roundtable discussion with UNCITRAL 4 to  interrogate the reasons behind the few adoptions of 
UNCITRAL texts by African States and suggest possible remedial measures. 
Though arbitration is a private dispute resolution mechanism, at various stages reliance on the powers 
of States and governments may become necessary. In addition, States have competence over such 
matters as: law reform, opening up of the African legal market, legal professional training as it relates 
to university curricula (to include training in dispute avoidance and ADR); negotiating and concluding 
investment related agreements; sovereign immunities; etc. 
It is now recognised that a strong regulatory regime with weak or inadequate supporting environment, 
primarily made up of non-legal factors which are within the competence of the executive arm of 
government, will not pull in the arbitral references.5 In recognition of this fact, the gaps in the support 
facilities by various African governments will be examined and possible solutions suggested. The 
primary aim of examining the impact of such non-legal factors is to provide a holistic discussion of the 
gaps which need to be filled to produce a sustainable environment that will attract disputes for 
resolution on the continent. It will also help government officials in attendance understand the far 
reaching impact of governmental policies and actions. In this way our conference proceedings will 
contribute to the continued development of an enabling environment for commercial activities to 
thrive on the continent, thereby enhancing its economic development. 
In examining the role of states and government in arbitration, investment arbitration cannot be left 
off the menu. This is primarily because states are primary players in concluding investment 
agreements and as disputants in investment arbitration. States therefore need to create a viable 
 
 
 
4 UNCITRAL is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html> 
5 Such non-legal factors include: efficient transportation; power; communication technologies; hotels; security; 
political stability; etc. 
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environment for dispute avoidance and where disputes arise, effectively and efficiently manage the 
dispute resolution process, and comply with legitimate awards, while sparingly deferring to the 
protection of sovereign immunity. 
 
This third conference will therefore discuss: 
 
 The role for African States and governments in making their countries attractive seats for 
arbitration. 
 How African States and governments can better support the development of arbitration in 
their various countries. 
 How African States and governments can better promote the use of arbitration in resolving 
commercial disputes. 
 How arbitration specialists can partner with and support African States and governments in 
their tasks of promoting the use of arbitration. 
 How UNCITRAL can better engage with African States and governments in achieving her 
mandate. 
 The reformation and modernisation of arbitration laws in African States. 
 Whether African States should open up their legal markets to embrace new developmental 
initiatives. 
 The right of disputants to freely choose their legal representation in arbitration and its 
implication for the legal market of African States. 
 The role of government lawyers in supporting the development of arbitration. 
 Whether African governments are ready and well equipped to participate beneficially in 
international investment arbitration. 
 The impact of the recourse to sovereign immunity on African States. 
 The tension between the exercise of the regulatory powers of the State and support for 
arbitration by African States. 
 Whether Africa needs a pan-African court for arbitration and related matters. 
 
Venue for the conference 
This third SOAS Arbitration in Africa conference will be hosted by the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration. 6 The Cairo Regional Centre is the oldest of the AALCO 7 
Arbitration institutions in Africa. Others are the Lagos Regional Centre (1989) 8 and the Nairobi 
Regional Centre (2013)9 . The Cairo Regional Centre remains very active in the administration of 
international arbitration cases market and is a very viable centre which attracts references from across 
the world primarily the MENA10 region. We are hopeful that with the greater engagement of African 
countries with each other, disputants searching for tried, tested and experienced arbitral institutions 
to administer their dispute within the continent, will find the Cairo Regional Centre an excellent choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Cairo Regional Centre <http://crcica.org/> 
7 AALCO is the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation <http://www.aalco.int/scripts/view- 
posting.asp?recordid=1> 
8 Lagos Regional Centre http://www.rcicalagos.org/ 
9 Nairobi Regional Centre <http://www.ncia.or.ke/about-ncia/> 
10 MENA refers to the countries in the Middle East North Africa region. 
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Outline of the conference panels 
As has become customary with our conferences, the Panel 1 will receive progress reports from 
arbitration institutions operating in Africa. On this panel, representatives from the various arbitral 
institutions will present the actions and results (if any) they have taken since our last conference in 
Lagos and any differences such actions have made on the development of  arbitration in their 
respective countries. This panel will be chaired by Ms Alexander Kerr Meise, Fellow, Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Panel 2 will examine the attitude of the governments of various African States towards arbitration. 
This panel will effectively set the context for the conference deliberations and will be moderated by 
Judge Edward Torgbor, Chartered Arbitrator. Panel 3 will be a roundtable discussion focusing on 
UNCITRAL arbitration related texts and their possible adoption (or adaptation) by African countries. 
This roundtable discussion will be moderated by Dr Emilia Onyema, SOAS University of London. Panel 
4 will examine the legal environment for investment arbitration in Africa. The speakers on this panel 
will critique the performance of African countries on the Ease of Doing Business (World Bank Rankings 
and Report); the environment for foreign and domestic investments and the engagement of African 
states in investment arbitration. This panel will be moderated by Ms Rose Rameau, Fulbright Scholar, 
University of Ghana. Panel 5 will provide the view of non-African practitioners and will be moderated 
by Professor Emmanuel Gaillard of Shearman & Sterling LLP. Speakers on this panel will share the 
experiences of other countries in supporting arbitration. Panel 6 will be a response from the attorneys- 
general from various African countries and will be moderated by Chief Bayo Ojo, SAN. Dr Jean-Alain 
Penda and Dr Councillor Ndudi Olokotor will act as rapporteurs for the conference. 
The conference keynote address will be given by Judge Mohammad Amin El Mahdi, the former 
Minister of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation; Former President of the Egyptian State 
Council; Former President of the High Administrative Court of Egypt, and current Vice President of the 
CRCICA Board of Trustees. Judge Mahdi was also the Egyptian appointed arbitrator in the very well- 
known SPP v Egypt arbitration11. The conference closing after dinner speaker is Datuk Prof Sundra 
Rajoo, Director, Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for International Arbitration, Malaysia 
One of the goals of these conference series is to create a meeting point for Africans in arbitration to 
interact with a view to working together. There will therefore be several social events focused on 
networking as part of this conference. On the evening of 4 April, the output from the 2015 conference 
published by Wolters Kluwer  in  2016 and  edited by Dr  Emilia  Onyema, The Transformation of 
Arbitration in Africa: The Role of Arbitral Institutions, will be launched at a reception sponsored by the 
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, SOAS University of London. Judge Edward Torgbor, who wrote the 
Foreword to the book and the author contributors to the book, shall speak to the book. 
Appendix 
This Discussion Paper includes three Tables. Table 1 lists the 54 independent States that make up the 
African continent and their arbitration related laws and conventions as at end of December 2016. 
Tables 2a and 2b reproduce the rankings for African States in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business 
Report, 2017 (with some 2016 comparators). 
 
 
 
 
11 SPP v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3 
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Expected output from the conference 
The papers presented at the conference and a final report from the conference will be published 
online on the SOAS and conference website and made freely available to the general public. 
Conference website 
All information relevant to the main research project and all the connected conferences including 
registration for this conference are available online at: http://www.researcharbitrationafrica.com/ 
 
Language 
The conference proceedings shall be conducted in Arabic, English and French with tri-lingual 
translation. The Discussion Paper is published in the three languages on the conference website 
mentioned above. 
Appreciation 
We thank Dr Mohamed Abdel Raouf (former CRCICA Director) for accepting our request to host this 
conference at CRCICA. We also thank Dr Ismail Selim (current CRCICA Director) for co-organising this 
conference with us. We are especially grateful to Mrs Wissam Elmolla and her team at CRCICA (with 
particular mention of Mr Yahia Rashwan, Mrs Rania Abdel-Hamid and Mr Aly Farouk) for the 
professionalism and quest for excellence in all they do and for their cooperation with our team in 
organising this conference. We thank Christine Djumpah and Chim Emuchay who ensured the SOAS 
end of the operation ran smoothly. 
We thank all our sponsors and particularly mention: Chief Bayo Ojo and ICAMA who have consistently 
sponsored our conference closing dinner since 2015 (Addis Ababa), 2016 (Lagos) and 2017 (Cairo); and 
WilmerHale LLP who sponsored our Lagos conference and our welcome reception here in Cairo, many 
thanks for your support of our work! 
We thank our keynote speaker, Judge Mohammad Amin El Mahdi of the CRCICA Board of Trustees; 
and Datuk Sundra Rajoo, our closing dinner speaker. 
We thank all our panel chairs, panellists, rapporteurs and all attendees, especially those who continue 
to travel round the continent on our conference train! Thank you! We look forward to continuing our 
discussions on arbitration in Africa in Kigali in 2018! 
2018 Conference 
The last conference in these series of conferences will focus on arbitration practitioners and how we 
can support the growth of the arbitral market in Africa. This conference will particularly interrogate 
the role of practitioners in arbitration particularly as: arbitrators, counsel, expert witness, tribunal 
secretary, administrator of arbitral centres. Our 2018 conference will be hosted by the Kigali 
International Arbitration Centre, Kigali, Rwanda from 14-16 May 2018. Please note these dates in your 
diaries and we very much look forward to seeing you and your colleagues in Kigali. 
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Dr Ismail Selim 
Dr Selim is the Director of the CRCICA since January 2017. Dr Selim 
started off his carrier as an associate at Shalakany Law Office. Further, 
he integrated the Egyptian judicial system where he started off as a 
Public Prosecutor in the Office of the Prosecutor General of Egypt, then 
a civil Judge, until he joined Zulficar & Partners Law Firm in 2009, as a 
leading member of its Arbitration Group and where he was promoted to 
Partner in 2013. Further, in May 2015, Dr Selim joined Nour and Selim 
in association with Al Tamimi and Company as Partner and Head of 
Dispute Resolution, Cairo. In parallel to his former judicial career, Dr 
Selim was seconded to the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration from 2003 until 2007 where he acted as Legal 
Advisor. Further, Dr Selim became a member of CRCICA Advisory 
Committee as of 1st May 2016. Moreover, Dr Selim teaches Private 
International Law at the IDAI in Cairo (Sorbonne University) since 2011 
and has taught Arbitration Law and Private International Law in several 
Universities in Egypt. He has been constantly appointed as Presiding 
arbitrator, Sole Arbitrator and Co-Arbitrator and has acted as a Counsel 
in more than forty ad hoc and institutional cases under various rules 
such as CRCICA, Swiss Rules, UNCITRAL, DIFC-LCIA and the ICC Rules and 
in diverse fields including telecommunications, electricity, oil and gas, 
hospitality, construction, banking, shareholders disputes, 
advertisement, international sale of goods and media and 
entertainment. Dr Selim has acted as Counsel in several post-arbitral 
litigation proceedings before Cairo Court of Appeal. In 2007, he 
accomplished an internship program at the ICC Court of International 
Arbitration in France, has published several articles in learned Egyptian 
and International journals and was a speaker in several national and 
international conferences, especially in the field of arbitration and 
investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
25 
Director, CRCICA 
  
 
 
Dr Nabil El Araby 
 
Dr. Nabil El Araby Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Cairo Regional 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (present). Previously 
the Secretary General of the League of Arab States July 2011 - 2016, 
He was appointed Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 2011, 
He served as director of the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration from 2008 to 2011. Previously He was a Judge 
at the International Court of Justice from 2001 until February 2006, He 
was appointed the Permanent Representative to the UN in New York 
from 1991 to 1999; a member of the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations from 1994 to 2001; President of the Security 
Council in 1996;  the  Permanent  Representative  to  the  UN  Office 
at Geneva from 1987 to 1991; he was Legal Adviser and Director in the 
Legal and Treaties Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 
1983 to 1987; Head of the Egyptian delegation to the Taba dispute 
negotiations from 1986-1988; in 1988 agent of the Government of 
Egypt in the Taba arbitration; Ambassador to India from 1981 to 1983; 
He was Legal Adviser and Director in the Legal and Treaties 
Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1976 to 1978; and 
was Egypt's Legal Advisor to the Camp David Middle East peace 
Conference in 1978. 
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President, Board of Trustees, CRCICA 
Ambassador Mahmoud Nayel 
Ambassador Mahmoud Nayel is Deputy Assistant Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for the Nile Basin Countries Affairs. He has held various 
positions including as, Ambassador of Egypt to Eritrea, Deputy 
Secretary General of the Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation with 
Africa; Deputy Head of Mission at the Egyptian Embassy in Brazil; and 
as diplomat in different Functions in Egypt’s Embassies in Moscow & 
Rome. He holds an MSc in Politics from SOAS University of London. 
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Keynote Speaker 
Judge Mohammad Amin El Mahdy 
 
Former Minister of Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation; 
Former President of the Egyptian State Council; Former President of 
the High Administrative Court of Egypt; Vice-Chairman CRCICA 
Board of Trustees. 
 
Dr Emilia Onyema is a senior lecturer in International Commercial 
Law at SOAS, University of London. She is a Fellow of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators; qualified to practice law in Nigeria; a non- 
practising Solicitor in England; alternative tribunal secretary of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal (London); and is listed 
on various arbitrator-selection panels. She is a member of the court 
of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Centre 
(LACIAC), and member of the Advisory Committee of the Cairo 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). 
Her latest book published by Kluwer is an edited collection on, “The 
Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: the Role of Arbitral 
Institutions” (2016). 
Dr Emilia Onyema 
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Ismail Selim’s speech 
 
Excellencies, 
 
Dear Distinguished speakers and guests. 
Dear African Sisters and Brothers. 
Dear friends of Africa who are interested in our continent. 
 
A very good morning to everyone and thank you for joining us at this lovely conference. 
It is a great honour for me to deliver this address to you today. 
At the outset, I would like to express my extreme happiness of seeing this lovely Conference as the 
third and last of a series of events that took place throughout this Africa Arbitration Week that we are 
savoring in the premises of the CRCICA. We have firstly started with a very informative Conference 
organized by the AILA and the University of Geneva, then CRCICA hosted the ICCA Second Consultative 
Workshop on Cooperation among African Arbitral Initiatives, and finally we have this distinguished 
3rd SOAS University of London Arbitration in Africa Conference, entitled “The Role of African States 
and Governments in the development of Arbitration in Africa”. This Africa arbitration week will 
culminate with a sightseeing tour on 6 April for those who would like to discover the ancient Egypt 
civilization through a visit of the Pyramids of Giza and the Egyptian Museum. 
I would like to express my sincere thanks to the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University 
of London (“SOAS”) and Dr. Emilia Onyema, for their confidence in CRCICA as a venue and co-organiser 
of this distinguished conference. 
 
Indeed, the SOAS is a remarkable institution which has developed an outstanding research project for 
the transformation and enhancement of the use of arbitration as the dispute resolution of choice 
within the African continent. Through its disciplinary expertise, regional focus and academic staff 
interested in Africa, SOAS has worked tirelessly on the development of arbitration in African countries. 
 
Likewise, the CRCICA shares the same devotion and owes a duty to support arbitration in Africa by 
virtue of the 1979 Agreement entered into between AALCO and the Arab Republic of Egypt. The said 
Agreement entrusts CRCICA with certain missions such as the promotion of arbitration and other ADR 
techniques in the Afro-Asian region, preparation of international arbitrators and legal scholars from 
the Afro-Asian region and coordination with and provision of assistance to other arbitral institutions. 
 
Historically, CRCICA entered into cooperation agreements with 8 African institutions in Morocco, Libya, 
Sudan, Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Somalia. Interestingly, not all of our co- 
signatories are arbitration centres, some are also law institutes and chambers of commerce. 
 
It should be recalled that CRCICA organized in 1989 the first ever arbitration training workshop in the 
Afro-Asian Region. CRCICA has also fulfilled its duty in providing advice, technical assistance and 
consultations to the then newly established African Arbitration Centers, such as Lagos in 1989 and 
Addis Ababa in 2002. 
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In 2002 and beyond, CRCICA participated in the regional educational scheme of the African Centre for 
Legal Excellence of the International Law Institute (ILI) to build legal capacities in Africa through a 
network of trainings around the continent generally and in Uganda particularly. 
In 2009, CRCICA hosted the first China-Africa Legal Forum which is a sub-project of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established in 2009 in Beijing with the involvement of 44 African 
countries and 17 international organizations to boost Sino-African Trade. 
 
On 15 May 2016, the then Director of the CRCICA delivered a lecture in English to 20 delegates from 
several African states on the pre-award arbitral proceedings. The lecture was given within the context 
of a training program specially tailored for the African delegates by the National Centre for Judicial 
Studies (NCJS), the training department of the Egyptian Ministry of Justice. 
 
Upon the request of the delegates, the lecture was followed by a visit to CRCICA headquarters where 
they were familiarized with concrete aspects of the arbitral proceedings. 
Today two members of the CRCICA Board of Trustees come from African Countries other than Egypt, 
specifically, Somalia, Nigeria Mrs. Funke Adekoya SAN and as of this year, we also have Dr. Emilia 
Onyema as a member of the CRCICA Advisory Committee. 
On a look back at CRCICA’s long-established record of cooperation in Africa, CRCICA ought to pay 
tribute to the names of two late African figures who supported CRCICA in its earlier years and 
contributed much of experience and expertise to its regional standing, those are the names of Dr. 
Amazou Asouzu of Nigeria and Mr. Norman Mururu of Kenya. 
Dr. Asouzu was a lecturer at King's College of London and had various academic contributions on the 
development of arbitration in Africa, which he believed CRCICA have been a key element of. 
Mr. Norman Mururu, as an international lawyer and former chair of the Kenya Branch of the CIArb, 
had partnered with Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein, the late Ex-Director of CRCICA and the catalyst of its 
renaissance for more than 25 years, in enhancing arbitration culture and trainings in various African 
countries. 
Today, I would like to thank to my predecessor Dr. Mohamed Abdel Raouf who thought of the brilliant 
idea of hosting the ICCA and SOAS African events. 
I also am very grateful to my colleagues at CRCICA Conferences and External Relations Department, 
headed by Ms. Wissam Elmolla, for their efforts and logistic support to this event. 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all the sponsors for their contributions. Particularly, 
I would like to thank WilmerHale LLP for sponsoring yesterday’s cocktail at the Marriott Hotel. I also 
thank all the other sponsors to this event, namely Faculty of Law & Social Sciences, SOAS University of 
London, Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA), International Centre 
for Arbitration and Mediation Abuja (ICAMA) , Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, London, 
Stephenson Harwood LLP, London, Youssef & Partners Attorneys, Cairo 
Shahid Law Firm, Cairo, JonesDay LLP, London, TMS Law Firm, Cairo, Shalakany Law Office, Cairo 
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Nour & Selim in association with Al Tamimi & Company, Cairo, Matouk Bassiouny, Cairo, Ms Alexandra 
(Xander) Kerr Meise, AILA, OHADA, ILFA, I-ARB and TDM. 
Furthermore, I must have a special recognition to Mr. Yasser Mansour for sponsoring three young 
African Lawyers from Kenya and the Comoro Islands to attend this event. Such sponsoring includes 
the return ticket from Nairobi to Cairo, hotel accommodation and a touristic tour. 
Finally, you will recall the Akan (Ghanaian) proverb proverb that I mentioned in my speech of 2 April. 
This proverb says: 
Wisdom is like a baobab tree; no one individual can embrace it." 
 
Today and again, I will take advantage of this African context to share with you another proverb (a 
Nigerian one this time) that reflects the purpose of this conference. Its a beautiful Nigerian proverb 
among the vast treasure of African oral literature. The proverb says: 
 
In the moment of crisis, the wise build bridges and the foolish build walls. (English) 
 
Dans les situations de crise, les sages construisent des ponts et les sots construisent des murs. 
(French) 
 
This metaphor is a reminder of the importance of facing challenges together, united to keep our minds 
open to innovative ideas and pathways for growth instead of giving in to fear. 
 
Accordingly, these conferences are a gathering place where we can all work together, share our 
different knowledge and exchange our experiences and I quote Emilia Onyema “talk to each other” to 
better face together today’s challenges of arbitration in Africa. 
 
We need to build bridges and demolish some artificial walls that are unduly separating certain African 
Countries. This foolish wall is called North Africa or MENA Region vs. Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
We need to build other bridges and demolish other fake walls that are creating isolated islands in 
Africa. I mean the divide between anglophones and francophones in Africa and as mentioned by Tulios 
yesterday we must not forget the portuguese speaking countries in Africa. I agree with Toulios, we 
must not forget Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and 
Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Today by hosting this conference we are building a bridge and destroying a wall. Further and for the 
very first time in the history of CRCICA we have build another bridge, I am happy to re-announce that 
we have launched on 31 March 2017 the French Version of our Arbitration Rules to meet the 
Francophone and some African Users’ needs. 
Now, I will give the floor to his Excellency Dr Nabil Alarabi who is, as we all know, among others, a 
Diplomat, Former Secretary General of the Arab League, Former Minister of Egypt, Former Judge at 
the International Court of Justice and the current Chairman of CRCICA Board of Trustees. 
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I wish this distinguished Conference a remarkable success and to all participants a very pleasant stay 
in Cairo. 
And I thank you for your kind attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
33 
Welcome Address by Dr Emilia Onyema 
 
Welcome 
Welcome to Cairo and to our third conference in our series of “SOAS Arbitration in Africa” Conferences. 
 
Appreciation 
Thank you to CRCICA for hosting us. 
 
Thank you to Dr Mohamed Abdel Raouf who accepted my invitation to CRCICA to host us when he 
was Director. 
Thank you to Dr Ismail Selim, current Director of CRCICA for all his support and assistance with the 
organisation of this conference. 
Thank you to Mrs Wissam ElMolla and her team here at CRCICA for working tirelessly with our team 
at SOAS to organise this conference. 
We are grateful. 
 
About SOAS 
SOAS is celebrating her 100th anniversary of researching, teaching and sharing information about ME, 
Africa and Asia. We are very proud of the fact that outside our  regions, we have the highest 
concentration of academics who study these regions. 
In 2014, in the course of my research on arbitration in Africa, I was confronted with the fact that 
African countries are not fully represented in international arbitral discourse; we do not host many 
international arbitration references neither do our courts make pronouncements that influence the 
direction of international arbitral practice, law or jurisprudence. My research led me to the conclusion 
that Africa generates disputes that are arbitrated; it however raised the following questions: why are 
these disputes not arbitrated on the continent? Why are so few arbitrators of African origin appointed 
to arbitral tribunals (even by African parties) as the data from various institutions attest? 
The search for answers to these questions birthed this SOAS Arbitration in Africa project. I shared 
some of my thoughts with Judge Edward Torgbor, who as it happened, was also grappling with the 
same questions. We decided to collaborate in this research project. Dr Jean-Alain Penda joined us to 
add the understanding of francophone Africa to this project. 
I identified four major stakeholders in arbitration and decided as part of the project, to construct four 
conferences that will focus on each major stakeholder in arbitration in Africa. This led to our first 
conference in 2015, hosted by the Office of the General Counsel, Africa Union Commission in Addis 
Ababa. While writing the Discussion Paper for our 2015 conference, I realised we did not know how 
many active arbitral institutions operate in Africa. As a result of our research in this area, ICCA has 
now updated our list of institutions and included additional information. This information is publicly 
available on the ICCA website. 
In 2016, we focused on the courts and judges and their support of arbitration in Africa. We were 
hosted by the Lagos Court of Arbitration Centre. This year, 2017, our conference will focus on the 
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legislative and executive branches of governments and how they can better support the development 
of arbitration in Africa. 
Goal of this Project 
The goal of this research project is to promote arbitration in Africa; and African arbitration 
practitioners and institutions to each other and to the international arbitration community. 
 
Outputs 
This evening we will launch the first book from this conference series which focuses on the major 
arbitration institutions in Africa; and titled: The Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: the role of 
arbitral institutions; published by Kluwer in 2016 (and which you can order with 20% discount. Order 
forms have been emailed to each of you). 
We are currently writing the second book on the attitude of African courts and judges to arbitration. 
I am editing this book which will also be published by Kluwer. 
We are hopeful that after this conference we will publish the third book in the series which will be 
edited by Judge Edward Torgbor. 
Why these books? 
Through our publications, we wish to add our “African Voices” to international arbitral discourse. We 
wish to have Africans also write about Africa with their own ‘African insights’ to provide some degree 
of balance in the literature and information about the continent. We also wish to project as many 
Africans with expertise in this field of study as our project will permit. 
 
Funding 
Organising conferences or carrying out independent research requires funding. So we thank all our 
sponsors for their continued  support since we  started  on this journey.  This year,  I will  like to 
particularly mention Mr Yasser Mansour who sponsored some of our younger Kenyan colleagues to 
attend this conference. Thank you! 
There will be many more opportunities to thank all our supporters and funders including all of you 
who are attending this conference, over the next two days. 
The programme 
We very much hope that all attendees will fully participate in the discussions as we explore together 
how our governments and states can better support the development of arbitration in Africa. 
Enjoy the conference; meet new people; make new friends and contacts that you can appoint or 
nominate as arbitrators in the future! 
Thank you! 
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Brief: African arbitration institutions will update the conference on their activities to support 
the development of arbitration since our Lagos conference. They will particularly respond on 
our request that they provide yearly reports on their activities which should be accessible on 
their websites. 
Chair: Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Ms Ndanga Kamau, LCIA-MIAC, Mauritius 
Mr Kizito Beyuo Ghana Arbitration Centre, Accra 
 
Dr Fidele Masengo, Kigali International Arbitration Centre, Rwanda 
Ms Deline Beukes, Africa ADR, South Africa 
Dr Dalia Hussein, Cairo Regional Centre, Egypt 
Mr Hicham Zegrary, CIMAK, Morocco 
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Panel 1: 
Year 2 Update from 
Arbitration Institutions in Africa 
  
 
Panel 1 
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Ms. Meise represents and advises sovereign governments and 
private entities in preventing and resolving international 
investment, commercial, public international law, and human 
rights disputes in domestic, international, and ADR fora, 
including before arbitration tribunals, other local and 
international tribunals, the PCA, and the ICJ. She also teaches 
International Human Rights Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center and serves as a Fellow of the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Investment at Columbia University. Before her legal 
career, Xander worked in finance and international political 
development. 
Prior to joining LCIA-MIAC in 2015, Ndanga worked in mainland 
Africa, Europe, and the United States specialising in public 
international law, international dispute resolution, oil, gas & 
mining, and international development. Ndanga is passionate 
about the development of dispute resolution mechanisms in 
Africa, and regularly speaks and writes on the subject. She an 
alumnus of the “Leading in Public Life” leadership programme 
for young Africans, has an LLM from the MIDS programme in 
Geneva, a degree in economics from the University of Cape 
Town, and was called to the Bar by Middle Temple in 2010. 
Ndanga is Kenyan, an avid runner, and speaks and writes 
English, Kikuyu, Kiswahili, French and Dutch with varying levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
39 
Panel 1: Chair 
Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise 
Panel 1: Speakers 
Ms Ndanga Kamau 
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Panel 1: Speakers 
Kizito Beyuo is the founder of Beyuo & Co in Accra, Ghana, a law firm 
providing focused and pragmatic legal services. His practice of over two 
decades has been involved primarily in civil commercial and corporate 
areas of law. Kizito’s current practice focuses mainly on corporate and 
commercial law with emphasis on litigation and arbitration. He has over 
the years acted as counsel or arbitrator in several commercial 
arbitrations in Ghana. He is a member of the Ghana Arbitration Centre 
and LCIA and is as a member of the ICC Task Force on Maximizing the 
Probative Value of Witness Evidence. 
Mr Kizito Beyou 
Dr Fidele Masengo is Board member of Kigali International Arbitration 
Center (KIAC) who has been appointed to serve as KIAC Executive 
Director assuming temporary the duties of KIAC General Secretary. He 
has served as the Deputy Chief of Party and Senior Technical Adviser 
within USAID-Chemonics International- LAND Project since June 2012 up 
to May 2015. Before joining USAID-LAND Project, Fidèle worked and is 
still working as legal consultant. He also worked as independent 
Advocate registered with Rwanda Bar Association since 2005 and in 
various other key legal positions in Rwanda, most notably in Rwanda 
Ministry of Justice as the Director of Public Prosecution services and 
Relations with the courts (from 1999 to 2001) and as the Director of the 
Administration of Justice (from 2001 to September 2004). 
Dr Fidele Masengo 
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Panel 1: Speakers 
Ms Deline Beukes 
 
Deline, a graduate from the University of Pretoria, acquired extensive 
experience in the commercial world before being appointed Chief 
Executive Officer of the Advertising Standards Authority of South 
Africa, a body responsible for the resolution of advertising disputes. She 
represented South Africa at the European Advertising Standards 
Alliance in Brussels for ten years and also acted as arbitrator for 
commercial communication disputes in the liquor industry in South 
Africa. In 2009 she joined the Arbitration Foundation of Southern Africa 
(AFSA) to develop a dispute resolution mechanism for cross-border 
commercial disputes. In 2016 she was appointed CEO of the newly 
established China-Africa Joint Arbitration Centre (CAJAC Johannesburg) 
and is also involved in the development of AFSA International. 
 
Dalia Hussein is a legal advisor at the CRCICA and Lecturer at the 
Faculty of Law, Zakazik University. Dalia was an Administrative 
Prosecutor in Egypt, and Counsel in arbitration practice where she 
represented states and private parties in commercial and investment 
disputes before many institutions including CRCICA, ICSID and DIAC. 
Dalia holds a Maîtrise en Droit from Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne 
University, an LL.B. from Cairo University, an LL.M. in Private 
International Law and International. 
Dr Dalia Hussein 
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Panel 1: Speakers 
Mr Hicham Zegrary 
Hicham Zegrary, 40 years old, is the recipient of the Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration (Paris, Badinter class 2010) and Holds a Master of 
Public Affairs from Paris Dauphine University and pr a PhD thesis on 
arbitration.In November 2010, he joined Casablanca Finance City 
Authority as head of Legal Affairs and January 2012 he is Director of 
Operations & Institutional Affairs. Since March 2016 he is Secretary 
General of Casablanca International Mediation & Arbit Centre. Mr. 
Zegrary began his professional career in February 2002 in Microsoft 
North Africa as Legal C in Intellectual Property Department. In October 
2004, he joins the General Inspection of Finance related to the 
Minister of Econ Finances witch is in charge of auditing projects 
funded by international financial organization auditing management of 
state-owned companies and departmental corporations. He is member 
of the ENA Alumni Association, member of ICCA and member of 
Association D Commerce. 
STRIVING FOR AN ATTRACTIVE AFRICAN HUB FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
 
A case study of the Kigali International Arbitration Centre 
By Dr. Fidèle Masengo12 
ABSTRACT 
Arbitration is a private way of resolving disputes with binding effect that may arise from a contractual 
relationship or another kind of relationship. This alternative mode of dispute resolution is 
undoubtedly one of the oldest but still popular methods of settling dispute. When compared to 
litigation, the arbitration process is hailed notably for its confidentiality, flexibility and less time 
consuming. 
 
Until recently, the use of arbitration in solving commercial disputes was not well known in Rwanda 
due to the fact that it is fairly a new concept and there was limited awareness among the general 
public. The legal framework governing arbitration is very new. Several legal instruments were only 
adopted these last years to regulate the matter. Among them are notably, Law No. 005/2008 of 
14/02/2008 on Arbitration and Conciliation in Commercial Matters and Law No. 51/2010 of 
10/01/2010 establishing the Kigali International Arbitration Centre and Determining its Organisation, 
Functioning and Competence. The main purpose of the current legal framework is to provide a speedy 
and effective commercial dispute mechanism to reduce the workload/backlog of the courts. 
Establishing an institutional arbitration administered by Kigali International Arbitration Centre, a 
specialist arbitral institution governed by its own rules of arbitration has tremendously contributed to 
the use of institutional arbitration is in Rwanda. Today, 54 cases have been filed with KIAC in less than 
5 years and with parties from more than eleven different countries worldwide (Rwanda, USA, Kenya, 
Italy, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, Dubai, Germany, Uganda and Zambia). This is an unbeatable and 
incomparable achievement for a newly established arbitration institution. 
 
The role played by KIAC and the Rwandan Government in the operationalization and tremendous 
growth is very remarkable. An analysis of current KIAC arbitration system reveals several strengths 
and opportunities for the Centre to serve as an international hub in Africa for effective commercial 
arbitration. However, some challenges are also observed for the institution to stand firmly in the 
worldwide competition. 
 
This paper offers an analysis of a model of evolution of an arbitral institution in Africa based on a case 
study of Kigali International Arbitration Centre and the extent to which it positions itself as an African 
and International venue of choice for commercial arbitration. Specifically, the research paper 
examines the role played by the newly established institution and the Rwandan government. The 
author identifies opportunities, challenges and proposes the measures needed to improve the 
effectiveness of KIAC institutional arbitration. 
 
The paper was prepared using desk review research. The researcher used analytical method whereby 
legal texts, textbooks, as well as electronic sources that are in relation to the subject matter. This 
paper is also based on decisions issued by courts of Rwanda from 2008 to 2016. 
 
 
 
 
12Dr. Fidele Masengo is the Secretary General of Kigali International Arbitration Centre. He holds a PhD in Law 
from the University of Antwerp in Belgium and Masters in Economic Law from the Catholic University of Louvain 
in Belgium. He has taught International Commercial Arbitration, International Economic law and International 
Competition Law at various universities in Rwanda. He has written books and published many articles. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Rwanda is a country that has been affected by the 1994 Genocide against Tutsis. Consequently, the 
society was severely and negatively affected. The justice sector was one of the most affected by the 
genocide. Its infrastructures were devastated and its personnel exterminated. Since 1994, the urgent 
duty of the post-genocide government was to rebuild the entire country and the justice system in 
particular. An effort to definitely address the past injustice, forging unity, reconciliation and peace 
among Rwandan communities was made. In this scope, several legal instruments were adopted to re- 
invent the institutions and uplift the level of justice standards. Criminal justice, civil justice and 
commercial justice were all concerned by the reforms. 
As far as commercial justice is concerned, a reform aimed at improving the legal environment of 
business, investment and economic development was envisioned. This reform led to the creation of 
commercial courts. At the same time, alternative disputes resolution such as arbitration and 
conciliation were introduced to offer alternative solutions to business and investment disputes. 
The following pages present the policy and legal framework of arbitration in Rwanda (I). It critically 
analyses the critical factors that make Rwanda an arbitration friendly jurisdiction (II). I will also assess 
the success indicators of KIAC as an African arbitral institution (III). The last section will discuss key 
suggestions for making Rwanda an attractive International venue for arbitration (IV). At the end, a 
summary conclusion has been presented. 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF POLICY, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING 
LEGISLATION IN RWANDA 
1. Meaning of arbitration under Rwandan law 
Article 3 (2) of the Law n° 005/2008 of 14/02/2008 on arbitration and conciliation in commercial 
matters defines arbitration as ‘a procedure applied by parties to the disputes requesting an arbitrator 
or a jury of arbitrators to settle a legal, contractual or another related issue’. 
This definition is not very clear. It does inform the reader about certain aspects of the arbitration 
process such as the binding effect, the procedures, etc. Butler and Finsen define arbitration as ‘a 
procedure whereby parties to a dispute refer that dispute to third party, known as an arbitrator, for a 
final decision, after the arbitrator has first impartially received and considered evidence and 
submissions from the parties.’13 
It is worthy to note that arbitration is a private way of resolving disputes with binding effect that may 
arise from a contractual relationship or another kind of relationship.14 An arbitration proceeding is 
administered and managed by a knowledgeable, independent, and impartial third party and the 
parties to a dispute present their arguments and evidence to the arbitrator who decides the case and 
resolves the dispute. 
2. Arbitration and business dispute resolution 
 
The legal and judicial system of every country or institution plays an important role in providing the 
confidence to international investors. It is often said that a sound legal system is a key to the economic 
development and social stability of a country. Therefore, good economic growth depends on a viable 
 
 
 
13 Butler, David and Finsen Eyvind Arbitration in South Africa, law and practice (1993), p. 1. 
14 About arbitration and mediation, Available at http://www.arbitration.co.za/pages/about.aspx . 
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legal framework. This viability requires legal systems that are consistent with economic realities and 
providing rules of commercial disputes. 
It is in this context that arbitration, which was mainly an institution of peace, aimed at establishing 
the rule of law to restore harmony between people destined to live with each other has also been 
introduced by many countries in commercial matters as an ultimate way of settling disputes arising 
from international trade. 
 
The motivations of using arbitration as one of the method of settling business and investment 
disputes15 are of several kinds: the longing for justice to be administered efficiently, the parties wish 
to see a different law applied other than that prescribed by the State, for example a right based on 
the usage of trade or lex mercatoria.16 Parties wish that the dispute be settled, as quickly as possible 
to their mutual satisfaction and that it will not lead to a break down in their business relationships. 
Furthermore, the type of disagreement that arise between the parties could involve certain technical 
issues which would best be dealt with in arbitration as both parties might be more willing to hire a 
specialist in that field. Arbitration can also save time as the parties are free to decide when and where 
they can meet. Furthermore, arbitration seems to satisfy businessmen in that it meets the key 
requirements of commerce such as confidentiality. It is in that perspective that institutions advocating 
for arbitration were created 17 such as International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 18 International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)19 and London Court of Commercial Arbitration 
(LCIA).20 Two of them are most common in international commerce. The most famous and oldest is 
the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICA) and the ICSID. 
 
3. The place of arbitration in Rwanda Government Justice strategy 
 
Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy (JRLOSS 2) is one of the key component of The 
Government of Rwanda medium term development policy in the second Economic Development and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2). The strategy outlines the Government’s agenda and priorities 
over the five-year period from July 2013 to the end June 2018.21  The overall objective of the JRLOSS 
is “to strengthen the rule of law to promote accountable governance, a culture of peace and enhanced 
poverty reduction,”22 through five prioritised outcomes. 
 
Arbitration is included in the said strategy. In fact, it is part of the Outcome 4 - Enhanced rule of Law, 
Accountability and Competitiveness.23 Under this component, the strategy focuses on key actions in 
relation to creating infrastructures, legislation and mechanisms by which competitiveness can be 
enhanced and access to justice promoted. In particular, this policy-document focuses on all 
arbitration and ADR-related outputs and activities. Among those activities, one can mention the 
review of the arbitration legal framework including but not limited to the 2008 arbitration law, the 
development of arbitration and ADR policy and the creation of synergies between the Judiciary and 
the newly established Kigali International Arbitration Centre. 
 
 
 
 
15A Redfern and M Hunter Law and practice of International Commercial Arbitration 4ed (2004) 1 Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
16 Y Dezalay and G Bryant Garth Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration and the construction of a 
transnational legal order (1996) 3 University of Chicago. 
17 A Redfern and M Hunter op cit note 1 at 48. 
18 Established in Paris in 1923. 
19 Established in 1966. 
20 Founded in 1842. 
21 Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy (JRLOSS 2) 2013-2018 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
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The government has understood that a more effective use of arbitration has a range of benefits. 
Arbitration can notably create a better business environment through reducing court case load 
burdens, improve clearance rates, and raise efficiency of the administration of justice. Arbitration 
offers to parties in disputes an increased access to justice, while providing quicker, cheaper and more 
tailored outcomes than is possible through the courts. 
 
 
 
II. CRITICAL FACTORS THAT ADVOCATE FOR RWANDA AS AN ARBITRATION- 
SUPPORTIVE JURISDICTION 
The Government of Rwanda had a vision of a world class arbitration center. This is materialized in 
the arbitration supportive legal and institutional frameworks envisioned since the conception of the 
arbitration project. 
 
1. Background of arbitration legislation in Rwanda 
Arbitration was historically introduced in Rwanda as a chapter of the civil and commercial procedures 
code of 15 July 1964. This was a very summarized piece of legislation. During the law reform of 2004, 
the law no 18/2004 on code of procedure, commercial, social and administrative inserted an entire 
title of 33 articles on arbitration24. The content of this legislation was based on the Belgian arbitration 
legislation. This legislation was changed in 2008 with  the adoption of the Law n° 005/2008 of 
14/02/2008 on arbitration and conciliation in commercial matters. During its initiation, it was very 
clear that the legislator wanted to make the 2008 law as compatible as possible with the Model Law 
in order to reflect the best practice in arbitration and inspire trust to its users. It is obvious that the 
current law is based on UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Through the 2008 Act, Rwanda has really revised and modernized its arbitration legislation in order to 
provide for the needs of the development of arbitration as an ideal system for business disputes 
resolution. Unlike the 2004 law, the current legislation favors arbitration in different ways. First for all, 
the law recognizes and respects the parties’ choice of arbitration. Any valid arbitration clause 
contained in a contract will automatically turn court to lack jurisdiction. Secondly, the current 
legislation provides clear arbitration process. Thirdly, the law minimizes all unnecessary court 
intervention in the procedures except where so provided in the law itself. Finally, the said law has 
served as a reference for the establishment of Kigali International Arbitration Centre. 
 
2. A path to a modern arbitration law 
Before the establishment of the current legislation on arbitration, Rwanda had a very old legislation 
of early sixties. By establishing a modern legislation on arbitration and other ADRs, the Rwandan 
Government has played a key role in promoting arbitration. As said above, the matter is primarily 
governed by the Law No. 005/2008 of 14/02/2008 on Arbitration and Conciliation in Commercial 
Matters (Arbitration Law), and the Law establishing the Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC). 
 
Beside these two laws, other laws, with reference to arbitration, have also been put into place such 
as the Law No. 26/2005 of 17/12/2005 relating to Investment and Export Promotion and Facilitation 
(Investment Law), the Law No. 13/2009 of 27/05/2009 Regulating Labour in Rwanda25, the Law No. 
 
 
 
 
24 Title VIII from article 365 to 398. See the Official Gazette Special bis of 30/07/2004. 
25 Articles 143 to 148 which provide for referral of collective employment disputes that are not amicably solved 
to an arbitration committee 
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50/2007 of 18/09/2007 determining the establishment, organization and functioning of cooperative 
organizations in Rwanda26. 
 
3. The establishment of Kigali International Arbitration 
A. The initial project and the creation of the Centre 
One of the key achievements towards a supportive policy in arbitration was the creation of Kigali 
International Arbitration Centre by an Act of the Parliament. The Centre was created as an initiative 
of the Rwanda Private Sector Federation (RPSF), supported by the Government of Rwanda as part of 
investment climate Reforms. This initiative emerged as a response to a need expressed by economic 
operators facing delays in courts. An initial study on the creation of the Centre was commissioned by 
the Private Sector Federation27. The purpose of the study was to draw a roadmap to promote the 
effective and efficient use of ADR means in commercial dispute resolution to complement the existing 
civil and commercial justice reforms. One of the first conclusions of the report of the study revealed 
that Rwanda ‘recognizes that the existing arbitral institution28 (s) might be both inadequate and 
ineffective in addressing the modern concerns of commerce and investment’’ 29 . The Study 
recommended a Centre established by a Law. 
After the approval of the said study report, a Draft Bill on Law establishing the Center and determining 
its functioning was prepared and approved by the Government. The Draft Bill was passed by the 
Parliament and published in the Official Gazette No. 09 bis of 28th February 2011 under law nº 51/2010 
0f 10/01/2010 establishing the Kigali International Arbitration Centre and determining its organization, 
functioning and competence. KIAC was established as an organ operating under the Rwanda Private 
Sector Federation (PSF) with the support of the Government of Rwanda. 
 
B. A wide mission given to the Centre 
 
During the establishment of the Centre, the Government has given KIAC a wide mission in promoting 
arbitration and ADR. In fact, as an ADR Centre, KIAC has been given the ordinary function of case intake 
and administration and process management once a case has been registered. These two activities 
are service-delivery oriented. KIAC performs other duties connected to its core functions such as 
Marketing and ADR promotion, training and advocacy. 
Through this mission, KIAC has core functions to promote Rwanda regionally and internationally 
commercial arbitration. It has the vision to position itself as the regional choice for commercial dispute 
resolution30. In that perspective, KIAC’s mission focuses on delivering appropriate, confidential and 
effective dispute resolution services in Rwanda and the region31. Hence, the Centre provides facilities 
and needed assistance to conduct domestic and International arbitration. It also provides all necessary 
the logistical support to conduct arbitration and mediation. 
 
 
 
26 Articles 129 – 130 provides that disputes not resolved amicably through the board, are referred to arbitrators 
appointed by the parties. The arbitrators’ decision is appealable within 15 days. 
 
27 D. AMEYO, Study of promotion and other alternative modes of commercial conflict resolution, June 2008. 
28 An institution known as Centre d’Arbitrage et d’Expertise du Rwanda owned by a former lawyer existed 
(CAER) with a very limited functionality. It rarely attracted cases from parties due to uncertainty of its legal 
status (a non for profit association). 
29 Ibid. 
30 KIAC, Annual Report, 2013-2014. 
31 Idem. 
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4. Adoption of modern arbitration rules 
 
One important feature in arbitral proceedings is the rules that will govern the whole process and as 
such KIAC administers cases under the KIAC arbitration Rules 32 and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
Following the establishment of KIAC, other key legal instruments were produced including the 
Ministerial order no 16/012 of 15/05/2012 determining the Arbitration Rules of Kigali International 
Arbitration Centre. The Ministerial Order is a set of modern arbitration rules reflecting the 
international best practices in the matter (rules modeled on the UNICITRAL arbitration rules) 
published in the Official Gazette No.22 bis of 28 May 2012. These rules cover all aspects of the arbitral 
proceedings. 
 
Under Article 7 of the said Rules it is stated that where the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration 
under the Rules, they shall be deemed to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules in effect on the date 
of commencement of the arbitration or such amended Rules as the Centre may have adopted to take 
effect before the commencement of the arbitration and it further goes on to state that by agreeing to 
arbitration under the Rules, the parties have accepted that arbitration shall be administered by the 
Centre.33 Based on this article, parties that wish to bring their matters to the Centre have an option of 
submitting to the said rules or nominate which other rules they would like the Centre to follow during 
the arbitral proceedings. 
There are other features in the current legislation and KIAC rules indicating how Rwanda legislation 
favors arbitration. Among those aspects, one can list the freedom to be assisted by counsel chosen by 
parties. In fact, KIAC rules state that parties to arbitration can be represented by their lawyers in all 
arbitral proceedings. From this provision, foreign lawyers are not excluded. 
According to the rules, parties have the ability to determine the language of the proceedings, the 
freedom to choose the arbitrators even out of KIAC panel. Another key aspect includes the power of 
the arbitral tribunal to issue interim and emergency measures. Articles 33 and 34 together with Annex 
2 of the rules give details on the general procedural framework in which emergency procedures are 
carried out. To date, two claims have been submitted to KIAC for appointment of emergency arbitrator. 
 
5. Value given to arbitral award, their recognition and enforcement 
Arbitral awards published in Rwanda have the same effect as any final and conclusive court judgment. 
As such, an arbitral award cannot be appealed to the local courts, unless if there is a significant error 
in the procedures, invalidity of arbitral agreement, the composition of the tribunal, inarbitrability, 
conflict with the public security of the Republic of Rwanda34. 
A. KIAC awards fully enforced 
To date, despite few challenges introduced to courts, no single award from KIAC has been set aside by 
the courts. Instead, as shown by the statistics collected from the courts, Rwandan courts have showed 
a strong trust to KIAC awards. This is also a result of the use of well-trained neutrals and KIAC scrutiny 
of awards. 
 
B. Adhoc awards 
 
 
 
 
 
32 See www.kiac.org.rw website for both the arbitration and mediation rules 
33 See the KIAC arbitration rules 2012 
34 Article 47 of the 2008 Law. 
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There is an interest to know if the adhoc awards are well enforced as it is for KIAC awards. Many 
arbitral awards taken by adhoc arbitrations that were challenged have not been set aside. However, 
there are few of them that were set aside for genuine reasons based on article 47 of the 2008 
arbitration act. It should be noted that in some cases where the competent court had set aside the 
award, the court of appeal sometimes reviewed and canceled the decision on setting aside the award. 
 
C. The case of foreign awards 
Rwandan courts rarely refuse to enforce adhoc arbitral awards. If it happens, it is mainly due to only 
reasons provided for in the law. Also, the duration of the various steps of the award enforcement is 
not long. It is done in a very short time for all awards meeting the legal standards. 
The arbitration friendly-jurisdiction is also attested in the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. In fact, Rwanda has ratified35 the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (The 1958 New York Convention). As a result, KIAC arbitration 
awards issued in Rwanda are enforceable in all New York Convention signatory countries in 
accordance with the spirit of the Convention. 
Again, all awards made in any New York Convention signatory country can be enforced in Rwanda. 
Rwanda arbitration law has adopted the provision of the Model Law on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards but has included a reciprocity condition (article 50 of the 2008 Law). 
This means that awards taken by non-signatory of the New York Convention are likely to be 
unenforceable in Rwanda unless if a reciprocity agreement exists. 
 
III. KIAC’S SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENTS IN ARBITRATION 
1. KIAC as a growing arbitral institution 
KIAC has tremendously grown as an arbitral institution. This can be attested domestically, regionally 
and even internationally. Domestically, KIAC is gaining genuine trust among its users. In fact, within 
the last four years that KIAC has been operational, it has been able to live up to its mission which is 
“To promote Rwanda as a venue of efficient arbitration services and a Centre of excellence for 
research and training of professionals in ADR”36. KIAC is proving to be model institution within the East 
African region and Africa as a whole when considering the cases that have been filed with the 
institution. Within Rwanda, KIAC’s reputation grows each and every day and this is shown by NGOs, 
GoR, judiciary and other public institutions have expressed the trust in terms of case administration 
number and partnership. 
Internationally, KIAC is quickly building its reputation. In fact, an international arbitration can be 
looked at in two ways: One is the kind of transaction; does it involve transaction that is either in a 
State other than the place of arbitration or that takes place in two or more States. The other method 
is to consider the parties; do they come from different States.37 
Most importantly, Article III of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards requires the currently 135 Contracting States to “recognize arbitral awards as 
binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award 
is relied upon…” It is upon this foundation stone that the entire edifice of international commercial 
 
 
35 On November 3rd, 2008 The UNCITRAL announced that Rwanda has become the 143rd country to accede to 
the New York Convention. The Convention entered into force for Rwanda on January 29, 2009. 
36See www.kiac.org.rw website 
 
37 The course on dispute settlement in international trade, investment and intellectual property, prepared by 
Mr.Eric.E.Bergsten for the United Nation Conference on trade and development (www.unctad.org) 
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arbitration is built.38 Hence, Rwanda being a signatory to the convention gives KIAC another plus in its 
quest to be the premier hub for international arbitration centre within the region. This can also be 
attested by the enforcement of awards within KIAC39. 
2. KIAC impressive arbitration caseload 
KIAC has recorded an impressive arbitration case load in comparison with other similar Centers. A 
record of 54 cases with parties from USA, Rwanda, Kenya, Italy, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, Dubai, 
Germany, Uganda and Zambia. The amount in dispute per case varies between 15,000- 6,000,000 USD. 
The total amount in dispute for 54 cases exceeds now 34 millions of USD. 
 
This is a milestone since it takes between 4 and 5 years for a newly established Centre to administer 
the first Case. 
 
Table 1: Cases administered for last five years 
 
Cases, Awards 
and 
settlement 
July 2012- 
June 2013 
July 2013- 
June 2014 
July2014- 
july 2015 
July 2015- 
June 2016 
July 2016- 
to March 
2017 
Cumulative 
total for 
5Years 
Cases Filed 5 12 11 12 14 54 
Cases 
submitted 
under KIAC 
Rules 
4 6 8 9 12 39 
 
 
KIAC high arbitration rates of cases is impressive. It can be partly attributed to the cultural roots of 
ADR in Rwanda based on ‘Abunzi” mediation which put emphasis on amicably settling disputes as 
opposed to litigation. The rapid increase in the number is also due to a very aggressive communication 
campaign targeting different sectors such as the financial and real estate sectors. It is also a result of 
a perfect collaboration with the government. 
 
 
3. Capacity building in Arbitration. 
 
When KIAC was established no professional existed in Rwanda. In order to build the capacity in ADR 
matters, KIAC took the lead to ensure that potential professional arbitrators and mediators are 
sensitized, trained and enrolled to its panel. Within four years of operations, over 350 professionals 
have been trained and accredited by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators-UK. KIAC's capacity building 
initiative of training and certifying professionals has facilitated the creation of a pool of qualified of 
arbitrators in the country. This makes Rwanda among the top countries in Africa with the highest 
 
 
 
 
38idem 
39KIAC annual report 2014/2015(www.kiac.org.rw) Pg 9 under the heading key achievements in service 
delivery. 
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number of CIArb certified arbitrators in Africa. KIAC has trained more than 15 arbitrators from the EAC 
region and few people from the United States, Switzerland and South Sudan40. 
4. Pool of qualified and experienced arbitrators 
 
KIAC has a panel of both domestic and international arbitrators who have vast knowledge, are 
experienced, credible and independent in a wide range of field. This is one of the important factors 
that an arbitration centre of an international status needs.41 KIAC domestic panel has more than 70 
arbitrators who are Associate and Members of CIArb. They are from various professions including 
lawyers, engineers, certified accountants, etc. 
On top of its domestic panel, KIAC has quickly attracted international arbitrators to its panel. Many of 
them are PhD and Masters holders who are fellows of CIArb certification or equivalent to it. This is a 
sign of trust and confidence for a new Center. The table and the graph below present the data of KIAC 
international panel of arbitrators. 
 
As practiced by most international arbitration centre, parties to KIAC arbitration are free to nominate 
their arbitrators, subject to confirmation by the Centre in accordance with its rules and when called 
upon to appoint an arbitrator, it does that primarily from one of its panel of arbitrators. 
 
Academic Qualifications of Arbitrators of KIAC 
 
Highest degree held Number in % 
1.   Ph.D. 23 % 
2.   Master’s 37 % 
3.   Bachelor’s 40 % 
 
 
Countries of Origin for International Arbitrators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40      http://www.kiac.org.rw/spip.php?article122 
41See www.kiac.org.rw website 
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5. Organizing and hosting international conferences 
 
 
Since its launch in May 2012, KIAC has organized two international conferences that have attracted 
professionals from over 18 countries worldwide and  contributed  to increase of awareness and 
significant behavior change toward arbitration. 
 
IV. SUGGESTIONS  FOR  MAKING  RWANDA  A  MORE  ATTRACTIVE  VENUE  FOR 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
1. Building on the existing country reputation as a friendly jurisdiction to arbitration 
Since the enactment of the 2008 law and the establishment of KIAC, Rwanda is slowly but surely 
building its reputation as a country that has tremendously improved its justice commercial system. 
The country has also created an image of a friendly jurisdiction to arbitration. 
The progress of Rwanda courts in their adherence to the arbitration-friendly jurisdiction is very 
impressive for a country where modern arbitration legislation has been introduced very recently. The 
reform of Rwandan courts has improved their functioning and, as a result, developed a friendly 
approach to KIAC arbitration. This a result of a strong partnership between the Centre and the 
Judiciary. In fact, since the establishment of KIAC, various communication campaigns targeting judges 
and registrars were intentionally organized to raise the awareness about arbitration. Trainings were 
also designed for the judicial personnel. A number of judges have even completed various levels of 
certified arbitration programs. Basing on the trust to KIAC, courts always appoint arbitrators from KIAC 
panel of arbitrators for their appointment decisions. 
 
2. Benefits associated to the signatory of the New York Convention 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by the judicial jurisdiction where a centre 
is found also plays an important role in making the centre more favorable and Rwanda being a 
signatory to the New York Convention means that the competent courts in Rwanda can enforce 
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arbitral awards of other countries that also ratified the New York Convention42. Any party wishing to 
enforce a foreign award may do so by way of application to the competent court under article 50 and 
51 of the law on arbitration and conciliation in commercial matters43. 
3. Support by the Government 
A. Strong support during the Centre official launch 
During the validation of the Final Report proposing the preliminary work for the establishment of the 
Centre (March 2011), a robust timetable for sensitizing and marketing the Centre after its 
establishment was also proposed. This came after the publication of the KIAC law 2010. In that 
document the implementation action plan was presented44, and the process of operationalizing KIAC 
was set to commence in May 201145. Due to technical and financial challenges, the launch which was 
proposed in May 2011 was delayed for one year. As a result, the Centre was officially launched in May 
2012. 
 
During the launching, an outstanding event was organized by the Private Sector Federation. The event 
was honored by the participation of very high government officials led by the Prime Minister and 
Members of the Business Community. The Chief Justice delegated his Deputy to attend the event as a 
sign of strong support to the new institution. 
B. Stakeholders support during the Center’s inception stage 
 
When KIAC was conceived, an initial budget to finance its infrastructure and operations was also 
prepared in partnership with the Government, the Private Sector Federation. International donors 
were also approached to fund the Centre. It was agreed that the PSF and the donor community were 
to mainly fund the Centre until it becomes financially self-sustaining. 
 
Connecting KIAC to PSF funding is understandable since KIAC was its own initiative. Since its 
establishment up to March 2015, KIAC received support from PSF under the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Project, a three years’ project supporting the operationalization of the Centre with 
contributions from ICF, PSF and Government of Rwanda. The support from PSF covered the staff 
remuneration while the Government funds were used for the acquisition of State of art modern 
building. ICF support was mainly channeled in the operationalization of the Centre, professional skills 
development and awareness campaigns. 
 
4. An opportunity of KIAC being an independent institution 
 
Many arbitral institutions claim to be independent referring to the legal provisions that create them. 
However, practitioners and researchers have several times questioned the independence that 
depends on the government funding and personnel. 
 
KIAC is one of the few institutions that are really independent. Since its creation, KIAC was established 
as an independent institution. The institution is independent from the Government. It is also 
independent from the Judiciary. Parties to a dispute elect to refer the dispute directly to KIAC for 
 
 
42 Article 50 law no005/2008 of 14/02/2008 Law on arbitration and conciliation in commercial matters 
(Rwanda) 
43 idem 
44 Annex VI on the Report on Implementation pln. 
45 See Annex VII of the report on the detailed implementation plan. 
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resolution. This autonomous status makes KIAC a unique regional institution of its kind. Many other 
arbitration centers established within the region are functionally and financially dependent to their 
respective governments or are court-connected. 
 
KIAC has a Governance Board comprised of seven Members with knowledge and practice in arbitration, 
who are nationals of different countries (Rwanda, France, Nigeria and Mauritius). 
 
Among the 7 members, 6 are appointed by the Rwanda Private Sector Federation and 1 was appointed 
by the Attorney General. 3 Board Members are international while 3 are Rwandan citizen. Prior to 
their appointment, the Board members appointed by RPSF were recommended by arbitral institutions 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators on London), legal professions 
(Rwanda Bar Association, Allen & Overy), academic institutions. All those Board Members are 
individuals who have an excellent reputation both in the area of expertise and for high ethical 
standards. 
 
The Secretary General is appointed by the Board. There is no possible subordination to the 
Government. 
 
5. Other benefits derived from the country’s reputation 
 
An international arbitration centre located in Kigali brings with it a lot of opportunities for Rwanda as 
a country and the entire region of the East Africa. Having a reputable centre within the region also 
gives confidence to investors how may and are mostly not very confident in the judicial systems of 
most African countries due to corruption and delay in handling of commercial matters. Rwanda makes 
an exception to that rule. In fact, for the last 5 years, Rwanda has been ranked in good positions in 
fighting against the corruption by transparency international46and also national reports on corruption 
have shown that the Rwandan judicial system is an independent branch47. For the last two years, 
Rwanda has been also ranked as the best performing country in the East and Central Africa and 3rd 
easiest place to do business in Africa48. This can be a boost for foreign investors to set their businesses 
in Rwanda and also having an independent judicial system is another opportunity that may attract 
those foreign investors. 
 
Other pillars that support arbitration include Government support in enhancing strategies to foster 
private sector growth and sustainable economic development. These efforts are gradually paying off. 
Rwanda has sustained an economic growth rate of over 8% in the last ten years49. The fact that the 
Rwandan Courts have shown to be independent and do not interfere with arbitration matters is 
another reason parties should consider in using KIAC as their arbitration institution. The government 
also introduced a very favorable visa policy for African citizens that includes but not limited to getting 
a visa on arrival. 
 
6. The benefits of legal regime and plurality of international languages 
Rwanda has a very big advantage compared to the rest of the EAC countries when it comes to legal 
system and language. Concerning the legal regime, Rwanda has been a civil law system country. 
 
 
 
46 Report by Transparency international, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. 
 
47  Report by Transparency International Rwanda, professionalism of Rwandan Courts Observation report, 
released July 2015. 
48 http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual- 
Reports/English/DB16-Full-Report.pdf 
49 idem 
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However, due to the influence of East Africa Community, during this last decade the country has 
adopted a set of legislation inspired by common law legal tradition. This gives KIAC an upper hand as 
it has a panel of arbitrators comprised of highly accomplished and respected experts mastering both 
legal regimes. The fact that the centre also has a large number of qualified arbitrators who have a 
good understanding of different international languages including but not limited to English and 
French is another opportunity that the centre will easily expand its influence beyond the region and 
into jurisdictions that use these languages and/or legal systems. 
 
7. Overcoming the KIAC’s challenges 
 
Every newly established institution faces different challenges and KIAC is not an exception to this, but 
as history has shown over and again the ones who are able to face these challenges and take a positive 
approach in solving them always become better. 
 
A. Funding of the Centre 
 
For an international arbitration centre to be seen as independent and credible it also has to be 
independent financially. Most international arbitration centres achieve this independence by the 
number of arbitration cases filled with them. Despite the current caseload of arbitration cases filed 
with KIAC, it is still very early for the Centre to be considered self-sustainable financially. 
One of the major problems that come with lack of funding is the attracting of the best and experienced 
worked force. The work force in terms of number and capability is an important element in how an 
arbitration centre is viewed or perceived. Currently the staff in KIAC is not of a satisfactory number 
and this may affect its ability in its service delivery within the international community and 
domestically. Both government and donor’s organization’s support is needed to help the Centre 
achieve its mission. 
 
B. Review and update of the current legislation on arbitration 
 
As said in our previous pages, Rwanda is a UNICITRAL Model Law country. However, the drafting of 
the 2008 arbitration law has omitted some very important aspects of the Model Law. Hence, there is 
a need to improve the current legislation to make it more competitive and make the Rwanda 
jurisdiction a more arbitration friendly jurisdiction than it currently is. Despite this great achievement 
in establishing the 2008 arbitration law, it is worthy to note that the latter has some imperfections 
and inconsistencies to address in order to reflect current best practice. In a recent concept paper on 
the legal framework for Arbitration in Rwanda, KIAC identified some issues which need to be reviewed 
and addressed in updated arbitration and other related legislation. Those include notably the need to 
designate the High Court and the Commercial High Court as the competent courts to intervene in 
arbitral proceedings, the unclear wording about the rights of appeal against awards that should be 
clarified and restricted, the review and update of the law to include arbitration in civil as well as 
commercial matters. 
The supportive role of the national courts in arbitration matters should be seen in such a way that it 
makes the country an arbitration friendly location. 
 
The approach of the Rwandan judiciary to international arbitration can make or break the centre to a 
certain extent. If the country can have laws that allow for specialized judges who specifically deal with 
arbitration matters in an international level would be a step on the right direction. 
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Currently in Rwanda there is no Foreign Arbitration Award Act or an International Arbitration Act 
which are likely to be found in jurisdictions that have fully embraced the international arbitration as a 
way of resolving commercial disputes. 
 
C. Increasing the qualification and competence of KIAC neutrals 
 
As said, KIAC has been able to recruit a very big number of its panel of domestic arbitrators. However, 
there is still a need to enhance their capacity and increase the competence of the neutrals listed on 
the said panel. In fact, one of the advantages of having qualified people with experience and from 
within the EAC is that it can help in reducing the expenses and cost of the arbitral process. A target 
aimed at raising the profile and number of current domestic arbitrators from Associate level to the 
next levels of membership and fellows of CIArb will reduce the capacity gap so as to build more 
confidence on its selection of arbitrators. 
 
D. Training capability of the Centre 
 
The Centre regularly organizes symposiums, workshops and training activities. The most recent was 
the workshop on international arbitration (investment arbitration) in partnership with Rwanda 
Development Board, Rwanda Bar Association and Shearman and sterling LLP law firm from Paris, 
France. KIAC knows how important this type of workshop is valuable to its staff and members of its 
panel but it on its own does lack the needed capability to be a training centre due to such issues as 
staffing and financing of such projects. One of its current project is to become a Chartered Institute of 
Arbitration Branch. 
 
E. Intensive awareness and Marketing campaigns 
 
One of the major challenges is making the Centre well known and recognized internationally. This can 
be achieved by first winning the confidence of the international business community and likeminded 
institutions. Going by the global competitiveness report Rwanda is ranked 17th when it comes to strong 
public and private institutions.50This is a clear sign that the institutions within Rwanda are strong and 
doing well and all that the KIAC needs to do is to fight the perception and negativity that surround 
African institutions. 
 
F. Strategy to attract the Adhoc arbitration cases 
 
Arbitration can take two forms either ad hoc or institutional arbitration. This is largely decided by the 
parties and based on the form of advice they have received from their legal representatives. An 
institutional arbitration is one in which a specialized institution intervenes and takes on the role of 
administering the arbitration process. Each institution has its own set of rules which provide a 
framework for the arbitration, and its own form of administration to assist in the process51. 
Ad hoc arbitration is one which is not administered by an institution such as the KIAC. The parties will 
therefore have to determine all aspects of the arbitration themselves - for example, the number of 
arbitrators, appointing those arbitrators, the applicable law and the procedure for conducting the 
arbitration. Provided the parties approach the arbitration with cooperation, ad hoc proceedings have 
the potential to be more flexible, faster than institutional proceedings. The absence of administrative 
fees alone provides an excellent incentive to use the ad hoc procedure.520ne of the reason for parties 
 
 
 
50 World economic forum (http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ 
51              http://www.out-law.com/en/topics/projects--construction/international-arbitration/institutional-vs-ad-hoc-    
arbitration/ 
52 Idem 
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opting for ad hoc arbitration is also the perception that institutional arbitration is expensive and it is 
a perception which KIAC needs to debunk by making known the fees and the benefits that institutional 
arbitration within KIAC has against the ad hoc process. It is also important to note that lawyers 
themselves prefer ad hoc arbitration more than institutional arbitration for selfish reasons on being 
the fact that they can have a high share of the fee paid by the parties. Thus, KIAC needs to adopt a 
strategy that helps to attract a big number of cases settled now by the adhoc arbitrators. However, a 
recent study53 by the Institute for Legal Practice and Development has showed that KIAC arbitration 
is far cheaper than the adhoc one54. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
All things considered it is clear from the above shown findings that KIAC as an international arbitration 
center has played a major role in arbitration matters in Rwanda and within the region since it was 
established. Despite arbitration being a new concept in many if not all African countries, KIAC has 
achieved its mission and many of its objectives including being the choice for commercial dispute 
resolution, providing trainings and workshops for different judicial personnel, reducing the backlog of 
cases in commercial courts and the centre has been seen as the next logical step, by both the 
Government and private initiative, for Rwanda to continue to improve its reputation to attract 
business and investment. 
 
Furthermore, arbitration has provided a significant contribution to facilitating foreign investment and 
trade through provision of adequate and timely solutions to disputes. On the other hand, Arbitration 
has proven to immensely contribute to the overall task of providing Justice to all thus reducing 
backlogs that have been a challenge in the service delivery of courts. This ultimately encourages 
investment which in the long run foster economic growth and strengthen the rule of law. 
 
Given the various achievements of the centre (KIAC), there are also some other things that need to be 
adopted by the center in order to continue in providing world class arbitration services. From this one 
can humbly recommend the development of supplementary rules especially regarding the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in a specific and detailed way and also adopt a law on 
international arbitration act underlying those international arbitration principles. Another thing 
concerns the marketing strategy, here one can say that KIAC has tried all its best to brand itself within 
the country but the centre needs to extend its marketing strategies first within the region and then to 
the rest of the world. In addition to this, the centre may look forward to publishing books and articles 
in different legal journals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 ILPD, Study to establish the cost of settlement and resolution of a commercial dispute, Final Report, January 
2016. 
54 KIAC arbitration costs less than 4 % of the value of the dispute whereby adhoc arbitrators reach up to 27%. 
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Panel 2: Chair 
Judge Edward Torgbor 
 
Hon. Justice Edward Torgbor, CA, FCIArb, LLD, is currently a Specialist 
International and Chartered Arbitrator and Mediator based in Nairobi 
(Kenya), Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (England) and 
Vice-President of the LCIA African Users’ Council. Judge Torgbor’s 
experience includes being formerly a Barrister in England, Judge of 
the High Court of Kenya, Professor of Law (Stellenbosch University) 
and Court Member of the LCIA.He is an Advocate of the Supreme 
Court of Zambia, Attorney at Law, Ghana, CIArb Lecturer and Tutor in 
arbitration law and practice. He has published for professional 
journals in Africa and United Kingdom (the LCIA and Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators). He continues to play varied roles as Keynote 
Speaker, Chairman, Presenter and Resource Person at numerous 
arbitration conferences, seminars and workshops in various countries 
in Africa and Europe. Specializations include: Domestic & 
International arbitration/ADR practice; International Trade & 
Investment Law; Corporate and Commercial Law; Energy and Natural 
Resources, Banking, and Designing regulatory frameworks for Public 
Sector reform, and governance facilitation. He was lead Counsel for 
the Eastern and Central African Trade Development Bank (PTA Bank) 
and Legal Consultant for UNEP and UN-Habitat. He drafted a 
Framework Environmental Law for the Kingdom of Cambodia and 
compiled a Compendium of Judicial Decisions on Environmental Law 
under UNEP Consultancy, and wrote a Guidebook on “The Right to 
Adequate Housing” for UN-Habitat. He is a law graduate from the 
Universities of Edinburgh, Cambridge and Stellenbosch, with many 
years’ experience in the legal, judicial and academic fields, and in 
dispute resolution. 
 
Dr. Babatunde Ajibade, SAN is the Managing Partner of S. P. A. 
Ajibade & Co. Since his admission to the Nigerian Bar in 1989, Dr. 
Ajibade has been engaged in active and full-time corporate and 
commercial practice, save for time taken out to pursue his 
postgraduate education. His area of academic specialization is in the 
field of Private International Law, with particular interest in the law 
relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
Dr. Ajibade has been involved in all aspects of corporate and 
commercial dispute resolution in Nigeria, and has expertise in 
litigation involving the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, banking law, intra-company shareholder disputes, as 
well as insolvency and insurance litigationDr. Ajibade was elevated 
to the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria in December, 2007. He is a 
Fellow of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London, an 
International Practice Fellow of the International Bar Association 
and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, United 
Kingdom. 
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Founder of COJA, President of CADEV Africa; Manager of the 
Permanent Center of arbitration and mediation of the CADEV (CPAM) 
at CADEV CADEV University of Rennes I, Faculty of legal and Political 
Sciences 
 
Maryan Hassan is a Somali British Lawyer who currently works as a 
Legal Adviser to the Federal Government of Somalia (Office of the 
Prime Minister). She is a member of the New York convention task 
force for Somalia alongside Gary Born, Baiju Vasari and Ilham 
Kabbouri. She is a panel member of the ICSID panels of arbitrators and 
conciliators, nominated by Somalia. Making her the youngest 
arbitrator at the institution at the time of her appointment. Maryan is 
a postgraduate of SOAS, University of London where she focused on 
investment and commercial arbitration, international trade and post 
conflict development - of which her research on Somalia was selected 
for presentation at the Institute for Global and Policy (IGLP) at Harvard 
Law School. She is the first Somali recipient of the prestigious JAMS 
International Weinstein Fellowship in ADR and will be based at ICSID 
and Harvard Law School this year. 
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Bakri Mohammed Abakar, an arbitrator expert he is the founder and general 
manager of the Al-Aayan Center for arbitration and dispute Settlements, he 
holds a Higher Diploma in Philosophy from the University of Al-Neelin, he 
holds a Master degree of Law from the University of Al_Neelin, a former 
mayor and former member of the Sudanese parliament, he is the founder of 
the Forum for arbitration and the legal culture in the University of Al-Neelin, 
he participated in several conferences related to arbitration within and 
outside the Sudan, he participated in the Sudanese peace negotiations in 
Kenya, a professor of law at the Open University of the Sudan. 
 
David Butler is Emeritus Professor in Mercantile Law at Stellenbosch 
University, South Africa, where he has taught International Commercial 
Arbitration for many years. He was the author of the SA Law Reform 
Commission’s report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for 
South Africa in 1998. He remains closely involved in the project to have 
the UNCITRAL Model Law adopted by South Africa for international 
arbitration, which is likely to happen shortly. His particular research 
interest is on the development of arbitration law and practice in African 
jurisdictions and he has regularly participated at arbitration conferences 
in several African countries since 1994. (100 words) 
Professor David Butler 
The attitude of the South African government to arbitration* 
 
 
David Butler** 
 
 
Introduction 
The stated focus of the Conference is on the role of African governments (executive and legislative 
branches) in creating efficient legal and regulatory environments for arbitration. The Conference 
Discussion Paper rightly identifies the importance of “clearly [defining] this role especially with the 
private nature of the arbitration process”. 
The emphasis in this contribution is on private arbitration and ADR, rather than on state-provided 
dispute resolution processes, although some reference will be made to these as they can clearly 
impact on the need for and the utilisation of private arbitration in the fields in which these processes 
are available. 
In 1994 South Africa became a constitutional democracy under the rule of law. Section 34 of our 
Constitution deals with the right of access to justice. The relationship between private arbitration and 
section 34 was considered by the Constitutional Court in Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates (Pty) Ltd v 
Andrews in 2009.55 The court stated that the twin hallmarks of private arbitration are firstly that it is 
based on the parties’ consent and secondly that it is private, i e a non-state process (para 198). The 
court held that section 34 does not apply directly to private arbitration (para 218). Section 34 however 
does impose a positive obligation on the state to provide courts and other appropriate forums for the 
resolution of disputes (para 200). Private arbitrators are required by the common law to proceed fairly 
and what is “fair” will be influenced by modern constitutional values (para 221). The grounds on which 
the court may set aside an arbitral award under section 33 of the Arbitration Act must be construed 
fairly strictly. The goals of private arbitration will be undermined if the courts enlarge their powers of 
scrutiny imprudently (para 235). Giving effect to these principles, South African courts have made a 
major contribution since 1998 to develop the common law on arbitration and to interpret the existing 
arbitration statute in ways which bring our arbitration law more in line with international standards, 
even without legislative amendments. (This will be the subject of a chapter in the forthcoming book 
resulting from the 2nd SOAS Conference on the attitude of national courts in Africa to arbitration.) 
My contribution to the discussion today turns on the role of the South African government in creating 
an efficient legal and regulatory environment for arbitration. This will be determined in part by the SA 
government’s attitude to arbitration. The focus is mainly on the executive branch of government, as 
the legislative branch can only consider the measures relevant to arbitration which the executive 
branch decides to introduce in parliament in the form of Bills for enactment. 
It is also necessary to understand that there are probably divergent views on private arbitration within 
the South African executive. This is partly explained by the fact that South Africa, by most standards, 
 
 
* Paper prepared for purposes of participation in Panel 2 at the Third SOAS University of London Arbitration in 
Africa Conference at the Cairo Regional Centre for International Arbitration, 3-5 April 2017. I am grateful to my 
colleague, Prof Geo Quinot, for valuable advice on constitutional aspects and state procurement. Any errors are 
mine. Although I assisted the SALRC and gave the Department of Justice advice regarding the preparation of the 
International Arbitration Bill of 2017, the views expressed in this paper are my own. 
** Emeritus Professor in Mercantile Law and Research Fellow, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. 
55 [2009] ZACC 6; 2009 4 SA 529 (CC). 
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has a very large cabinet. There is a Minister of Economic Affairs, a Minister of Finance and a Minister 
for Trade and Industry. My contribution is focused on the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, the Chief Procurement Officer in the National 
Treasury is responsible for coordinating state supply chain management.56 Private arbitration can 
potentially be used and has been used for disputes relating to state procurement contracts. For this 
purpose one must note section 217(1) of the Constitution, which provides: 
“When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any other 
institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.” 
It should be noted that “contracts” is used as a verb. It is arguable that the system, which has 
transparency among its key requirements continues for the duration of the contract, and that the 
subsequent cancellation of the contract could, at least in certain circumstances, amount to 
administrative action.57 I will revert to this point below, both in the context of the confidentiality of 
arbitration proceedings and in the context of arbitrability. 
This paper will first deal with the much-delayed introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law in South 
Africa for international arbitration and then consider the provisions of the International Arbitration 
Bill of 2017 regarding the New York Convention. The government’s apparent rejection of arbitration 
for investment disputes with foreign investors will then be explained. The paper then refers to certain 
entities, both private and provided by the state, particularly ombudsmen, which offer affordable 
dispute resolution in certain fields to individuals, as an attractive alternative to private arbitration. The 
use of private arbitration by public bodies in practice is then considered. This is followed by a brief 
discussion on the government’s attitude to certain aspects of arbitrability, with particular reference 
to the non-arbitrability of the validity of administrative action, in the context of disputes pertaining to 
state procurement, together with a concluding comment. 
1) The much delayed introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law for International Arbitration 
Regarding the role of the South African government in support of arbitration, the executive was 
initially strongly supportive of private arbitration between 1996 and 1998. This resulted in the SALRC 
report: Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa in July 1998. The Draft Bill 
accompanying the report was approved by cabinet. The 1999 election brought a cabinet reshuffle and 
a change of political leadership at the Department of Justice. The International Arbitration Bill lacked 
a political champion until this role was assumed by the current Deputy Minister of Justice in the latter 
part of 2015. By that time the Bill had been updated, partly to take account of UNCITRAL’s own 
amendments to the Model Law in 2006. A revised International Arbitration Bill was approved by 
Cabinet on 1 March 2017 and the Bill has subsequently been published by the Department of Justice 
with a view to its introduction in parliament. The comments in this section are restricted to the 
provisions in the Bill regarding the adoption of the Model Law. (Other aspects of the Bill will be dealt 
with in the appropriate section below.) Certain small amendments have been made to the Bill during 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 See e g the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 5 of 2000 and the latest Preferential Procurement Regulations 
of 2017 in GG 40553 of 20 January 2017. The regulations commence on 1 April 2017 (see reg 17). 
57 See Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO [2002] ZASCA 135, but compare Calibre Clinical Consultants (Pty) Ltd v National 
Bargaining Council for the Road Freight Industry [2010] ZASCA 94. 
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the updating process since 2012 to avoid sources of potential controversy during the legislative 
process. This has resulted in certain “nice to have” clauses from earlier drafts being omitted.58 
The drafters wished to use the Bill as a vehicle to promote South Africa as a seat for international 
arbitration in Africa. For this reason, modifications or additions to the UNCITRAL text were restricted 
to those deemed reasonably necessary for the Model Law to be successfully implemented in South 
Africa. 
The most user-friendly way of adopting the Model Law from the perspective of foreign users is through 
incorporation by reference. Hence s 6 states that the Model Law is to apply in the Republic subject to 
the provisions of this Act. “Model Law” is defined as the text adopted by UNCITRAL in 2006, as adapted 
in Schedule 1 to the Bill. This approach, as opposed to redrafting the UNCITRAL Model Law in the text 
of the Bill, was strongly recommended by the SALRC in 1998 and has been retained. 
The Bill binds “public bodies”, as defined,59 but subject to s 13 (the dispute resolution provision) of the 
Protection of Investment Act of 2015. (The significance of s 13 is explained below.) The Model Law’s 
definition of “international” in article 1(3) has, however, been adopted without alteration. Thus, will 
the International Arbitration Bill or the 1965 Act apply to an arbitration between an SA registered SPV 
and a public body arising out of a large infrastructure project, for example the construction of Gautrain? 
This could well depend on the wording of the arbitration clause and how our courts apply article 1(3)(c) 
of the Model Law. 
 
Other interesting features: 
 The omission of articles 17 B and 17 C regarding the possibility of the tribunal granting 
preliminary orders on an ex parte basis; 
 The retention of the SALRC’s carefully nuanced provision on court ordered interim measures, 
which specifies the powers of the court and when the court may be approached instead of 
the arbitral tribunal, in preference to the UNCITRAL text of article 17 J; 
 The revision of the definition of arbitrability from the 1965 Act – “status” has been replaced 
as an excluded category by matters which the parties are not entitled to dispose of by 
agreement (s 7(1)). Restrictions on arbitration in other legislation could be a more important 
obstacle to private arbitration. This is discussed below. 
There is also an interesting addition on confidentiality in s 11, which distinguishes between an 
arbitration involving a public body and one between two commercial parties. In the latter case the 
arbitration may be held in private and in that event, the award and other documents created for the 
arbitration must be kept confidential, unless disclosure is required by reason of a legal duty or to 
protect or enforce a legal right (s 11(2)). 
S 11(1) requires arbitration proceedings to which a public body is a party to be held in public, unless 
for compelling reasons, the arbitral tribunal directs otherwise. This provision is arguably influenced 
by s 217(1) of the Constitution, discussed above, which provides that where a public body contracts 
for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a transparent system. This transparent system 
 
 
58 For example, the default appointing authority for the appointment of the arbitral tribunal in article 11 of the Model Law, 
where the parties have failed to designate their own appointing authority, is now the court. (Compare article 6(2) in sch 1 of 
the SALRC’s Draft Bill in its 1998 report.) 
59 The term “public body” includes a functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation. Most, if not all, “state-owned companies” as defined in the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 would be 
included as well as “organs of state” as defined in the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000. 
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arguably applies to the contract for its duration. However, s 11(1) can be justified more simply: public 
bodies cannot escape the publicity associated with court proceedings by resorting to private 
arbitration.60 
How will “compelling circumstances” be interpreted? The arbitral tribunal could possibly take into 
account when a public court is likely to order certain information to be kept confidential, for example 
the identity of a witness.61 For example, in an arbitration between a public body and a foreign aircraft 
supplier, a senior state official, who is not a party to the arbitration, is accused of receiving a 
commission to facilitate the contract through a front company. Alternatively, the tribunal could be 
influenced by the ICC Rules article 22.3, whereby the arbitral tribunal can take measures for protecting 
“trade secrets and confidential information”. 
To the extent that the arbitral tribunal rules that compelling circumstances require that an arbitration 
involving a public body should be held in private, the confidentiality exception in s 11(2) will apply. 
(“Where the arbitration is held in private … .”) 
 
2) Support for the New York Convention 
Arguably the most important advantage offered by arbitration for resolving trans-border commercial 
disputes, compared to litigation in a national court, is the availability of the New York Convention of 
1958. One way in which African governments can therefore show their support for arbitration is by 
acceding to the New York Convention. States in Southern Africa which have yet to accede to the 
Convention are now reduced to three (Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland), from five, two years ago. 
South Africa acceded to the New York Convention in 1976, but the legislation in 197762 to give effect 
to this accession was seriously defective. 
There are at least four important criticisms: the legislation omitted article II on the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, leaving the court’s discretion under the Arbitration Act of 1965 not to enforce 
valid arbitration agreements still applicable; the 1977 legislation fails to deal with recognition of 
awards as opposed to their enforcement; the legislation creates the impression that the court has a 
discretion as to whether or not to enforce a foreign award, as opposed to an obligation; and finally it 
is not clear that the stated grounds on which enforcement may be refused are exhaustive. In addition, 
the Protection of Businesses Act of 1978 requires the consent of the Minister of Trade and Industry 
for the enforcement of certain foreign awards, a restriction which clearly conflicts with South Africa’s 
obligations under the Convention.63 
All these problems are satisfactorily addressed in the International Arbitration Bill of 2017, chapter 3 
of which will replace the defective 1977 legislation. Some of the defects in the 1977 legislation were 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 S 11(1) is also justified by s 195 of the Constitution, which sets out the basic values and principles applying to public 
administration, including the need to foster transparency, “by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate 
information”. S 195(3) of the Constitution requires national legislation to promote the values listed in s 195(1). 
61 However, the procedure for obtaining privacy and confidentiality could well differ. The court could order the media not to 
publish or disclose the name of a certain witness. However, the arbitral tribunal’s powers only extend to persons who are 
parties to the arbitration. Therefore the only way of obtaining privacy and confidentiality is to hold the arbitration, or the 
relevant part of it, in camera. 
62 The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 of 1977. 
63 See the SALRC’s Report of July 1998, paras 3.14-3.15 and 3.89. 
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possibly politically motivated. By approving the 2017 Bill, the executive demonstrates its support for 
proper compliance with South Africa’s obligations under the NYC.64 
 
3) Apparent rejection of investment arbitration: 
There has been a clear shift in the South African government’s attitude to investment arbitration in 
the last two decades. Post 1994, the government entered into a number of BITs. These BITs, in their 
dispute resolution clauses, provided for investor-state investment disputes to be resolved by 
arbitration. Some of these clauses provided for ICSID arbitration, among other alternatives. This 
created the perception that South Africa intended to accede to the Washington Convention of 1965. 
The SALRC in its 1998 report recommended that South Africa should join ICSID, also with a view to 
providing protection to South African companies who were making trans-border investments in Africa. 
In June 2009, the DTI published a position paper, the Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework 
Review, which highlighted the one-sided nature of the protection provided to foreign investors by 
first-generation BITs and exhibited suspicion regarding investment arbitration. The direct cause of the 
review was arguably a response to the Foresti arbitration under the Republic’s BIT with Italy in 2007.65 
Subsequently, in the face of foreign criticism, the government cancelled most of the existing BITs.66 In 
2015 the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 was enacted but the Act has still to come into 
operation. Some of the concerns which led to this Act appear from the preamble, e g the need to 
secure “a balance of rights and obligations of investors to increase investment in the Republic” and 
“the government’s right to regulate in the public interest in accordance with the law.” The most 
important provision for present purposes is section 13, the dispute resolution clause. Investment 
disputes should in the first instance, be referred to mediation and a foreign investor is not precluded 
from approaching any competent court in the Republic (s 13(4)). In short, foreign investors under the 
Act are restricted to the state courts, unless the dispute can be resolved by mediation. 
The only mention of arbitration is in s 13(5): 
“(5) The government may consent to international arbitration in respect of investments 
covered by this Act, subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. … Such arbitration will 
be conducted between the Republic and the home state of the applicable investor.” 
The only arbitration envisaged by the Act in the context of investor disputes is state to state 
arbitration, which would require the consent of both state parties. The government clearly objects to 
the notion of being compelled to arbitrate non-contractual disputes with foreign investors in a private 
arbitration. However, where a foreign investor contracts with a (South African) public body, the 
 
 
 
 
64 Pending the enactment of the International Arbitration Bill, SA courts should be mindful of s 233 of the constitution when 
interpreting and applying the 1977 legislation. S 233 requires the court to prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
relevant legislation “that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law”. 
65 Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v Republic of South Africa Case no ARB(AF)/07/1. The award of 4 August 2010, in 
which the tribunal only had to decide the issues of discontinuance and costs, is available on ICSID’s website, 
www.worldbank.org/icsid. 
66 The German ambassador was particularly vocal in criticising the decision and in warning about its negative effects on 
foreign investment. Subsequently, German support for arbitration provisions in BITs lessened substantially when the Swedish 
firm Vattenval used the ISDS clause in a treaty to refer a claim for € 3.7 billion in compensation to arbitration, arising from 
Germany’s decision to close all nuclear power stations in Germany. 
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dispute resolution clause in the contract is a matter for negotiation and arbitration is by no means 
excluded. 
South Africa’s neighbour, Namibia, recently enacted the Namibia Investment Promotion Act 9 of 2016 
to replace the Foreign Investment Act of 1990. Whereas s 13 of the previous statute gave foreign 
investors a right to international arbitration, s 28 of the new Act allows the investor to request 
mediation, while retaining the jurisdiction of the Namibian Courts. The responsible minister may 
however agree in writing that a dispute be referred to arbitration in Namibia under the Arbitration 
Act of 1965. Although ISDS may still take place by arbitration where both parties agree, the juridical 
seat of that arbitration must be Namibia. 
As far as the foreign investments of South African companies are concerned, the government cannot 
provide blanket protection for investments in specified host states by unilateral action. An inherent 
weakness with the protection offered by arbitration clauses in BITs in an African context is that it takes 
two to tango. Several important economic powers in Africa have shown little enthusiasm for BITs. 
The reason for government and informed public disillusionment with investment arbitration, both in 
South Africa and elsewhere, has been well expressed by The Economist: 
“If you wanted to convince the public that international trade agreements are a way to 
let multinational companies get rich at the expense of ordinary people, this is what you 
would do: give foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive tribunal of highly paid 
corporate lawyers for compensation whenever a government passes a law to, say, 
discourage smoking, protect the environment or prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet 
that is precisely what thousands of trade and investment treaties over the past half 
century have done, through a process known as ‘investor-state dispute settlement’, or 
ISDS.”67 
 
 
4) Promotion of state-provided forums for affordable dispute resolution 
Improved legislation for domestic arbitration is from a practical perspective less urgent and from a 
political perspective more controversial than the International Arbitration Bill of 2017. The SALRC’s 
Draft Bill to replace the Arbitration Act of 1965 for domestic arbitration was updated in 2013. It may 
well be that the Department will await the outcome of the intended resumption of the investigation 
by the SALRC into possible legislation on ADR and mediation, before proceeding with new legislation 
for domestic arbitration. 
It may be controversial to say so at an arbitration conference aimed at promoting arbitration in Africa, 
but domestic arbitration, at least in South Africa, is not generally seen as a way of promoting access 
to justice for the overwhelming majority of the community. ADR and mediation may legitimately be 
seen as promoting access to justice for those who could not afford to consider litigating in state courts. 
However, there is no doubt that arbitration in the context of complex construction disputes regarding 
large infrastructure projects, for example the Gautrain project, effectively reduces the burden on the 
courts.68 
 
 
67 See The Economist 11 October 2014 “The Arbitration Game”, available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-   
and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration (accessed 30 March 
2017). 
68 See PM Nienaber “Toegepaste kontraktereg – oor arbitrasies en dies meer” (2016) 27 Stell LR 393 394. 
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The South African government has increasingly sought to make use of Ombudsmen as a way of 
providing affordable dispute resolution for the financially weaker party.69 Moreover, the Long-term 
Insurance Ombudsman provides an excellent example of a successful private scheme, brought into 
being and financed by the long-term insurance industry.70 The FAIS Ombud (the Ombud for Financial 
Services Providers) was established in terms of section 20 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 
37 of 2002 (the “FAIS Act”). The main objective of the FAIS Ombud is to investigate and resolve complaints in terms of 
the FAIS Act and the Rules promulgated under it. A further function of the FAIS Ombud is to resolve complaints in 
terms of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act, 37 of 2004 (the “FSOS Act”), which are not covered by any of the 
other voluntary ombud schemes, for example the Long-Term Insurance Ombudsman, referred to above. The FAIS 
Ombud received 4263 claims falling within its jurisdiction during the 2015/2016 financial year, many of which related 
to negligent advice by intermediaries on the investment of retirement savings.71 
A tax ombudsman has also recently been introduced.72  Until recently, disputes in the context of 
sectional title schemes (condominium) were required, in terms of the standard rules for such schemes, 
to be referred to private arbitration. This method was used for approximately two decades and was 
unfortunately not a success. It would appear that the two main failings were the over-involvement of 
lawyers and the excessive expense and duration of the process. This method has been replaced by a 
state-provided dispute resolution scheme, provided by the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 
9 of 201, which commenced on 7 October 2016. It is funded in part by a levy on all owners of units or 
interests in the schemes that are subject to the Act. In spite of the success of other ombudsman 
schemes in South Africa, there is not much optimism that this particular scheme will be successful. 
Although the Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced the Companies Tribunal for resolving intra- 
corporate disputes through mediation or arbitration before a state-provided tribunal, s 166(1)(c) 
leaves the door open for private mediation and arbitration and it is likely that this will be the preferred 
route. The (South African) Institute of Directors has recommended that, in compliance with the King 
Code on Corporate Governance, South African companies should include a multi-tiered dispute 
resolution clause in their contracts, providing first for direct negotiations,73 then mediation and finally 
arbitration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 See generally N Melville “Has Ombudsmania reached South Africa? The Burgeoning role of ombudsmen in commercial 
dispute resolution” (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 50-65. Melville is a former Ombudsman for Banking Services. 
70 See the Annual Report 2015 of the Ombudsman for Long-Term Insurance. The report stresses that the Ombudsman 
provides a free service and the report contains interesting information on the number of complaints received and how long 
it takes to deal with them. Complainants succeed in approximately 29% of the complaints. 
71 See the FAIS Ombud Annual Report 2015/2016. 
72 See Tax Ombud Annual Report 2014/15. 
73 Under South African law, a clause providing for disputes to be settled by negotiation is enforceable as long as there is a 
deadlock-breaking mechanism. See Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC), [2016] ZACC 13 paras 96-102. 
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5) Use of arbitration by public bodies 
Case law is indicative of the continued use of arbitration in South Africa for contractual disputes 
involving public bodies in the period since 2005. At least six cases,74 some quite influential, spring to 
mind. Arbitration has also been used to resolve disputes arising from major infrastructure projects. 
The Gautrain project resulted in at least eleven arbitrations, all relating to main contracts.75 A new 
harbour near Port Elizabeth also resulted in a major arbitration. 
Legislation directed at public procurement does not contain express provisions on dispute 
resolution.76 Contracts for the procurement of goods and services do on occasion contain arbitration 
clauses, although the current General Conditions of Contract available from the website of the Chief 
Procurement Officer at the National Treasury include a dispute resolution clause which provides for 
mediation followed by litigation in the state courts.77 
The Preferential Procurement Regulations of 2017 include the possibility of an organ of state 
cancelling a procurement contract because of misrepresentations made by a tenderer submitting an 
offer, regarding matters dealt with  in  the regulations. Assuming  that the contract contains an 
arbitration clause wide enough to cover the dispute, is there any reason why the arbitration clause 
should not be enforced? South African law recognises both the doctrine of the severability of the 
arbitration clause and kompetenz kompetenz, particularly when the parties have chosen arbitration 
rules containing appropriate provisions in this regard.78 On the one hand it can be argued that the 
dispute relates to a commercial contract. (It must be conceded that the dispute concerns the 
formation of the contract. In the case of a dispute regarding the performance of the contract, it is 
easier to argue that the dispute is a purely commercial matter.) On the other hand, it is arguable that 
a dispute regarding the formation of a contract for public procurement, or even its cancellation for 
that matter, could easily give rise to questions regarding the validity of administrative action. As 
discussed below, this is not a matter which is necessarily appropriate for resolution by private 
arbitration.79 
As regards disputes relating to a tendering process, which does not result in the aggrieved party’s offer 
being accepted, it is clear from Telkom v Mzanzi that the arbitration clause in the stipulated conditions 
or terms of contract has no application, as there is not yet a contract.80 
The South African courts in  the constitutional  era have shown  a greater willingness to uphold 
arbitration agreements and awards and are aware that if courts are too inclined to intervene 
unnecessarily, this will undermine the goals of private arbitration. According to section 195(1) of the 
 
 
74 Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 3 SA 266 (SCA), which concerned an international arbitration; SA [2006] 
139 (SCA); North West Provincial Government v Tswaing Consulting CC 2007 4 SA 452 (SCA); Lufuno Mphaphuli and Associates 
(Pty) Ltd v Andrews [2009] ZACC 6; 2009 4 SA 529 (CC); Airports Company South Africa Ltd v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 642 (GSJ); Telkom v Mzanzi & others (383/12) [2013] ZASCA 14; and State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd 
v ELCB Information Services (Pty) Ltd 2016 JDR 0723 (GP). 
75 See PM Nienaber “Toegepaste kontraktereg – oor arbitrasies en dies meer” (2016) 27 Stell LR 393 394. 
76 The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 5 of 2000 and the 2011 and 2017 Preferential Procurement 
Regulations. Reg 14 of the latter regulations provides remedies for an organ of state in the case of misrepresentations by the 
tenderer, including the cancellation of the contract and the inclusion of the tenderer on a list maintained by the national 
Treasury of entities precluded from submitting tenders. 
77 The dispute resolution clause is clause 27 of the GCC (2010), which is also used e g by the Department of Water and 
Sanitation. 
78 Radon Projects (Pty) Ltd v NV Properties (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZASCA 83, 2013 6 SA 345 (SCA); Zhongji Construction v Kamoto 
Copper Company [2014] ZASCA 160, 2015 1 SA 345 (SCA). 
79 See para 6 below. 
80 [2013] ZASCA 14. The ACSA v ISO Leisure case referred to in para 6 below is distinguishable on its facts. 
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Constitution, the basic values underpinning public administration include “effective, economic and 
efficient use of resources” and a high standard of professional ethics. If these values are taken 
seriously by public bodies, arbitration can certainly provide a more appropriate forum for resolving 
commercial disputes involving a public body than the state courts. There has nevertheless been a 
tendency on the part of some organs of state to use the courts as a delaying tactic.81 
 
6) Restrictions on arbitrability 
As stated above, s 7(1) of the International Arbitration Bill treats all matters, which parties are entitled 
to dispose of by agreement, as arbitrable, unless arbitration is excluded by the provisions of another 
law or where the arbitration agreement is contrary to public policy. 
Examples of restrictions on arbitration in other legislation are provided by the Patents Act 57 of 1978 
s 18, the Competition Act 89 of 1998 s 65 and the Protection, Promotion, Development and 
Management of Indigenous Knowledge Systems Bill, 2016 s 27, each of which appears to give exclusive 
jurisdiction to the state tribunal created in terms of the legislation, to the exclusion of private 
arbitration. Two of the three statutes or bills referred to impose restrictions on arbitrability in the 
context of intellectual property. 
One of the long-standing restrictions on arbitrability in South African law is that relating to 
matrimonial causes: s 2(a) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 prohibits arbitration regarding “any 
matrimonial cause or any matter incidental to any such cause”. One result of this provision is that 
disputes arising out of a settlement agreement as part of a divorce order, cannot subsequently be 
referred to arbitration. Family lawyers have for decades argued that this restriction is too wide. A 
recent response to this problem by the executive was to refer the matter to the SALRC as part of a 
broader inquiry. In December 2015 the Commission produced Issue Paper 31 entitled “Family Dispute 
Resolution: Care of and Contact with Children.” 
One chapter of the paper is devoted to dispute resolution processes. It is submitted that private 
arbitration is not suitable for disputes relating to children, particularly in view of the relatively narrow 
grounds on which an arbitral award can be taken on review to the court under s 33 of the Arbitration 
Act. Matrimonial property disputes could arguably be dealt with by arbitration, but again, not where 
the disputes involve the interests of children. Legislative efforts to provide better protection to 
children (e g the Children’s Act 38 of 2005) have in effect broadened the issues regarding children 
which should not be subject to arbitration. In this context, the reference to “matrimonial causes” in s 
2 is clearly too narrow, as it implies that the parents of the child in question were at one time married. 
Meanwhile a multi-disciplinary “industry” is developing, whereby “facilitators”, often with the input 
of the parties’ lawyers, compile and administer “parenting plans”. The parents agree to comply with 
directives of the facilitator, until a court of competent jurisdiction rules otherwise. Post-divorce 
parenting plans will typically involve interpreting and applying the settlement agreement incorporated 
in the divorce order, but in practice, the directive could easily involve what is, objectively, a variation 
of the court order. Although the directive is only binding until a court decides otherwise and therefore 
lacks the finality of an arbitral award, the post-divorce parenting plan has become a way of bypassing 
the prohibition in the Arbitration Act. The Commission’s investigation is on-going, and family lawyers, 
 
 
 
 
81 The saga culminating in Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others [2017] ZACC 8, which is further 
discussed below, provides a recent unfortunate example. 
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who have had mixed experiences with the state-provided family courts, continue to agitate for the 
amendment of s 2. The form which this amendment should take remains controversial. 
Perhaps the most interesting question regarding arbitrability is in relation to the validity of 
administrative action. In Airports Company SA v ISO Leisure OR Tambo (Pty) Ltd,82 an unusual factual 
situation occurred where any tenderer submitting a tender in response to a request for proposals 
issued by ACSA agreed to be bound by the contractual terms in the Request for Proposals, which 
included an arbitration clause. ACSA rejected the tender of ISO Leisure and granted the contract to 
another bidder. ISO Leisure disputed the rejection of its tender and ACSA wanted this dispute to be 
referred to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause. The arbitrator queried whether disputes 
regarding the validity of administrative action are arbitrable, as the court is given exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine this question by legislation to give effect to s 33 (the administrative justice provision) of 
the Constitution. The court agreed with the arbitrator that the issue was not arbitrable and was 
reserved for the High Court, despite the existence of an arbitration agreement. 
Normally, when a proposed construction project is subject to tender, a contract only comes into 
existence between the employer and a contractor, when the employer accepts the bid of a specific 
contractor. The employer would not usually wish to go to arbitration with contractors whose bids have 
been rejected. However, there is also a practical difficulty. An arbitral tribunal’s powers only extend 
to persons who are parties to the reference to arbitration. The problem is illustrated by one of South 
Africa’s most notorious procurement disputes regarding the granting of a contract by the South 
African Social Security Agency (“SASSA”) to Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd (“CPS”) on 3 February 
2012 for the monthly payment of social grants on behalf of the state to approximately 17 million 
beneficiaries. The validity of the tender process was challenged by another company, All Pay. The 
Constitutional Court declared that the tendering process was fatally flawed with the result that the 
contract between SASSA and CPS was unconstitutional.83 The court subsequently suspended the 
declaration of invalidity until 31 March 2017, to give SASSA the opportunity of either awarding a new 
contract following a proper tender process or to take over the making of payments itself, when the 
“contract” expired.84 SASSA failed to do either, resulting in a further application to the Constitutional 
Court to ask the Court to sort out the mess. The second application involved the applicant, an 
intervening party, seven respondents and two friends of court. Even fervent advocates of arbitration 
would hopefully agree that the procedural quagmire arising from this disaster is best left to the court. 
Unlike an arbitrator, the court has the power to ensure that all interested parties are joined and is not 
dependent on the consent of the parties concerned. The Constitutional Court in its judgment ordered 
the relevant minister to be joined in her personal capacity, for the purpose of showing why she should 
not be held personally liable for the costs.85 
Concluding comment 
The South African government may said to be generally supportive of commercial arbitration, 
particularly in the international sphere, and in disputes not involving public bodies. An international 
arbitration with its seat in South Africa and involving a public body should take place in public. The 
government seems to be becoming more cautious in promoting private commercial arbitration in 
 
 
82 2011 4 SA 642 (W). 
83 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency [2013] 
ZACC 42; 2014 1 SA 604 (CC). 
84 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency [2014] 
ZACC 12; 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
85 See Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others [2017] ZACC 8 para 3-15 and para 13 of the order. 
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domestic disputes to which a public body is a party. It would be easy enough for the public body to 
stipulate in the arbitration clause that the arbitration should take place in public. Where the hearing 
of an arbitration commences in public, it is easier than in the case of mediation to ensure that the 
outcome of the process is also made public in the interests of transparency.86 The government is 
possibly also concerned about the limited grounds for having an adverse arbitral award set aside by 
the court.87 The government is entirely opposed to private arbitration with foreign investors relating 
to non-contractual disputes. 
It is surely up to supporters of arbitration to demonstrate that private arbitration will generally result 
in commercial disputes involving a public body being resolved by way of a good quality award on the 
merits in less time and with less costs than by using the state courts. If that can be adequately 
demonstrated, the state and public bodies would not be justified in routinely excluding arbitration in 
favour of litigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 A possible danger to transparency lies in a dispute resolution clause providing first for mediation and then arbitration, if 
mediation is unsuccessful. I concede that the mediation proceedings can hardly be conducted in public. However, there is 
the need to guard against a settlement agreement between a public body and a commercial company, which results from 
the mediation, being made subject to a blanket confidentiality provision. It is submitted that such a blanket confidentiality 
provision would undermine constitutional values and be in breach of public policy. 
87 The state and public bodies could not reasonably be motivated by a general fear of bias on the part of arbitral tribunals. 
The state and public bodies are the losing parties in litigation with sufficient regularity for some frustrated politicians to infer 
that some judges at least are biased. 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
76 
  
 
Brief: This roundtable will examine arbitration related UNCITRAL texts and their adoption by 
African states 
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African States and UNCITRAL Arbitration-related Texts 
Dr Emilia Onyema (SOAS University of London). 
 
Data available on the UNCITRAL website shows that as it relates to arbitration, UNCITRAL has the 
following texts: 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 with amendments adopted in 2006. The 
arbitration legislations in 103 jurisdictions in 73 States are based on the Model Law. 25 of these are 
based on the 2006 revision. The arbitration laws of 10 Africa states are based on the Model Law and 
of these 10 only the laws in Mauritius and Rwanda are based on the 2006 revision. The remaining 8 
states are: Egypt; Kenya; Madagascar; Nigeria; Tunisia; Uganda; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976 revised in 2010 and 2013 (adopted a new article 1 paragraph 4). 
These Rules have been adopted by various arbitration institutions as the basis of their arbitration rules. 
The UNCITRAL website provides some examples of such institutions from various states including 
Egypt (Cairo RC); Mauritius (LCIA-MIAC); Nigeria (Lagos RC); South Africa (AFSA). This list is obviously 
incomplete. For example the rules of KIAC (Kigali); LCA (Lagos); LACIAC (Lagos); NCIA (Kenya) to name 
a few are all based on the UNCITRAL Rules. 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002. Though the UNCITRAL website does not 
list any African State as member to this Model Law, some African states have included provisions on 
conciliation in their national arbitration laws. An example is Nigeria with her Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act. 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules 1980. This text influenced the provisions on conciliation of some African 
states as mentioned above. 
UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Mauritius Convention 
on Transparency) adopted on 10 December 2014 (not yet in force). This convention has been ratified 
by Canada (12/12/2016) and Netherlands (05/06/2015) and signed by 17 States of which four are 
African States (Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, and Mauritius). The Convention requires three 
ratifications to enter into force. 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (New York Convention) 
1958. This Convention has 156 parties with Angola set to become the 157th party this year. 35 African 
States are currently parties to this Convention. If you check the appendix to our Conference Discussion 
Paper, you can easily find out the status of your country. So the question is why have the remaining 
19 African States not ratified the New York Convention? What can we do to persuade these countries 
to consider ratifying the Convention? 
 
The key questions our panel will examine are: 
 Why  do  such few  African countries  adopt  UNCITRAL  Texts  (in  comparison  to  the  ICSID 
Convention for example)? 
 How can UNICTRAL better engage with arbitration practitioners in Africa? 
 Is it desirable for African countries to engage with UNCITRAL and adopt their texts? 
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Panel 3: Moderator 
Dr Emilia Onyema 
 
Dr Emilia Onyema is a senior lecturer in International Commercial 
Law at SOAS, University of London. She is a Fellow of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators; qualified to practice law in Nigeria; a non- 
practising Solicitor in England; alternative tribunal secretary of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat Arbitral Tribunal (London); and is listed 
on various arbitrator-selection panels. She is a member of the court 
of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Centre 
(LACIAC), and member of the Advisory Committee of the Cairo 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). 
Her latest book published by Kluwer is an edited collection on, “The 
Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: the Role of Arbitral 
Institutions” (2016). 
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Panel 3: Speakers 
Timothy Lemay is Principal Legal Officer and Head of the Legislative 
Branch of the International Trade Law Division  /  Office  of Legal 
Affairs, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL (the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law) based in Vienna. He has also served as 
Secretary of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III (Online Dispute 
Resolution). Before joining UNCITRAL in July 2009, he served as Chief 
of the Governance, Human Security and Rule of Law Section of 
UNODC (the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), prior to 
which he was Chief of UNODC’s Global Programme against Money 
Laundering. Tim joined the UN in 1995 following a career as a lawyer 
in Canada in private practice, with the Attorney General of Nova 
Scotia and latterly with Canada’s Department of Justice in Toronto. 
He is a graduate of Dalhousie Law School and a member of the 
International Bar Association as well as several bar associations in 
Canada. 
Mr Timothy Lemay 
Dr Mohammed Abdel Raouf is an Attorney at law, ABDEL RAOUF LAW 
FIRM, Cairo-Egypt and an Associate Professor at Université Paris 1 
Panthéon-Sorbonne. He specializes in international commercial 
arbitration and ADR as well as in commercial contracts, investment 
agreements, construction, real estate and sports-related disputes. His 
arbitration experience as counsel and arbitrator covers a wide range 
of arbitration Rules including those of CRCICA, UNCITRAL, ICC, AAA, 
ICSID, PCA, DIAC, CAS, GCC, ADCCAC and the BCDR. He is a member of 
the Governing Board and former Vice President of the International 
Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), a member of the Board of 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC), a member of the Advisory Committee of CRCICA, a CEDR 
Accredited Mediator, and an Arbitrator listed in the Panel of 
Arbitrators of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 
Dr Mohamed Abdel Raouf 
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  Mrs Doyin Rhodes-Vivour 
 
Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour was educated at the University of Lagos (LLB 
Hons), University of Lagos (LLM) and King's College London, University 
of London (MA, International Peace and Security) with merit. She has an 
international practice diploma in arbitration and is a fellow of the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and chartered arbitrator; a mediator 
accredited by the CEDR (UK); a member of the Court of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), The Hague, the Netherlands; a member of 
the board, Lagos Court of Arbitration and a member of the ICC 
Commission on Arbitration. She has very significant experience in oil and 
gas, maritime, power, construction, banking/finance and 
corporate/commercial disputes. She is the chairperson of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators (Nigeria branch) and pioneer president of the 
Maritime Arbitrators Association of Nigeria. She is a member of the 
International Law Association (ILA) international committee on 
international commercial arbitration, and the pioneer chair of the 
committee on international commercial arbitration of the ILA’s Nigerian 
branch. She has written various articles on arbitration and ADR. She acts 
as resource person at domestic and international conferences and 
seminars and is an approved tutor of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators (UK). 
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Dr Kennedy Gastorn 
Prof. Kennedy Gastorn, of United Republic of Tanzania, is the sixth
Secretary-General of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization
(AALCO). He took office on 15th August, 2016. He was elected for a four-
year term at the Fifty-Fifth Annual Session held in New Delhi (HQ), India.
Prior to his current appointment, Prof. Gastorn was the Director of
International Affairs of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and
the immediate past Head of the Department of Public Law, University
of Dar es Salaam School of Law. He was also a member of the National
Environmental Advisory Committee in the Vice President’s Office
United Republic of Tanzania. Prof. Gastorn is an accomplished legal
scholar and author and has co-edited and published numerous research
papers and books on international legal issues ad regional integration
in particular. His writings include: Books titled “The impact of
Tanzanian’s new land laws of the customary land rights of pastoralists:
A case study of the Simanjiro and Bariadi Districts” (2008); “Processes
of Legal Integration in the East African Community” (2011), and
“Constitutional Reform Processes and Integration of East Africa” (2013).
He has received several academic awards including the Fulbright African
Research Scholar in 2014 at the Buffalo Law School, State University of
New York. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gaston Kenfack Douajni is a Cameroonian Magistrate; currently the 
Director of Legislation at the Ministry of Justice in Cameroon, he has 
obtained a Doctorate of International Economic Law at the 
University of Paris I (Pantheon Sorbonne) in 2005, a Certificate on 
trade, negotiations and settlement of trade disputes at the Kennedy 
School of Government –Harvard University (USA) in 2004 and an 
Habilitation to Direct Researches at the University of Pau in France. 
Since 2008, he is Professor of business and arbitration law at the 
International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC)-University of 
Yaoundé II, Guest Professor at the Institute of International Studies- 
University of Paris II and at the  University of Paris-Sud.  Former 
member of the ICC Court of Arbitration and Corresponding member 
of the Paris Institute of International Arbitration in the OHADA space, 
he has delivered numerous opinions on contracts, business, 
investment, banking, mediation and arbitration law. He is the Editor 
of the “Revue Camerounaise de l’Arbitrage”, the President of the 
Association for the Promotion of Arbitration in Africa (APAA) and, 
since July 2016, the current President of the United Nations 
Commission on international Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
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Mr Jonathan Ripley-Evans 
 
Jonathan is a Director in the Dispute Resolution Department of Cliffe 
Dekker Hofmeyr. Jonathan enrolled as a candidate attorney at Cliffe 
Dekker Hofmeyr in 2009 and was promoted to associate in 2011. In 
2013, Jonathan was promoted to senior associate and in 2016 
became a director. Jonathan obtained his BCom (Law) degree from 
the Rand Afrikaans University, his LLB degree from the University of 
Johannesburg, his LLM degree from the University of Saarland 
(Germany) and an advanced certificate in ADR through the University 
of Pretoria in collaboration with the Arbitration Foundation of South 
Africa (AFSA). Jonathan is a member of the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators and is an AFSA accredited mediator and arbitrator. 
Jonathan also sits on the Africa Committee of the China Africa Joint 
Arbitration Centre (CAJAC). Jonathan has contributed to numerous 
publications, including the International Arbitration Review, 7th 
Edition, Thompson Reuters Practical Law and the International 
Comparative Legal Guide series, 2017. 
 
Dr Gaston Kenfack Douajni 
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Panel 4: Chair 
Ms Rose Rameau 
 
Rose Rameau was a Fulbright Scholar at the University Of Ghana 
School Of Law from 2014-21016 where she taught Investment and 
International Commercial Arbitration, General Principles of 
Arbitration as well as ontemporary Issues in Arbitration. Rose 
Rameau is an active member of the ABA International Law Section. 
She is Vice-Chair of the Africa Committee and the International 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the ABA International 
Law Section. Ms. Rameau represents Host Statesand investors in 
investment disputes and is also ready for appointment as arbitrator. 
Her most recent case involves an oil and gas dispute between the 
Federation of Nigeria and an American company and its shareholders 
before the International Center for investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
Washington DC. Her Recent article entitled “Ghana’s Future in the 
Offshore Oil Business” is published in the Fall 2015 Issue of the ABA 
International Law News Journal. A Member of the Charted Institute 
of Arbitrators in the UK, she is fluent in English, French, and Spanish. 
Ms. Rameau is admitted to practice law in France, Florida, District of 
Columbia, and New Jersey. 
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Tsegaye Laurendeau is a Senior Associate in Shearman & Sterling's 
International Arbitration Practice Group. He has represented 
companies and States in arbitrations brought under the ICC, LCIA, 
CRCICA, UNCITRAL and ICSID Arbitration Rules, with particular focus on 
commercial and investment arbitrations involving financial, valuation 
and accounting issues. Prior to joining Shearman & Sterling, Tsegaye 
practiced as an associate in the Project Finance group of a Magic Circle 
firm, acting for financial institutions and project developers in relation 
to the financing and development of large energy and infrastructure 
projects in Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa. Tsegaye is an  active 
member of a number of organizations which focus on the development 
of international arbitration in Africa, including in his native Ethiopia. In 
particular, he currently serves as the LCIA-YIAG Regional Co- 
Representative for Africa. 
Mr Tsegaye Laurendeau 
Chrispas Nyombi is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of 
Bedfordshire, joining in October 2014. He is currently the LLM Course 
Coordinator and Module leader for the following modules on the LLM 
International Business Law, and LLM International Commercial and 
Dispute Resolution Law courses. Chrispas has an abiding interest in 
various aspects of International Commercial Law and has presented 
his work nationally and internationally. Externally, Chrispas provides 
expert advice to the Uganda Law Reform Commission on Corporate 
and Commercial law matters. He is also part of the Task Force set up 
by the Djibouti Chamber of Commerce and Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) to design, create and develop an 
international arbitration centre in Djibouti. It hoped that the centre 
will foster relationships in the Horn of Africa and lead to greater 
cooperation and prosperity in the region. 
Dr Chrispas Nyombi 
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Mr Ike Ehiribe 
Ike Ehiribe is a barrister, chartered arbitrator and accredited mediator 
at 7 Stones Commercial & IP Chambers in London. He is an experienced 
international dispute resolution practitioner having been appointed 
arbitrator, mediator, expert determiner and administrative tribunal 
panelist by a number of international arbitral institutions. He is listed 
on a number of international arbitral panels including the Panel of 
Neutrals of the United Nations backed World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) based in Geneva and the Energy Panel of the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) in the US etc. He is 
a member of the ICC (UK) Branch, the ICC Institute of World Business 
Law in Paris, ICCA in The Hague and the Arbitration committee of the 
IBA. He is also a member of the LCIA and is a Councillor of the African 
User's Council of the LCIA. He is a visiting professor at the Center for 
International Legal Studies, Salzburg, a visiting lecturer and  senior 
teaching fellow in international trade law modules at the School of 
Oriental & African Studies at the University of London. He is also an 
approved tutor, trainer and assessor of international and domestic 
arbitration, and mediation for the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in 
London. 
Rukia Baruti is a qualified solicitor in England & Wales. She is founder and 
Managing Director at Africa International Legal Awareness (AILA), a not- 
for-profit organisation working to build legal professional competence 
and encourage recognition of existing international  legal  expertise of 
African lawyers. Prior to founding AILA, Rukia practised law at SJ Berwin’s 
International Arbitration Group in London. She also held the position of 
Vice-President of the London Court of International Arbitration Africa 
Users’ Council. She benefits from experience in the roles of counsel, 
arbitrator and tribunal secretary in arbitrations. She is currently 
completing a PhD on investment laws in Africa. 
Ms Rukia Baruti 
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Professor Dr Walid Ben Hamida 
Dr. Walid Ben Hamida is a Professor of Law at the University of Paris-Sacly 
University (Evry-Val d’Essonne), France. He is a member of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Arbitration Court. He served as 
arbitrator, expert and counsel in many cases under ICSID, ICC and ad hoc 
rules. His practice focuses on Arab laws, Islamic law, Investment Law, 
International law, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Arbitration.Dr. 
BEN HAMIDA authored more than 70 publications in the Arabic, French 
and English languages. He cooperates with many international 
organisations on issues of ADR, International Trade, Investment and Arab 
legal systems (World Bank, ESCWA, UNCTAD). He is a regular speaker at 
conferences on arbitration and dispute settlement, and visiting professor 
in more than 40 countries. 
Mahutodji Jimmy Vital Kodo was the Technical advisor to the President 
of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the organization for 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire. Before joining the Court, he has practiced law in Paris and 
Nanterre (France) and served as Adjunct Professor at the University of 
Paris-Est Creteil, France. He holds law degrees respectively from 
University of Abomey-Calavi, Benin (Master’s Degree), University of 
Lille 2, France (LL.M), and University of Paris-Est Creteil (LL.D). In 2008, 
Mr Kodo co-authored the Annotated OHADA Code, published by the 
Institut International de Droit d’Expression et d’Inspirations Françaises 
(IDEF).He also published the first comprehensive case law study of the 
application of OHADA law since the establishment of that legislation 
(L’Application des Actes Uniformes de l’OHADA, Publications de 
l’Institut Universitaire André Ryckmans 5 (Louvain-la-Neuve: 
Academia-Bruylant, 2010). 
Dr Jimmy Kodo 
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Mr. Jimmy Muyanja, LLM (Commercial Law), is the Executive 
Director, Center for Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CARDER), 
Uganda. He is a Board Member of Nairobi Centre for International 
Arbitration, and a registered Arbitrator and Mediator, Centre for 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, Kampala, Uganda. He has 
authored several papers on Arbitration in Uganda. He developed 
reporting scheme for Uganda Arbitration cases on the UNCITRAL 
Case Law on Uncitral Text; developed jurisprudence on compulsory 
appointment of Arbitrators; and also developed and oversaw 
implementation of case division scheme for court-connected 
mediation at the Commercial Court of Uganda. He is a Member, 
NCIA legislation Committee and has arbitrated and mediated cases 
within Uganda. 
Mr Jimmy Muyanja 
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Rose Rameau 
Investment Laws in West Africa 
 
 
There are about 18 countries in Western Africa, with 15 being members of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao 
Tome and Principle and Togo). Each of these countries have signed the 1965 Washington 
Convention88 and have participated in the massive signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties boom in 
the 1990’s and still counting. 
 
ECOWAS is designed to have all the member states operate under one economic block similar 
to the European Community’s ability (EU) to enter into treaties that bind all EU member states. 
Currently, the world has witnessed that even the EU is facing challenges entering into free trade 
agreements such as the CETA89 and the TTIP90 that would bind the member states. Because many 
West African states base their laws on the Western concept of international law, they are facing a 
bigger problem in their implementation of investment laws.  International investment agreements 
 
 
 
 
88 Convention on the Settlement of the Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States. 
89 Daniel L. Kiselbach, The Canada – EU Free Trade Agreement Demystified: New Opportunities for Trade, Investment and Government 
Procurement, Global Trade and Customs Journal “The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
‘agreement in principle’ was signed on 18 October 2013 by Prime Minister Harper and European President Jose Manuel Barroso. On 29 
October 2013, the Prime Minister tabled a report on CETA and hailed it as: ‘the biggest deal ever concluded by Canada’. If it is not the 
biggest deal, it is certainly a big deal. CETA provides a variety of trade, investment and government procurement opportunities to Canadian 
and EU businesses which are expected to pay dividends for years to come. CETA will provide Canada with access to the twenty-eight 
member EU, which has over 500 million consumers, and CDN 17 trillion in annual economic activity. It will remove 98% of EU import tariffs 
on goods originating from Canada (e.g., aerospace parts, agricultural products, automobiles, beef and bison, chemicals, dairy products, 
forest products, fruits and vegetables, grains and oils, industrial machinery, iron and steel, IT equipment, medical equipment,                
metals, minerals, plastic products, and seafood products). CETA could boost Canada’s annual income by CDN 12 billion, create 80,000 jobs, 
and result in a 20% annual increase in bilateral trade. Once CETA is ratified, Canada will have preferential trade agreements with countries 
having 53% of global GDP (approximately CDN 36.4 trillion), and a trade advantage over the USA. The EU expects CETA to result             
in duty savings of approximately CDN 700 million. CETA will remove Canadian import tariffs on goods including automobiles, some 
cheeses, industrial machinery, seafood products, and wine and spirits. European exporters will save three times as much in annual duty 
payments as Canadian exporters. Canadian businesses and consumers stand to benefit if retailers and exporters pass on duty savings to  
them. At present Canada is the EU’s fourth largest source of investment, and the EU’s twelfth largest export market. CETA is not just a free 
trade agreement. It addresses issues such as services and investment; government procurement; intellectual property; dispute settlement; 
sustainable development, the environment; immigration and labour. This ambitious agreement will create business opportunities for a large 
number of sectors including: advanced manufacturing; the automotive industry; chemicals and plastics; agriculture and agri-food; food 
processing; metals and mineral products; fish and seafood products; information and communications technology; services; investment and 
government procurement. Within an improved regulatory environment under CETA, Canadian and EU businesses will be able to forge new 
alliances, and access new markets.” 
 
90 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
92 
(IIAs) exist at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. An Example of the Regional and multilateral 
agreements are the North  American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 91 between US-Mexico and 
Canada and the Energy Charter which is a multilateral agreement. At the bilateral level, is situated 
many BITs that were signed between developed countries and Lesser Economically Developed 
Countries (LEDCs), in particular west African Countries. 
 
One of the common features of the IIAs is that they all have a dispute resolution section that 
usually oust the jurisdiction of local courts, by referring any future dispute to an institutional arbitral 
tribunal such as the ICSID, ICC, LCIA or just an ad hoc arbitral tribunal under the UNCITRAL rules. Many 
LEDCs have signed IIAs in particular the BITs, because they were made to believe that they would 
increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in their countries and such treaty would likely contribute to 
the development of their countries.92 Now 25 and some years later, West African States that had 
signed these IIAs find themselves with huge arbitral awards against them for violating these 
agreements. Cognizant that West African States are not alone in this phenomena, next are the Latin 
American countries such as Argentina and others. This development has prompted many LEDCs to 
revise their investment laws and at times to even withdraw from BITs, treaties altogether.93 In 
addition it has prompted some states to draft and propose their own BITs, such as Cameroun and 
South Africa.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 Kiselbach and Katherine Xilinas, Partner, Ernst and Young / Couzin Taylor titled How Will Globalization Affect Free Trade which was 
originally presented at the ABA International Section’s Fall Meeting in Montreal on October 22, 2015 “The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) is a mature agreement, and although controversial, is generally regarded as one of the first and most important FTA’s 
that set a pattern for others.” 
92 M. SORNARAJAH, « Power and Justice : Third World Resistance in International Law », Singapore Year Book of International Law and 
Contributors, 2006, pp. 19-57 (spéc., p. 32). 
93 James MOUANGUE KOBILA, Quel cadre juridique optimal pour attirer les investissements privés en Afrique ? Le cas du Cameroun 
(Unpublished) « L’Afrique du Sud a ainsi dénoncé ses TBI avec la Belgique et le Luxembourg en 2012 ; puis avec l’Allemagne, l’Espagne, 
les Pays-Bas et la Suisse en 2013 ; mais aussi avec l’Australie, le Danemark et l’Allemagne en 2014. Voir Emmanuel GAILLARD, 
« L’avenir des traités de protection des investissements », in : Charles LEBEN (dir.), Droit international des investissements et de  
l’arbitrage transnational, Paris, Pedone, 2015, pp. 1027-1045 (spéc., p. 1027) et le World Investment Report, 2015, Reforming international 
Investment Governance, p. 110” 
 
94 Dominique CARREAU et Patrick JUILLARD rapportent qu’« entre 2000 et 2005, six pays africains ont ainsi publié leur propre modèle 
de convention bilatérale de promotion et de protection des investissements (Bénin, Burkina-Faso Burundi, Ghana et Ouganda) » (Droit 
international économique, 4e éd., Paris, Dalloz, 2010, p. 452). 
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In looking at investment laws in Western Africa, one can review it at the bilateral level, 
regional level and international level. A fragmentation of West African laws at each of those levels is 
very present. Such fragmentation is due to language barriers as West Africa is divided into French 
Speaking, English and Portuguese. At the bilateral level, there are BITs between African States, 
however, African states engage in very little trading amongst themselves. At the Regional level, rest 
ECOWAS and other economic blocks that have been attempting to implement the laws by passing 
directives and protocols designed to bind Member States for a better sustainable development and 
enhancement of African International Law. At the International level, there exists the African Union, 
yet still not powerful enough to hold each Member State accountable for possible violations because 
of the notion of supranationality in that each state wish to maintain its individual sovereignty.95 
The ICSID Convention has served as the main source of laws for investor protection at the 
international level and it is usually stated that African states maintain the effectiveness of the 
convention because 25 percent of the ICSID involves African States. In fact, the first 25 cases that 
were registered at ICSID, African states were parties to at least 15 of them.96 As of 31 December 2016 
ICSID has registered a total of 597 cases and about 134 of them involved African States. Below 
features a list of the ICSID cases as of 31 December 2016. 
 
  
Case No 
 
Claimant (s) 
  
Respondent 
 
1 
 
ARB/72/1 
 
Holiday Inn S.A 
 
vs 
 
Morocco 
 
2 
 
ARB/74/1 
 
Adriano Gardella S. p. A 
 
vs 
 
Ivory Coast 
 
3 
 
ARB/76/1 
 
République du Gabon 
 
vs 
 
Société Serete S.A 
     
95 Adelardus Lubango Kilangi, Introduction to African Union Law, International Law Seminar for African Universities 
KOFI ANNAN CENTRE, ACCRA GHANA, August 2016 
96 Institut Afrique Monde, Un Demi-Siecle Africain Au CIRDI, Regards Retrospectif et Prospectifs, 27 mars 2017, p. 13 
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4 
 
ARB/77/1 
 
AGIP S.p.A 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Congo 
 
5 
 
ARB/77/2 
 
S.A.R.L Benvenuti & Bonfant 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Congo 
6 ARB/78/1 Guadalupe Gas Product Corp Vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 
7 
 
ARB/81/2 
 
Klöckner Industrie-AnlagenGmbH 
 
vs 
République-Unie du 
Cameroun et Société 
Camerounaise des Engrais 
 
8 
 
CONC/82/1 
SEDITEX Engineering 
Beratungssgesellschaftfü die 
Textilindustriem.b.H 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Madagascar 
 
9 
 
ARB/82/1 
Société Ouest Africainedes Bétons 
Industriels 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Senegal 
 
10 
 
ARB/83/2 
 
Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Liberia 
 
11 
 
ARB/84/1 
 
Atlantic Triton Company Limited 
 
vs 
 
République Populaire 
Révolutionnaire du Guinée 
 
12 
 
ARB/84/3 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle 
East) Limited 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
13 
 
ARB/84/4 
Maritime International Nominees 
Establishment 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Guinea 
 
14 
 
ARB/86/1 
 
Ghaith R. Pharaon 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Tunisia 
 
15 
 
ARB/87/1 
Société d’Etudes de Travaux et de 
Gestion SETIMEG S.A 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Gabon 
 
16 
 
ARB/89/1 
 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Company 
 
vs 
Arab Republic of Egypt et 
General Authority for 
Investment and Free Zones 
 
17 
 
ARB/92/1 
 
Vaccum Salt Products Ltd. 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Ghana 
 
18 
 
ARB/93/1 
American Manufacturing & Trading 
Inc. 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
19 
 
CONC/94/1 
SEDITEX Engineering 
Beratungsgesellschaftfü die 
Textilindustriem.b.H 
 
vs 
 
Madagascar 
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 20 ARB/95/3 Antoine Goetz at al vs Republic of Burundi 
 
21 
 
ARB/97/1 
Société d’ Investigation de 
Recherche et d’Exploitation Minière 
 
vs 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
22 
 
ARB/97/2 
 
Société Kufpec (C0ngo) Limited 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Congo 
23 ARB/97/8 
Compagnie Française pour le 
Développement des Fibres Textiles 
vs Côte d’Ivoire 
24 ARB/98/3 
International Trust Company of 
Liberia 
vs Liberia 
25 ARB/98/4 Wena Hotels Limited vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
26 
 
ARB/98/7 
Banro American Resources, Inc. and 
Société Aurifère du Kivu et du 
Maniema S.A.R.L. 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
27 
 
ARB/98/8 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
Limited 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
28 
 
ARB/99/5 
 
Alimenta S.A 
 
vs 
 
Gambia 
29 ARB/99/6 
Middle East Cement Shipping and 
Handling Co. S.A. 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
30 
 
ARB/99/7 
 
Patric Mitchell 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
31 
 
ARB/00/4 
Salini Construttori S.p.A. et 
Italstrade S.p.A 
 
vs 
 
Morocco 
32 ARB/00/6 Consortium R.F.C.C vs Morocco 
33 ARB/00/7 World Duty Free Company Limited  Kenya 
 
34 
 
ARB/00/8 
Ridgepointe Overseas 
Developments, Ltd. 
 
vs 
République Démocratique du 
Congo et Générale des 
Carrirères et des mines 
35 ARB/01/2 Antoine Goetz et autres vs 
Burundi 
36 ARB/01/5 
Société d’Exploitation des Mines 
d’Or de Sadiola S.A 
vs Republic of Mali 
 
37 
 
ARB/02/4 
 
Lafarge 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Cameroun 
38 ARB/02/9 
Champion Trading Company & 
Ameritrade International, Inc. 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
39 ARB/02/14 CDC Group plc  République de Seychelles 
40 ARB/02/15 Ahmonseto, Inc. et autres vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
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41 
 
ARB/03/8 
Consortium Groupemewnt L.E.S.I- 
DIPENTA 
 
vs 
République Démocratique 
Pupulaire d’Algérie 
 
42 
 
ARB/03/11 
 
Joy Mining Machinery Limited 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
43 ARB/03/14 Miminco LLC et Autres vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
44 CONC/03/1 TG World Petroleum Limited vs République du Niger 
45 ARB/04/5 
Compagnie d’Exploitation du 
Chemin de Fer Transgabonais 
vs Republic of Gabon 
 
46 
 
ARB/04/11 
Russell Resources International 
Limited et autres 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
47 ARB/04/12 ABCI Investments Limited vs Republic of Tunisia 
 
48 
 
ARB/04/13 
Jan de Nul N.V. et Dredging 
International N.V. 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
49 
 
ARB/05/3 
 
LESI, S.p.A et Astadi, S.p.A 
 
vs 
République Démocratique 
Pupulaire d’Algérie 
 
50 
 
ARB/05/6 
BernadusHenricusFunnekotter et 
autre 
 
vs 
 
Zimbabwe 
51 CONC/05/1 Togo Electricité vs Togo 
 
52 
 
ARB/05/15 
Waguih Elie George Siag et 
ClorindaVecci 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
53 ARB/05/19 Helnan International Hotels A/S vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
54 
 
ARB/05/21 
African Holding Company of 
America, Inc. et Société Africaine de 
Construction au Congo S.A.R.L 
 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
55 ARB/05/22 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited vs Tanzania 
56 ARB/06/7 
Togo Electricité et GDF-Suez Energie 
Services 
 
Togo 
57 ARB/06/12 Scancem International ANS vs Congo 
58 ARB(AF)/07/1 
Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli et 
autres 
 
South Africa 
 
59 
 
ARB/07/2 
 
RMS Production Corporation 
 
vs 
 
République Centrafricaine 
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60 
 
ARB//07/10 
 
M. MeerapfelSöhne AG 
 
vs 
 
République Centrafricaine 
61 ARB/07/18 Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep Limited vs Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 
62 
 
CONC/07/1 
 
Shareholders of SESAM 
  
République Centrafricaine 
63 ARB/07/24 Gustav FWHamester GmbH & Co KG vs Republic of Ghana 
64 ARB/08/17 
Participaciones Invisiones Portuarias 
SARL 
vs Republic of Gabon 
65 ARB/08/18 Malicorp Limited vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
66 ARB/08/20 
Millicom International Operations 
B.V. et Sentel GSM S.A. 
vs Republic of Senegal 
67 ARB/09/14 Mærsk Olie, Algeriet A/S vs 
République Démocratique 
Pupulaire d’Algérie 
 
68 
 
ARB/09/15 
 
H&H Enterprises Investments Inc. 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
69 ARB/09/19 Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Limited vs Republic of Gambia 
 
70 
 
ARB/10/4 
Antoine Abou Lahoud and Leila 
Bounafeh-Abou Lahoud 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
71 
 
ARB/10/10 
 
Olyana Holdings 
 
vs 
 
Rwanda 
72 ARB/10/12 Standard Chartered Bank vs Tanzania 
73 ARB/10/15 Bernhard von Pezol et autres vs Zimbabwe 
74 ARB/10/20 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong 
Kong) Limited 
vs 
Tanzania Electric Supply 
Company Limited 
 
75 
 
ARB/10/21 
International Quantum Resources 
Limited, Frontier SPRL et Compagnie 
Minière de Sakania SPRL 
 
vs 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
76 
 
ARB/10/25 
Border Timbers Limited, Timber 
Products International (Private) 
Limited, et Hangani Development 
Co. (Private) Limited 
 
vs 
 
Zimbabwe 
77 ARB/11/6 
Bawabet Al Kuwait Holding 
Company 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
78 
 
ARB/11/7 
 
National Gas S.A.E 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
79 ARB/11/11 
AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East 
et Africa S.A 
vs Niger 
 
80 
 
ARB/11/14 
 
Diamond Fields Liberia Inc. 
 
vs 
 
Liberia 
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81 
 
 
ARB/11/16 
Hussain Sajwani, Damac Park 
Avenue for Real Estate 
Development S.A.E., et 
DmacGamsha Bay for Development 
S.A.E 
 
 
vs 
 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
82 CONC/11/1 RSM Production Corporation vs Cameroun 
 
83 
 
ARB/11/29 
 
Getma International et others 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Guinea 
84 ARB/11/32 
Indorama International Finance 
Limited 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
85 ARB(AF)/1/2/2 
Groupo Francisco Hernando 
Contreras 
vs Equatorial Guinea 
86 ARB/12/8 
Société Industrielle des Boissons de 
Guinée 
vs Republic of Guinea 
87 CONC(AF)/12/1 
Hess Equatorial Guinea Inc et Tullow 
Equatorial Guinea Limited 
vs Equatorial Guinea 
88 ARB/12/11 
Ampal-American Israel Corporation 
at al 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
89 
 
ARB/12/15 
 
Veola Propreté 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
90 CONC/12/2 Equatorial Guinea vs 
CMS Energy Corporation and 
others 
 
91 
 
ARB/12/26 
 
Sudapet Company Limited 
 
vs 
 
South Sudan 
92 ARB/12/30 Lundin Tunisia B. V. vs Tunisia 
93 ARB/12/32 Gelsenwasser AG 
 République Démocratique 
Pupulaire d’Algérie 
 
94 
 
ARB/12/34 
 
Tullow Uganda Operations PTY LTD 
 
vs 
 
Uganda 
 
95 
 
ARB/12/35 
 
Orascom TMT Investments S.ar.l 
 
vs 
République Démocratique 
Pupulaire d’Algérie 
 
96 
 
ARB/12/36 
 
Société Civile Immobilière de Gæta 
 
vs 
 
Republic of Guinea 
 
97 
 
ARB/13/3 
 
Ossama Al Sharif 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
98 
 
ARB/13/4 
 
Ossam Al Sharif 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
99 
  
99 
 
ARB/13/5 
 
Ossama Al Sharif 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
100 
 
ARB/13/7 
 
Joseph Houben 
 
vs 
 
Burundi 
 
101 
 
ARB/13/14 
 
RSM Production Company 
 
vs 
 
Cameroun 
 
102 
 
ARB/13/15 
 
Lundin Tunisia B.V 
 
vs 
 
Tunisia 
 
103 
 
ARB/13/16 
 
Société des Mines de Loulo S.A. 
 
vs 
 
Mali 
 
104 
 
ARB/13/20 
Interocean Oil Development 
Company et Interocean Oil 
Exploration Company 
 
vs 
 
Nigeria 
105 ARB/13/23 ASA International S.p.A vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
106 ARB/13/25 
Tullow Uganda Operations Pty Ltd et 
Tullow Uganda Limited 
vs Uganda 
107 ARB/13/29 
Cementos la Union S.A et 
AridosJavita S.L.U 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
108 ARB/13/34 
Courts (IndianOcean) Limited et 
Courts Madagascar S.A.R.L 
vs Madagascar 
 
109 
 
ARB/13/37 
Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S International 
GmbH, Erich 
UtschAktiengesellschaft, et Helmut 
Jungbluth 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
110 
 
ARB/14/2 
 
Michael Dagher 
 
vs 
 
Sudan 
111 ARB/14/4 Union Fenosa Gas, S.A vs Egypt 
112 ARB/14/6 
African Petroleum Gambia Limited 
(Block A1) 
vs Gambia 
113 ARB/14/7 
African Petroleum Gambia Limited 
(Block A4) 
vs Gambia 
114 ARB(AF)/1/4/2 Oded Besserglik vs Mozambique 
115 ARB/14/19 VICAT vs Senegal 
116 ARB/14/22 BSG Resources Limited vs Guinea 
117 ARB/14/23 
TamagotBumi S.A. et 
BumiMauritania S.A 
vs Mauritania 
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 118 ARB/14/31 
Tariq Bashir and SA Interpetrol 
Burundi 
vs Burundi 
 
119 
 
ARB/15/7 
 
WalAmEnergy Inc. 
 
vs 
 
Kenya 
120 ARB/15/11 Total E&P Uganda BV vs Uganda 
121 ARB/15/12 PT Ventures, SGPS, SA 
 
Republique du Capo Verde 
122 ARB/15/18 
Capital Finance Holdings 
Luxembourg SA. 
vs Cameroun 
123 ARB/15/21 
MenzieS Middle East and Africa S.A 
Aviation Handling International Ltd. 
vs Senegal 
 
124 
 
ARB/15/29 
Cortec Mining Kenya Limited, Cortec 
(Pty) Limited et Stirling Capital 
Limited 
 
vs 
 
Kenya 
125 ARB(AF)/1/5/1 Strabag SE vs Libya 
126 ARB/15/41 
Standard Chartered Bank (Limited) 
Hong Kong 
vs Tanzania 
127 ARB/15/46 
BSG Resources (Guinea) Limited et 
BSG Resources (Guinea0 SARL 
vs Republic of Guinea 
128 ARB/15/47 Arcelor Mittal S..A. vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
129 ARB/16/1 Al Jazeera Media Network vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
130 ARB/16/2 
Champion Holding Company & 
others 
vs Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
131 
 
ARB/16/11 
Société Resort Company Invest 
Abidjan, Stanislas Citerici et Gérard 
Bot Beograd 
 
vs 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
132 ARB/16/15 AngloGold Ashanti (Ghana) Limited vs Republic of Ghana 
133 ARB/16/32 Thomas Gosling and Others vs Republic of Mauritius 
 
134 
 
ARB/16/37 
LP Egypt Holdings I, LLC, Fund III 
Egypt, LLC and OMLP Egypt Holding 
I, LLC 
 
vs 
 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) as tools for African States to engage with and 
promote the use of arbitration 
Mr Tsegaye Laurendeau 
 
Introduction 
 
 Stating the obvious, a fundamental prerequisite for increasing the use of arbitration and 
international arbitration references in Africa, is continued economic growth. 
 
 A number of sub-Saharan Africa countries performed well on the Ease of Doing Business World 
Bank rankings, i.e. increasing private sector participation and FDIs. 
 
 However, much of the economic growth in Africa is driven by SOEs. 
 
 This means that in addition to their role as policy makers, African States are also key economic 
players. 
 
 This gives African States a further fundamental tool to effect change in Africa. 
 
 Will discuss: 
 
i. African SOEs as agents for promoting the use of and Africanising arbitration 
ii. African SOEs : ideally placed to take advantage of Africa's competitive advantage in the 
area of finance arbitration 
 
1. African SOEs as agents for promoting the use of and Africanising arbitration 
 
 The importance of SOEs in economic growth in Africa is likely to continue growing: former state 
economies transitioning to market economy, influence of the Chinese model, suspicion about 
private sector since the 1990’s international lenders imposed privatisations and the 2008 
financial crisis. 
 
 SOEs have best of both worlds: direct access to the State/executive branch and mighty economic 
players. E.g. Eskom, one of the  biggest SOEs in the world; Ethiopian Electric Power, sits on 
45,000 megawatts of just hydropower. 
 
 As a result, SOEs are in a position to discuss as equals, if not dominant party, with foreign 
companies. Discuss my experience re cement plant project promoters in Ethiopia vis a vis 
international lenders. 
 
 SOEs will soon be at the heart of mega power and infrastructure projects which will involve 
African and international parties: e.g. East Africa Power Pool (power interconnection) projects; 
Northern Corridor Integration Projects. 
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 SOEs can leverage their strategic position to push for African governing law/arbitration 
institutions/arbitrator appointing authority. 
 
2. African SOEs : ideally placed to take advantage of Africa's competitive advantage in the area of 
finance arbitration 
 
 Africa has a competitive advantage in the area of finance arbitration: explain. 
 
 At the same time, Africa faces a huge financing gap for its infrastructure projects which cannot 
be filled by the likes of AfDB or IFC. 
 
 This explains the growth of capital and debt markets in Africa in recent years. 
 
 This growing financial industry will bring with it complex disputes: e.g. what experts refer to as 
excessive debt of Africa's subprime State borrowers. 
 
 The fundamental goal here is to create African expertise and knowledge in this new area – 
already foreign experts can be heard complaining about the lack of local expertise and 
suggesting managing this industry from outside of Africa. 
 
 SOEs are again ideally placed to leverage their strategic position: SOEs act either as borrowers or 
issuers of debt instruments. 
 
 As such, they can greatly assist by, in particular: appointing local counsel to negotiate financing 
instruments; when disputes arise, appointing African arbitrators and counsel who can develop 
expertise in this area. 
 
END 
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Shaping Investment Arbitration: The Experience of COMESA and SADC 
 
Rukia Baruti


Abstract 
This paper discusses the role played by African States in shaping the development of international 
investment arbitration. In particular, it looks at how Member States of the COMESA and SADC have 
responded to the issues raised in the arbitral practice of investment treaties. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
The development of international investment arbitration beyond its contractual basis is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Not too long ago, it was inconceivable – unless consent to arbitrate had been 
given in a concession contract – for private investors to initiate direct arbitration against host States. 
But neither Contracting Party to the first bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’) nor signatory of the 1965 
Convention on the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID Convention’) 97 would have foreseen that they had unwittingly 
participated in a chain of events that would ultimately limit host States’ sovereign powers and open 
other bases up for direct arbitration by private investors. 
Now, the right to initiate arbitration against a host State is not only contained in contracts but also in 
host State laws, bilateral, regional and multilateral investment instruments. And ever since, 
investment arbitration has developed considerably, in large part due to a proliferation of BITs and 
their interpretation and application by arbitral tribunals. While these developments have seen African 
States involved in more than a third of the total number of investment arbitrations at ICSID, their role 
in the development of international investment arbitration has thus far been almost exclusively 
limited to signing BITs and defending enforcement of BITs against them. 
This paper reviews the development of international investment arbitration and the changing role of 
the African States in it.  In particular, the States belonging to the Common Market for Southern and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Research Member of the Foreign Investment in Africa Project (funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
(SNSF)), Law Faculty of the University of Geneva, Department of Public International Law and International 
Organisation and Managing Director of Africa International Legal Awareness (AILA). An updated version of this 
paper will be published as: Rukia Baruti, ‘Investment Facilitation in Regional Economic Integration in Africa: 
The Cases of COMESA, EAC and SADC’ Journal of World Investment & Trade 18:3. 
97 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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Eastern Africa (‘COMESA’)98 and the Southern African Development Community (‘SADC’).99 In doing 
so, it traces the emergence of investment arbitration, its development by the practice of arbitral 
tribunals and the experience of COMESA and SADC Members with investment arbitration. It then 
considers how COMESA and SADC Members have responded to the issues raised in the arbitral 
practice of BITs. It concludes by suggesting that their response hints at an evolving shift in roles from 
mere observers to a more hands-on role in the development of investment arbitration by the African 
States. 
 
2. The Emergence of Investor-State Arbitration 
Investment arbitration was born out of the need to address the deficiencies of diplomatic protection 
as a means of resolving investor-State disputes. In the 1930s, host States had concluded some 
concession contracts in the mining and oil sectors with private investors. These concession contracts 
included investor-State arbitration clauses to protect private investors from unilateral changes by the 
host State.100 However, as evidenced by the great oil nationalisation arbitrations of the 1970s, there 
were significant problems with these types of arbitrations due to the abuse of sovereign powers by 
host States within a contractual framework.101 
Furthermore, while the inclusion of these clauses addressed the problems encountered with 
diplomatic protection, investor-State arbitrations were not possible without a concession contract 
between the private investor and the host State and only a minority of private investors ever had a 
concession contract.102 Accordingly, in the absence of a concession contract providing for investor- 
State arbitration, diplomatic protection remained the only option for resolving disputes between host 
States and private investors.103 
Subsequently, BITs appeared to offer another solution to the investor-State dispute settlement 
problem. This solution was in most of the older BITs from the 1960s concluded by the European States 
 
 
 
98 Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
99 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
100 Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as A Complex Adaptive System, How It 
Emerged And How It Can Be Reformed (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 24 January 2014), p. 
392 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2271869> accessed 27 February 2017. 
101 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework in Albert Jan van Den’, in 50 
Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, ed. by Albert Jan van den Berg, 
ICCA Congress Series (Kluwer Law International; Kluwer Law International, 2009), XIV, 95–145 (p. 98). 
102 McLachlan, XIV, p. 98. 
103 Pauwelyn, p. 392. 
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mostly with developing States, which contained an umbrella clause. The umbrella clause – also known 
as the “observance of undertakings” clause – required either party to “observe any other obligations” 
it may have entered into with regard to investments by nationals or companies of the other Party. 
This clause arguably obliged host States under the BIT to comply with investment contracts concluded 
with private investors, effectively elevating a contract claim to a treaty claim. However, the precise 
scope of an umbrella clause has been the subject of controversy and inconsistent decisions by arbitral 
tribunals.104 
Conversely, the genius of the 1965 World Bank ICSID Convention was in embodying an investor-State 
dispute settlement system in an instrument that bound the Contracting States thus ensuring that any 
agreements on dispute resolution voluntarily entered into would be honoured. The ICSID Convention 
authorised both conciliation and arbitration as a means of resolving investor-State disputes. Not only 
did the ICSID Convention create a self-contained  system that  kept out the national  courts, on 
arbitration, but it also adopted the model of commercial-style arbitration before specialised 
international tribunals. These tribunals would issue final and binding awards recognised and 
enforceable in any ICSID Contracting State as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.105 
Accordingly, the ICSID Convention obligated States to comply with ICSID awards as an international 
law obligation.106 Furthermore, in creating ICSID as a neutral forum for the direct determination of 
investor-State disputes, it depoliticized the process by obviating the need to involve the investor’s 
home State. 
However, mere ratification of the ICSID Convention does not confer jurisdiction on ICSID or its arbitral 
tribunals – a Contracting State has to have given consent. As the Report of the Executive Directors on 
the ICSID Convention states, among other things, consent to jurisdiction needs to be in writing and 
once given it cannot be withdrawn unilaterally.107 Nevertheless, paragraph 24 of the Report provides 
that it does not require the consent of both parties to be expressed in a single instrument. On this, it 
states that “a host State might in its investment promotion legislation offer to submit disputes arising 
out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction of ICSID, and the investor might give his 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13), 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, paras 166-67; Société Générale de 
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6), Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, paras 115, 119. 
105 ICSID Convention, art. 54.1. 
106 McLachlan, XIV, p. 96. 
107 ICSID Convention, art. 25(1). 
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consent by accepting the offer in writing.” Thus, in a first of its kind, the 1984 SPP v Egypt case108 saw 
a claimant successfully initiate arbitration at ICSID by accepting a host State’s unilateral offer to 
arbitrate contained in a 1988 Egyptian investment law to which Egypt had adhered by Law No. 90 of 
1971 acceding to the ICSID Convention. 
Then in 1987 in the Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka109 case the claimant, 
a Hong Kong company, invoked Article 8(1) on ‘Reference to International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes’ of the 1980 UK-Sri Lanka BIT to initiate ICSID arbitration. Sri Lanka did not 
challenge ICSID’s jurisdiction and this case became the first that ICSID registered based solely on a BIT 
provision. 
Following the AAPL v Sri Lanka case the majority of BITs started explicitly including provisions on 
investor-State dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) with arbitration under ICSID. At around the same time, the 
shortage of capital110 and the need to attract it had intensified and spurred conclusion of BITs, which 
had become the preferred method of investment protection following the failure to conclude a 
multilateral agreement on investment.111 Like most developing countries, African countries viewed 
inward foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) as an integral part of their development strategy. As such, the 
notion that to attract FDI, States have to demonstrate their ability to protect such investment, has, 
over the decades, been ingrained in the economic mindsets of African States. Consequently, at the 
height of their pursuit of such investment COMESA and SADC Members concluded many BITs. These 
BITs were negotiated on the basis of a pre-existing model agreement drafted by the developed State. 
The proliferation of BITs was accompanied by the conclusion of Regional Free Trade Agreements like 
the 1993 North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’) and multilateral treaties such as the 1994 
Energy Charter Treaty (‘ECT’) both of which included arbitration provisions affording private investors 
the ability to invoke treaty violations directly. Simultaneously, ICSID membership grew and became 
the leading forum for the resolution of investor-State disputes with the number of claims filed annually 
 
 
108  Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3), 
Decision on Jurisdiction 14 April 1988. 
 
109 Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3) 
110 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata (1991), ‘Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment - A General Account, with Particular 
Reference to the Role of the World Bank Group’, ICSID Review, 6.2 (1991), 484–509 (p. 488). 
111 This included the unsuccessful efforts to establish a multilateral framework for investment including the 1948 
Havana Charter, which contemplated codifying investment protection through the establishment of an 
international trade organization; the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad which was 
to provide the basis for a multinational agreement on investment protection for the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD); and the OECD’s attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement on 
investment in the 1990s. 
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having increased dramatically from barely having any in the 1970s to registering 597 cases by the end 
of 2016.112 
3. Development of Investment Arbitration 
As cases at ICSID increased, so did the development of investment arbitration. While investment 
treaties provide the framework of investment arbitrations, the treaties need to be interpreted then 
applied. But there may be situations faced by an arbitral tribunal that neither the investment treaty 
concerned nor the applicable law and arbitration rules addresses. In such cases, there is a general 
understanding that arbitral tribunals have inherent powers or the discretion to fill the jurisdictional 
lacuna to enable them to exercise their powers in controlling the arbitration process. 
As a result, investment arbitration tribunals have played a significant role in interpreting and applying 
investment treaties thus developing investment arbitration. In this regard, arbitral tribunals have, 
through their practice of treaty interpretation and application, developed – albeit inconsistently – 
certain areas of investment arbitration in ways that treaty parties had not anticipated. Such areas 
have included: (i) expanding grounds for founding jurisdiction by, for example, expansive 
interpretation of the definition of ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ or through the application of the most- 
favoured-nation (‘MFN’) clause;113 (ii) extending the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (‘FET’);114  (iii) establishing the basis for third party participation;115 (iv) delineating the scope 
of interim measures;116 and (v) deciding on the standard for non-expropriation breaches,117 scope and 
 
 
 
 
 
112 ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2017-1) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID   
percent20Web percent20Stats percent202017-1 percent20(English) percent20Final.pdf> accessed 27 February 
2017. 
113 William Rand, Robert N. Hornick, and Paul Friedland, ‘ICSID’s Emerging Jurisprudence: The Scope of 
ICSIDs Jurisdiction’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 19 (1986), 33; Chen 
Huiping, ‘Expansion of Jurisdiction by ICSID Tribunals: Approaches, Reasons and Damages’, Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, 12 (2011), 671–88. 
114 S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada (NAFTA) (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, (12/11/00), 40 I.L.M. 1408, 
2001, para 264; Pope and Talbot v. Government of Canada, (NAFTA) (UNCITRAL), Award on the Merits (April 
10, 2001), 7 ICSID Reports 102, paras 105-118. 
115 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, (NAFTA) Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third 
Persons to intervene as “Amici Curiae” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6039.pdf> accessed 2 
March 2017; Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) Order in response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005), in particular at para 15. 
116 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Procedural 
Order     No.     1,     Request     for     Provisional     Measures,     September     31,     2006,     paras.     100- 
102, <http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC1581_En.pdf>    accessed    2 
March 2017. 
117 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7), Award, 25 May 
2004, para. 238; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award, 
12 May 2005, para. 410. 
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valuation118 of compensation. 
 
Whereas some of these developments through arbitral practice have been welcomed by treaty parties 
and subsequently incorporated into their treaties119 and institutional arbitration rules,120 many still 
have not and have in fact left questions open by rendering conflicting awards.121 This disconnect 
between what treaty parties expect from their investment instruments and how arbitral tribunals 
have interpreted and applied them has caused tension between States and arbitral tribunals. 
 
Consequently, some States have exercised their inherent powers to address some of the issues raised 
in the interpretation of their treaties. On this, Article 31(3) (a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) provides that treaty interpretation shall take account of the treaty parties’ 
subsequent agreements and practice. Additionally, some investment treaties include provisions 
stating that the treaty parties can issue joint interpretations (even after arbitration is underway) that 
will bind investor-State tribunals.122 The exercise of this power has divided opinions of investment 
treaty tribunals. Some tribunals anxious about ensuring equality of the parties have expressed 
concern because they consider that a State that is alleging to be issuing an interpretation of a treaty 
during an on-going arbitration, may, in fact, be making an illegitimate attempt to amend the treaty 
retroactively. 
This issue first arose in Pope & Talbot v Canada123 when the NAFTA States decided to issue their 
interpretation on the FET standard. Although the interpretation was issued after the Award on Merits 
ruling that Canada had violated the FET standard, the determination of damages had yet to be made. 
The tribunal considered this to be an amendment of the treaty designed to interfere with on-going 
arbitration proceedings but concluded that its findings of liability would stand. 
 
 
 
118 Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, Award of 30 August 2000, 40 I.L.M. (2001) 36, para. 121; Wena Hotels Ltd 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4), Award of 8 December 2000, 41 I.L.M. (2002) 896, para. 
122; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) Award of 29 May 2003, 
43 I.L.M. (2004) 133, para. 186; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, Award of 25 May 2004 
<http://www.italaw.com/documents/MTD-Award_000.pdf> accessed 2 March 2017. 
 
119    Free   Trade   Commission,   Statement   on   Non-Disputing   Party   Participation,   7   October   2003 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf> 
accessed 2 March 2017; 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules (Article 37). 
120 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules (Article 37); 2013 UNICTRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. 
121 Frank Spoorenberg and Jorge E. Vinuales, ‘Conflicting Decisions in International Arbitration’, Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 8 (2009), 91–114. 
122 See NAFTA Art. 1105; Article 30(3) 2012 US Model BIT; Article 20(2) of the China-Canada BIT. 
123 See Pope & Talbot Inc. v Government of Canada (Award on the Merits Phase 2) NAFTA Case (UNCITRAL) 
(10 April 2001) paras 111-118 holding that Canada had breached its obligation to provide fair and equitable 
treatment to the investor. 
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In part, due to the dissonance between States and arbitral tribunals regarding the interpretation of 
investment treaties an increasing number of developing States, including  African countries, are 
disengaging from the regime of concluding BITs. 124 Many States are concerned that the 
unpredictability of tribunal decisions interferes with their ability to regulate by influencing them to 
make regulatory decisions based on the need to avoid liability to investors under a BIT. Accordingly, 
States are seeking to renegotiate current BITs, unilaterally terminating existing treaties or denouncing 
multilateral arbitration conventions.125 
4. COMESA and SADC Experience with Investment Arbitration 
Equally, the experience of investment arbitrations by COMESA and SADC Members has soured their 
perception of BITs. As at the end of 2014, more than half (61 percent) of COMESA and SADC Members 
had been involved in a total of 60 investor-State arbitrations, a majority (55) of which were ICSID 
arbitrations representing 11.11 percent of the total number of ICSID arbitration claims at the time.126 
Despite involving African States, these 60 arbitrations only had 15 African arbitrators as members of 
the tribunals. 
Also by the end of 2014, COMESA and SADC Members had concluded more than 15 percent of the 
total number of BITs 127 and all BITs they concluded from the 1990s contained investor-State 
arbitration clauses. Despite the increase in the number of BITs they concluded, there was no 
corresponding increase in the percentage of FDI inflows into COMESA and SADC regions (Fig. 1). 
Furthermore, not only did the increase in the number of concluded BITs fail to show a corresponding 
increase in FDI inflows, but there was a gradual increase in the number of investor-State arbitrations 
involving COMESA and SADC Members (Fig. 2). 
This rise in investor-State arbitration claims in COMESA and SADC regions is alarming. It raises 
concerns not only about the investment climate in these States and their ability to comply with their 
BIT obligations – but given their developing status – it also raises concerns about the detrimental 
 
 
 
124 Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, ed. by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014), 
World Investment Report, 2014 (New York: United Nations, 2014), p. xxxi. 
125 Venezuela denounced and sought to renegotiate its BIT with the Netherlands in 2008; Ecuador terminated nine 
of its BITs with other Latin American States in 2008 and sought to terminate 13 other BITs in 2010 but only 
managed to denounce the BIT with Finland; Bolivia denounced its BIT with the US in 2011; South Africa 
denounced its BITs with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union in 2012, with the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and Spain in 2013 and with Austria and Germany in 2014. 
126 ICSID Database <https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx> accessed 
31 December 2015. 
 
127 UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Agreements Navigator’ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/> 
accessed 13 December 2014. 
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impact on their economies as a result of the amount of money spent on defending claims and paying 
damages to successful investor Claimants. 
 
Figure 1. BITs in force and FDI inflows (Percentage of GDP) in COMESA and SADC 
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Figure 2. BITs in force, Investment Claims and FDI inflows in COMESA and SADC 
 
 
 
SOURCE: UNCTAD, ICSID and PCA Databases129 
 
Out of 39 concluded cases, 13 were settled; three were discontinued; four were dismissed; 11 were 
in favour of the investor; seven were in favour of the host State; and two had no information available 
for review. Given that the settled arbitrations involved some monetary compensation to the investors, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the host States lost more cases than they won. 
The underlying causes of the rise in investment arbitration claims in these States included (a) a violent 
change in government; (b) legal and political instability in the aftermath of anti-government protests; 
(c) conflict situations due to civil strife; (d) corruption; (e) a change in government policy or law; and 
(f) insufficiently developed tax regimes. The most common cause of investment disputes was a 
change of policy or a change of law. Such changes raise the issue of the regulatory space required by 
developing States to be able to adopt new laws and policies designed to improve their economies and 
the lives of their citizens without the fear of being challenged by foreign investors. While most of 
these causes for investment disputes can arise in any given country, they are invariably more common 
in developing States, and the longer they remain unaddressed, the more crippling they are on the 
capacity of developing States to adhere to the rule of law, let alone comply with their BIT obligations. 
 
 
 
 
 
129 Supra note 31; ibid and PCA Cases <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/> accessed 12 October 2015. 
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Additionally, provisions in BITs – especially those in the older BITs – were rather vague. Not having 
participated in their drafting, COMESA and SADC Members are more likely to interpret their provisions 
differently from the predominantly “Western” or developed country arbitral tribunals.130 The fact that 
African arbitrators are very rarely appointed in such arbitrations is disadvantageous because the 
African perspective in the development of investment arbitration by way of interpretation of their 
BITs is lacking. 
 
5. The Shaping of Investment Arbitration by COMESA and SADC 
Given the preceding, COMESA  and SADC Members decided to attempt a regional  approach to 
regulating FDI. They did so by concluding regional investment instruments. In 2007 COMESA 
concluded the COMESA Common Investment Area Agreement (‘CCIA Agreement’).131 In 2006, SADC 
concluded the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (‘FIP’), which came into force in 2010.132 
Annex I of the FIP on Co-operation on Investment was amended in August 2016. However, the 
changes have yet to be ratified 133 and the amended FIP is not publicly available for review. 
Additionally, in 2012, SADC concluded the SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.134 
Even though the CCIA Agreement is yet to enter into force and the amendments to the FIP are yet to 
be ratified, and the SADC Model BIT is currently being revised,135 these instruments show a significant 
change in the focus of attention in investment instruments. This change is evident not only in the level 
of detail but also in the new provisions introduced as well as in the restriction or omission of certain 
traditional standards of protection. These instruments include provisions aimed at addressing some 
of the concerns raised in the practice of investment tribunals, with the specific aim of shifting the 
emphasis away from the protection of investments. 
 
 
 
 
130 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire (ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1), Award, 21 
February 1997 (hereinafter American Manufacturing Award) where Zaire had a different interpretation of Article 
IX of the 1984 Zaire-US BIT to that of the tribunal. 
131       COMESA    Common    Investment    Area    Agreement    (23    May    2007,    not    yet    in    force) 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3092> accessed 9 February 2017. 
132 SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP) (signed 18 August 2006, entered into force 16 April 2010) 
<www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance Investment2006.pdf> accessed 2 February 2017. 
133 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Investigation: In Aftermath of Investor Arbitration against Lesotho, SADC MemberStates 
Amend Investment  Treaty So As To Remove ISDS and Limit Protections’, IAReporter (February 20 2017) 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-in-aftermath-of-investor-arbitration-against-lesotho-sadc-  
member-states-amend-investment-treaty-so-as-to-remove-isds-and-limit-protections/> accessed 21 February 
2017. 
 
134 SADC, ‘SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary’ (2012) <www.iisd.org/itn/wp-  
content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf> accessed 9 February 2017. 
135 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016: Recent Policy Developments and Key Issues (United Nations 2016). 
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5.1. Standards of Treatment 
Although the FIP includes the FET standard, it qualifies it by providing that it shall be no less favourable 
than the treatment granted to investors of a third state.136 As such, it links FET to MFN treatment, 
which should limit potential damages by ensuring that all foreign investors receive the same level of 
compensation. In the amendments to the FIP, the FET standard has been deleted.137 The FIP does not 
provide for national treatment (‘NT’); instead, Article 7 allows the Member States to grant preferential 
treatment to their nationals in accordance with their domestic legislations to enable them to achieve 
national development objectives. However, it requires the Member States to ‘eventually harmonize 
their respective domestic policies and legislation within the spirit of non-discrimination.’ 138 The 
amendments to the FIP offer NT on post-establishment rights of management, operation and 
disposition of investments.139 
FET has been given special attention in the CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT because it is the 
most frequently invoked standard. In this regard, the CCIA Agreement obliges Member States to apply 
FET to investors and their investments in accordance with the customary international law minimum 
standard140 and clarifies that this ‘does not require treatment in addition to or beyond what is 
required by that standard.’ 141 It acknowledges that the Member States have different forms of 
administrative, legislative and judicial systems and that they understand that different levels of 
development may not achieve the same standards at the same time.142 This approach differs from the 
traditional one to the international minimum standard by introducing a degree of flexibility in its 
interpretation based on the level of development of the respondent country.143 Moreover, the CCIA 
Agreement excludes the full protection and security provision. 
 
The SADC Model BIT recommends not to include the FET standard and suggests an alternative 
standard called ‘Fair Administrative Treatment.’ This standard requires, taking into consideration the 
level of development of the Member State in reviewing its approach to procedural justice or due 
process in administrative, legislative, and judicial processes so as to ensure that these do not operate 
in a manner that is arbitrary or that deny justice or due process to investors or their investments.144 
 
 
136 SADC FIP Annex I, art 6. 
137 Peterson. 
138 SADC FIP, art 7(2). 
139 Peterson. 
140 CCIA Agreement art 14(1). 
141 ibid art 14(2). 
142 ibid art 14(3). 
143 Peter Muchlinski, ‘The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedural Problems 
in Dispute Settlement’ in CL Lim (ed), Alternative Visions of the International Law on Foreign 
Investment - Essays in Honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (CUP 2016) 131. 
144 SADC Model BIT, art 5.1, Option 2. 
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While it recommends excluding the FET standard, it does include it as an option but links it to the 
customary international law minimum standard by using the specific language of the Neer case,145 
which is known for its high threshold.146 While the SADC Model BIT includes a provision on ‘protection 
and security’, it makes it a standalone provision that is not linked to FET, but instead to non- 
discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, compensation relates to losses suffered as a result of war or 
another armed conflict, which is determined on a non-discriminatory basis.147 
Similarly, to avoid uncertainty in the interpretation of the phrase ‘like circumstances’ with respect to 
non-discrimination provisions, both the CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT require an overall 
examination on a case-by-case basis of all the circumstances of an investment so that a broad view is 
taken as opposed to merely looking at whether the investors are in the same sector or a related or 
competitive sector.148 The amendments to the FIP contain a similar provision.149 Both the CCIA 
Agreement and the SADC Model BIT exclude NT for measures included in the exceptions or exclusion 
lists, and the SADC Model BIT also allows for the exclusion of NT to certain sectors. 
 
The MFN clause has been excluded from the SADC Model BIT. Also, unlike the CCIA Agreement, which 
confers NT for both pre-establishment and post-establishment rights, the SADC Model BIT only covers 
non-discrimination for post-establishment rights of management, operation and disposition150 to limit 
the potential for claims. 
 
The regional investment instruments of COMESA and SADC include provisions on expropriation and 
compensation. While the FIP still adopts the typical BIT standard for compensation, the CCIA 
Agreement requires ‘prompt’ and ‘adequate compensation’, which may be adjusted to ‘reflect the 
aggravating conduct by a COMESA investor or such conduct that does not seek to mitigate 
damages.’151 However, the amendments to the FIP provide for “fair and adequate” compensation.152 
Similarly, the SADC Model BIT departs from the typical expropriation provision in at least two ways. 
Firstly, it does not require an expropriation to be non-discriminatory to be lawful. The explanation 
given for this is that expropriations are commonly targeted and specific and could, therefore, be 
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viewed as discriminatory anyway. Secondly, it adopts a different standard of compensation for 
expropriation, which is ‘fair and adequate’ to be paid ‘within a reasonable period of time.’153 
Both the CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT allow host States to pay awards that are 
‘significantly burdensome’ in instalments, i.e. on a yearly basis ‘over a period agreed by the Parties, 
subject to interest at the rate established by agreement’ of the disputants or by a tribunal.154 However, 
compensation will not be payable for ‘the issuance of compulsory licences granted in relation to 
intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights 
to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with applicable 
international agreements on intellectual property.’ 155 Similar provisions are included in the 
amendments to the FIP.156 
Furthermore, a measure of ‘general application shall not be considered an expropriation of a debt 
security or loan covered by these agreements solely on the basis that the measure imposes costs on 
the debtor that cause it to default on the debt.’157 In addition, both instruments affirm the right of a 
host State to regulate for the public good by providing that regulatory measures taken by a host State 
‘designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety and the environment’ will not constitute an indirect expropriation.158 This provision is also 
adopted in the amendments to the FIP.159 
As seen above, provisions on standards of protection in the COMESA, EAC and SADC investment 
instruments show a clear restriction in coverage compared to similar provisions in traditional BITs. 
There is also a complete exclusion of some of the standards of protection typically found in BITs. 
5.2. Host States’ Rights 
To further limit the coverage of the standards of protection, the regional investment instruments 
introduce host States’ rights. In this regard, the CCIA Agreement permits a  host State to take 
‘emergency safeguard measures’ if it suffers injury as a result of economic activities under the CCIA 
Agreement160 and to take ‘measures to safeguard balance of payments … external financial difficulties’ 
by applying restrictions on investments with respect to which it has undertaken commitments on 
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transfers of assets, NT, MFN treatment and expropriation if it suffers a serious balance-of-payment 
and external financial difficulties.161 
The FIP includes a specific article on the ‘Right to Regulate’ that allows the Member States to regulate 
in the interests of the public. Through this provision, Member States can ‘adopt, maintain or enforce 
any measure’ considered appropriate for ensuring that ‘[i]nvestment activity is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns.’162 This provision has been expanded 
in the amendments to the FIP to allow a host State to ‘take regulatory or other measures to ensure that 
development in its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and 
with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives.’163 
 
Similarly, the SADC Model BIT includes a provision on the ‘Right of States to Regulate.’164 It provides 
that a host State ‘has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in 
its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and with other 
legitimate social and economic policy objectives.’165 This right is to be ‘understood as embodied within 
a balance of the rights and obligations of Investors and Investments and host States.’166 
 
 
The SADC Model BIT also bestows upon host States the right to pursue development goals. In this 
respect, a host State ‘may grant preferential treatment’ to any enterprise ‘in order to achieve national 
or sub-national regional development goals.’167 A host State may also ‘support the development of 
local entrepreneurs’ and ‘seek to enhance productive capacity, increase employment, increase human 
resource capacity and training, research and development.’168 Finally, a host State may take measures 
to ‘address historically based economic disparities suffered by identifiable ethnic or cultural groups 
due to discriminatory or oppressive measures.’169 It appears that the introduction of provisions on 
host States’ rights in these regional instruments aims to balance out the rights and obligations of host 
States and investors. 
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5.3. Investor Obligations 
In developing the balancing act, the regional investment instruments introduce provisions on investor 
obligations. In this respect, the FIP requires investors to abide by the laws, regulations, administrative 
guidelines as well as policies of the host State.170 The amendments to the FIP require investors to abide 
by this provision for the ‘full cycle of those investment’.171 Similarly, the CCIA Agreement requires 
investors and their investments to comply with all applicable domestic measures of the host State.172 
The SADC Model BIT has several provisions placing obligations on investors. These include an 
obligation against corruption, 173 compliance with domestic laws, 174 provision of information, 175 
environmental and social impact assessment,176 environmental management and improvement,177 
the minimum standard for human rights, environment and labour; 178 corporate governance 
standards,179 investor liability,180 as well as transparency of contracts and payments.181 In deviating 
further from the approach of the traditional BITs, these regional instruments take into account host 
State concerns by incorporating investor obligations to integrate environmental, social and 
governance issues in investment decision-making. 
 
5.4. Dispute Settlement 
While retaining the BIT practice of including ISDS provisions, the regional investment instruments take 
a more restrictive approach to allowing recourse to arbitration.  They also allow counterclaims 
intended to achieve a more balanced access to investment dispute resolution. All the regional 
investment instruments confer on investors the right to bring direct claims against a host State but 
make this conditional upon attempting an amicable settlement of disputes. The FIP requires that 
(after failing to settle the dispute amicably), investors should exhaust local remedies before resorting 
to arbitration. However, the amendments to the FIP do not include an ISDS provision and provide 
only for State-to-State dispute resolution.182 
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The CCIA Agreement obliges disputing parties to seek to resolve their disputes through amicable 
means, both before and during the cooling-off period.183 The cooling-off period is a minimum of six 
months. If no alternative means of resolving a dispute is agreed, a disputing party is obliged to seek 
the assistance of a mediator to resolve it during the cooling-off period.184 If three months before the 
expiration period of the cooling-off period the disputing parties have failed to agree on a mediator, 
the President of the COMESA Court of Justice, or his designate, shall appoint a mediator from the 
COMESA Secretariat’s list. The appointment shall be binding on the disputing parties.185 
The SADC Model BIT does not make it obligatory to resort to mediation, it does, however, provide 
that either disputing party may request mediation of the dispute after a notice of intent has been 
submitted, and the other disputing party may agree to such mediation.186 
Additionally, both the CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT impose a three-year cut-off period 
for submission of an arbitration claim.187 Like the FIP, the SADC Model BIT requires the exhaustion of 
local remedies before arbitration proceedings are commenced. If local remedies have been exhausted 
the time limit for bringing an arbitration claim under the SADC Model BIT is one year from the 
conclusion of the request for local remedies.188 Moreover, the SADC Model BIT prevents the initiation 
of arbitration under a BIT if the issue in dispute would be covered by choice of forum clause contained 
in any investment law, regulation, permit or contract.189 
Whereas the CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT provide investors with a choice of forum for 
bringing claims against a host State, including arbitration under the ICSID Convention and ad hoc 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or under any other arbitration institution or rules,190 
they also attempt to limit the potential for multiple claims by including fork-in-the-road clauses that 
prevent an investor from choosing another forum after having initiated proceedings for a claim 
relating to the same subject matter.191 
The CCIA Agreement and the SADC Model BIT allow host States to bring counterclaims against 
investors. Under the CCIA Agreement, the host State may do so as a defence, counterclaim, right of 
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set-off or a similar claim.192 Under the SADC Model BIT, a host State may counterclaim for damages 
or other relief resulting from an alleged breach of the BIT.193 The SADC Model BIT also allows the 
initiation of a civil action by the host State, political subdivisions or private entities in domestic courts 
against an investor or investment for damages arising from an alleged breach of the obligations set 
out in the BIT. 194 In  reformulating  their  dispute resolution provisions, the regional  instruments 
attempt to shift the focus away from investment protection and towards investment facilitation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Investment arbitration developed in response to the need to better protect foreign investors and their 
investments. This protection was achieved by establishing ICSID to provide a more effective forum for 
the resolution of investor-State disputes. Simultaneously, developed States drafted and concluded 
BITs mostly with developing States, which later offered arbitration under ICSID and are seemingly 
skewed in favour of investors. However, the prominence of ICSID as the preferred forum for ISDS and 
the proliferation of BITs as well as investment tribunal practice, have not been favourable to COMESA 
and SADC Members who have had to defend a relatively high percentage of ICSID arbitrations. 
While COMESA and SADC Members signed several BITs at the height of their pursuit of FDI, they had 
little if any input in their drafting or the subsequent development of investment arbitration. In 
recognition of the failure of BITs as a tool for attracting FDI and the need to prevent the rise of 
investment arbitration claims, COMESA and SADC Members concluded regional investment 
instruments. It is evident from the content of these investment instruments that they are in response 
to the arbitral practice of investment tribunals as they shift the focus of their purpose away from the 
protection of investors and their investments. 
This approach is apparent not only in the inclusion of specific provisions aimed at balancing out the 
rights and obligations of host States and investors but also in the limitation of coverage or omission 
of certain investment protection provisions. Viewed holistically, the deliberate shift away from an 
emphasis on protection demonstrates the changing role of these African States in the international 
investment regime from mere observers to fully fledged participants keen to shape the development 
of investment arbitration. 
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A case for a Regional Investment Court for Africa 
Chrispas Nyombi

Abstract 
 
Since the end colonial rule, African countries have sought self-determination, both on domestic and 
international fronts, but their participation in the international economic order has been, at best, 
abysmal. In a recent wave of international investment law reform, progressive measures have been 
pursued in Asia, the Latin American countries have denounced the Investor- State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) system en masse, while the European Union (EU) has proposed the creation of an Investment 
Court system. With the exception of South Africa, African states have been largely oblivious to these 
international investment policy departures. It is argued in this paper that Africa’s economic aspirations 
cannot be realised through inaction, rather a developmental mind-set must be harnessed, one that 
supports attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) while preserving national regulatory space. This 
paper found that Africa has already embraced the new generation of investment policies that seek to 
create a balance between investors’ interests and national public policy, but at regional level. Africa is 
also undergoing a process of regionalisation in a bid to promote greater economic cooperation and 
harmonisation in trade and investment, with plans for a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) with all 
fifty-five African Union (AU) member states. It is argued in this paper that the regional integration and 
regulatory harmonisation at regional level creates a unique opportunity for the establishment a 
Regional Investment Court (RIC) in Africa, via a multilateral treaty on investment. The RIC is proposed 
as the way forward, after evaluating competing reform proposals, because it serves Africa’s current 
social-economic developmental aspirations, at a time when the institutions of international 
investment law are under increased scrutiny. 
1. Conceptual underpinning 
It is a core principle of democracy that government exercises its authority for personal and communal 
self-determination.195 This implies that States, guided by democratic principles, are trustees of public 
interests, which  are promoted  through  the legitimate exercise of national  sovereignty. 196 Thus, 
provided that governmental power is exercised through legitimate national sovereignty and 
democratic authority, such as the ceding of dispute resolution authority to an international arbitral 
body, and provided the body exercises its adjudicatory role within the confines set out in the relevant 
treaties, the State and its citizens are bound to respect its decisions. 197  However, when viewed 
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through the imperfect lens of political history, democratic principles alone cannot hold a multilateral 
system together, no matter how legitimate or justified; public consensus is pivotal. It was a global 
rebuke of diplomatic protection spearheaded by the Latin American States that ultimately led to the 
development of international arbitration as a medium for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).198 
This decade has seen landmark events such as Britain’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) 
buttressed by concerns over national sovereignty and democratic principles,199 and the increased 
rejection of ISDS.200 For example, an EU-wide consultation on the inclusion of ISDS in the investment 
chapter of the Transatlantic and Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) culminated in an outright 
rejection of the arbitral mechanism by a wide spectrum of the EU civil society.201 Thus, the ISDS 
mandate is under increased scrutiny, with national sovereignty at the forefront of this campaign. 
 
In the context of international investment law, a paradigm shift in international investment protection 
policy has recently surfaced through increased demand for progressive investment policies and a 
dispute resolution mechanism that supports national public policy. 202 In the EU, for example, 
investment courts have been herald as the future of ISDS, featuring in the EU-Vietnam Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA)203 and the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and 
Canada,204 with plans to include it in all future EU trade agreements with an investment chapter.205 
The aspirations behind the EU’s proposal for an investment court resonate in the passage of Garcia- 
Bolivar:  “[t]he  interpretation  of  concepts  and  principles  that  are  peculiar  to  States  and  public 
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international law cannot be left to the view of ever changing arbitrators.”206 This paper argues that 
Africa should not be left behind in the on-going international investment law reform process; rather 
they should learn and where necessary, lead on these reforms. African countries have embraced the 
international investment law regime having concluded BITs, ratified ISDS-based multilateral treaties 
such as the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA 
Convention),207 the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention),208 the Agreement Establishing the African Trade Insurance Agency,209 
and the International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (ICSID Convention).210 It is argued in this paper that a multilateral treaty on investment 
would serve African countries better than the current patchwork of BITs, based on evidence of 
regional integration and regulatory harmonisation. However, reforming substantive rules is only half 
of the task; African countries must consider the creation of a Regional Investment Court (RIC) as a 
means of reforming the much-maligned ISDS system. The plan is to take a TTIP-style investment court 
system, with borrowed features, and design a mechanism that serves investors interests and 
expectations while preserving national regulatory space. 
 
This analysis is timely because waves of democratisation have swept across North Africa in the past 
decade, impacting on countries with a growing body of investment treaties such as Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya. 211 Such political transitions are likely to be accompanied by investment treaty claims, as 
incumbent governments try to reverse the actions of previous regimes. For example, following the fall 
of the Mubarak government, an Egyptian court queried and reversed the sale of land by a former 
tourism minister to a foreign investor for a price below its market value.212 Similarly, a claim by a 
foreign investor that a stabilisation provision in a concession contract signed under the Mubarak 
government required the Morsi government to compensate them for the increase in minimum wage 
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was challenged. 213 Besides political transitions, African countries share the same burdens and 
concerns as other reform active States, that International Investment Agreements (IIAs), particularly 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), limit the regulatory space thereby making it difficult for 
governments to discharge their public responsibilities under the shadow of ISDS.214  Thus, African 
countries have a vested interest in the future of international investment law, and rather than sitting 
on the periphery, they should take centre stage. As aforementioned, the EU has led the way in this 
endeavour by establishing an international court in TTIP and CETA to resolve investor-state disputes 
arising from the agreement, as a response to the criticism of investor-state arbitration. Thus, the 
creation of a RIC, responsible for a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, plus an 
appellate body to correct substantively wrong awards, could help bring about the much-needed 
consistency in decision making and a rebalancing of IIAs in favour of host States in Africa. 
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, both Africa’s growing economic profile and regional 
integration are examined. Secondly, Africa’s position in international investment law is examined with 
particular emphasis on her aspiration for social-economic development in an era defined by the 
increased flow of trade and investment on the continent. Thirdly, although a number of proposals for 
reforming ISDS have been suggested by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UCTAD)215 and numerous academics,216 investment courts appear to be paving the way. This paper 
evaluates the reform choices open to African countries before reaching a decision on a RIC. Last but 
not least, the practicalities surrounding the design and implementation of the investment court are 
explored before reaching a circumspect conclusion. 
2. The investment landscape in Africa 
Before examining the proposal for a RIC, it is important to appreciate the investment and regulatory 
landscape in Africa. According to the World Investment Report 2016, foreign investment flows into 
Africa amounted to fifty-four billion dollars in the year 2015 (down seven per cent) compared to 504 
for Europe and 541 for Asia.217 Thus, Africa held 3.1 per cent of the world’s FDI flows down from 4.6 
per cent in 2014.218 In West Africa, a slump in investment in Nigeria, the largest economy on the 
continent, weak commodity prices and a delay in major projects such Royal Dutch Shell’s multibillion- 
dollar offshore oil operations culminated  in  a decline in  investment. 219 Despite that, consumer 
spending remained strong and the German pharmaceutical company Merck, for example, opened its 
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first office in Nigeria as part of a broader African expansion.220 Similarly, French chocolatier Cémoi 
established its first chocolate processing factory in Côte d’Ivoire.221 In Central Africa, FDI flows fell by 
thirty-six per cent as flows to the two commodity rich countries (Congo and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo declined) significantly.222 Similarly, East Africa experienced a two per cent decrease from 
2014.223 Investor confidence returned to North Africa with FDI flows rising by nine per cent largely due 
to investments in Egypt, where FDI flows increased by forty-nine per cent, driven mainly by the 
expansion of foreign affiliates in the financial industry (CIB Bank and Citadel Capital) and 
pharmaceuticals (Pfizer).224 FDI flows to Morocco remained high with the country continuing to serve 
as a major manufacturing base for foreign investors in Africa. In 2015, Morocco attracted FDI in the 
automotive industry, especially from France and real estate developments from West Asia. Thus, 
despite a drop in overall FDI inflow, a number of African countries experienced growth in investment. 
 
Trends show that foreign investment in Africa is likely to grow in the coming decades. Foreign investors 
from developing economies are increasingly active in Africa, but those from developed countries 
remain the major players. This is reflective of recent global trends of rising FDI flows from emerging 
markets with half of the top ten investors in Africa coming from developing economies, including China 
and India.225 China’s FDI stock increased significantly as they overtook South Africa as the largest 
investor from a developing country in the region.226 Despite that, developed economies, led by the 
United Kingdom, the United States and France, remain the largest investors in the continent.227 As a 
result, it is predicted that FDI inflows to Africa would return to growth in 2016/2017 due to the growing 
number of greenfield projects being announced.228 Major automotive firms are expected to continue 
to expand into Africa such as PSA Peugeot-Citroen, Renault and Ford in Morocco, Volkswagen and 
BMW in South Africa, Honda in Nigeria, Toyota in Kenya and Nissan in Egypt. Furthermore, Textile and 
garments firms from Bangladesh, China and Turkey seeking alternative production bases for export to 
the European Union (EU) and North America see countries such as Ethiopia as ideal bases.229 Thus, 
despite a fall in FDI inflow in 2015, investment in Africa is projected to increase. 
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Although FDI is crucial for the economic growth of African countries, intra-regional investment is 
equally important especially if Africa wants to achieve self-determination and take up a leading role 
in international investment law reform. Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) shows that intra-regional FDI in Africa is manifestly limited both in terms of 
volume and diversity.230 It estimates that intra-regional FDI in Africa accounts for only five per cent of 
the total FDI in Africa in terms of value.231 Much of the criticism has been directed towards South 
Africa, the continent’s second largest economy, for failing to use its entrepreneurial advantage to its 
fullest. Nonetheless, South Africa’s intra-regional FDI eclipses those of Kenya and Nigeria, two 
important foreign investors in the region. Kenya, East Africa’s largest economy, has realised high FDI 
outflows to its neighbours Uganda and Tanzania, and considered East and Central Africa’s hub for 
financial services.232 However, FDI outflow from Kenya into the region is relatively small but it is 
predicted to grow in coming decades. Similarly, Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, actively targets the 
financial services sectors of other African countries with its FDI outflows. By far the most important 
source of FDI outflows in Africa stems from North Africa, with countries such as Libya and Egypt 
directing some of their FDI outflows at Africa. However, compared to the overall FDI flow in Africa, 
intra-regional FDI is markedly low. Nevertheless, UNCTAD acknowledges that there is “some evidence 
that intra-regional FDI is beginning to emerge in non-natural resource related industries.”233 UNCTAD 
recommends harmonisation of regional trade and investment agreements to help Africa realise its 
intra-regional FDI potential.234 
3. Regional integration in Africa 
The goal of increased harmonisation of trade and investment is at the heart of the regional integration 
plan for Africa spearheaded by the African Economic Community (AEC).235 The AEC is an organisation 
of the African Union with a mandate to establish mutual economic development among African states. 
This is to be achieved through the creation of custom unions, free trade areas, a central bank, a single 
market, a common currency and ultimately an economic and monetary union. Regional trade blocks 
in Africa, also known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), mainly the East African Community 
(EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have 
led the regional integration  campaign  through the establishment of free trade areas and  have 
launched programmes for the establishment of regional Customs Unions.236 The rest of the RECs, 
including the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Intergovernmental Authority on 
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Development (IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) are at the stage of coordinating Member 
State activities towards greater economic cooperation. This is essentially the platform for the 
proposed launch of a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)237 (signed in June 2015 and pending ratification 
by national parliaments) covering COMESA, SADC and EAC Member States, covering fifty-eight per 
cent of Africa’s total GDP.238 The aim is to create the largest economic block in Africa, with plans to 
extend the free trade area to ECOWAS, ECCAS and AMU Member States. Thus, Africa is geared towards 
greater regional integration, leading to greater harmonisation in trade and investment on the 
continent. More significantly, leaders of the TFTA announced at the June 2015 African Union Summit 
in South Africa, plans for a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) with all fifty-four African Union Member 
States. The launching of the CFTA negotiations is a critical step in Africa’s goal for self-determination, 
by creating a trade zone spanning the entire African continent.239 
 
Since both the TFTA and CFTA proposals are likely to pave way for increased economic cooperation 
and foreign investment in Africa, it is expected that both regional and foreign investors would in return 
demand investment protection before investing. Thus, the goals of increased FDI, intra-African trade 
and economic cooperation are unlikely to be achieved without a functioning regulatory framework for 
foreign investment. The need to study the relationship between the economic development of Africa 
and international investment treaties was expressed at the African Union Conference of Ministers of 
Trade, held in Addis Ababa in October 2013. This has culminated in a growing body of research 
focusing on economic and regulatory harmonisation in Africa.240 However, academic attention alone 
cannot defeat the perception that Africa is a risky destination for investment. Africa needs strong 
regulatory frameworks that guarantee essential protections. 
 
 
4. Regulatory Landscape in Africa 
The international investment regulatory framework in Africa (at global, regional and national level) is 
examined below. 
 
4.1 The global regulatory framework 
At global level, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is one of the four 
principal legal agreements of the WTO trade treaty, and all members of WTO are bound by it.241 The 
 
 
 
237 Also known as the African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) was announced at the EAC-SADC-COMESA Summit on 22 
October 2008. Also known as the African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ). 
238 Pearson, Mark. Trade Facilitation in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area. (tralac. 2011). 
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241 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO Agreement]. It has a total of 164 WTO members, Liberia and 
Afghanistan being the newest members joining in 2016. In Africa, only Criteria and South Sudan (submitted an 
application for observer status in 2012) are the UN member states which are neither members nor observers; 
see also TRIMS Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
130 
scope of the multilateral agreement is limited to investment measures affecting trade in goods, thus 
measures that harm trade in services are not covered. TRIMs enables international firms to operate 
more easily within foreign markets by restricting policies such as local content requirements, trade 
balancing requirements, foreign exchange restrictions and export restrictions that had historically 
been used to promote domestic interests, while having a negative impact on the commercial presence 
of foreign investors. In addition, investment made in the form of commercial presence by natural 
persons is governed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).242 Under GATS, the level 
of commitment to liberalizing the service sector differs from country to country depending on their 
commitment schedules.  243 Furthermore, the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is 
an open agreement, adopted by thirty-five OECD countries and  eleven  non-members including 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.244 This is a formal commitment to improve the investment climate by 
promoting social and economic development of multinational enterprises. 
 
Another important OECD instrument is the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (legally 
enforceable) which promotes progressive and non-discriminatory liberalization of capital movements, 
establishment and transactions mainly in service industries.245 In addition, the OECD Policy Framework 
for Investment, a soft law instrument, that underpins the fundamental principles of non- 
discrimination, rule of law and protection of property rights, has been participated in by African states 
including South Africa, Senegal, Mozambique, Morocco, Egypt and Tanzania. 246 The OECD Policy 
Framework for Investment was influential in Africa’s decision to launch an Investment Initiative of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) with four the primary objectives: promotion of 
sustainable growth and development, accelerating the empowerment of women, integrating Africa 
into the world economy and eradicating poverty.247 This is evident in the recent drive towards social- 
economic development. 
 
Furthermore, fifty-four African countries are members of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA).248 MIGA is the fifth member of the institution of the World Bank Group acting as an 
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investment insurance facility to encourage confident investment  in  developing  countries. MIGA 
provides political risk insurance and credit enhancement guarantees as a means of protecting foreign 
direct investment against political and non-commercial risks mainly in the developing countries. 
Similarly, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), another arm of the World Bank, offers 
investment, advisory and asset management services to investors in order to encourage private sector 
development particularly in the developing countries.249 Both institutions are funded by Member 
States through paid-in capital and the issuance of debt obligations in international capital markets. 
Last but not least, ICSID has been ratified by forty-four African countries.250 Non ICSID members from 
Africa include Angola, Cape Verde, Djibouti, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Eretria and 
Libya. Thus, a majority of African countries have ratified the ICSID convention giving foreign investors 
access to ICSID’s dispute resolution tribunals. 
 
However, ICSID’s dispute resolution mechanism is at the heart of the campaign to reform international 
investment law due to disagreements over the practice of investor-state arbitration. In 2015, sixty- 
two per cent of the known investment treaty arbitration disputes were handled under the ICSID 
procedural rules.251 However, investors can agree to pursue their investment disputes via other 
arbitral rules such as those provided by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (the 
UNCITRAL rules),252 or through private arbitral institutions such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). Thus, at global level, investment in 
African is governed by a multiplicity of regulatory instruments designed to promote investment 
protection, economic liberalisation and social development. 
 
4.2 The regional regulatory framework 
At sub-regional level, RECs have signed agreements and developed model laws containing investment 
protection standards. First, the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area 
(CCIA) was adopted in 2007 granting national and most-favoured nation protection to COMESA 
investors, in addition to the right of free transfer of payments.253 Similarly, expropriation must be for 
a  public  purpose  and  accompanied  by  ‘prompt,  adequate  and  effective’  compensation. 254  The 
 
 
 
249 See World Bank, “International Finance Corporation (IFC) inaugural report : July 24, 1956 - September 15, 
1956.” Washington DC, Currently has with 184 Member states. 
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253 CCIA, “Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area” signed 23/05/2007; Articles 15 
(transfer of assets), 17 (national treatment) and 19 (Most Favoured Nation); in the preamble to the CCIA, 
Member States express a conviction that the measure, “shall contribute towards the realisation of the Common 
Market and the achievement of sustainable development in the region.” 
254 COMESA, “Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area” signed 23/05/2007, Articles 
20 and 14. 
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Investment Agreement also provides rules for dispute settlement in both state-state and investor- 
state disputes. In investor-state disputes, an investor from a COMESA Member State may submit the 
dispute for arbitration via a competent local court, the COMESA Court of Justice, or pursue 
international arbitration. 255 In state-state disputes, a decision may be sought from a tribunal 
constituted under the COMESA court of justice.256 Thus, the CCIA Agreement offered a new approach 
to ISDS by combining the realities and sensitivities of African states into account as opposed to the BIT 
traditional approach. For instance, in order to quality for protection and thereafter obtain the right to 
dispute settlement under the agreement, the number of jobs created, the impact of the investor on 
local communities, the length of operation in the country and the amount of investment made in the 
host State would be assessed.257 
 
Furthermore, Part One of CCIA sets out the general obligations of Member States and institutional 
issues that are not justiciable. Article 10 states that “[n]o investor shall have recourse to dispute 
settlement for any matter relating to Part One of this Agreement.” Part Two sets out the rights and 
obligations of a COMESA Investor “with certain rights in the conduct of their business within an overall 
balance of rights and obligations between investors and Member States.”258 This includes compliance 
“with all applicable domestic measures of the Member State in which their investment is made.”259 
However, the consequences for breach are not clearly defined. The CCIA Agreement also departs from 
traditional IIAs in terms of substantive rights, by for example, providing flexibility in the interpretation 
of fair and equitable treatment standards to the level of development of the host State.260 Article 14(2) 
of the CCIA states that “the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as 
the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments and does not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by that standard.” In addition, Article 14(3) states 
that “Member States understand that different Member States have different forms of administrative, 
legislative and judicial systems and that Member States at different levels of development may not 
achieve the same standards at the same time.” 
 
The CCIA protects national regulatory space by incorporating a general exception clause under Article 
22(2) stating that: “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Member State from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to the principles outlined in sub- 
paragraphs 1(a) to (c) ….” These include national security and public morals; human, animal or plant 
life or health and the protection of the environment. Furthermore, Article 22(3)(a) provides a security 
exception by stating that nothing in the agreement shall be construed to “preclude a Member State 
from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations under the 
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United Nations Charter with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” The CCIA agreement required 
ratification by six States and to-date, this has not been achieved. Had it come into force, it would have 
been an important investment and political statement in Africa’s goal of self-determination in 
international investment law. 
 
Secondly, the Protocol on Finance and Investment for the SADC Free Trade Area came into force in 
2010.261 The Protocol covers all the areas normally found in IIAs and grants investment protections 
such as uncompensated expropriation (Article 5) and fair and equitable treatment (Article 6). The 
Protocol provides that investor-state disputes need to first be referred to a competent host State court 
and then, international arbitration via the SADC Tribunal, ICSID or an arbitration panel based on 
UNCITRAL rules (Article 28).262 In a move designed to harmonise investment policies in the sub- 
regional, a SADC model BIT was completed in 2012.263 However, the Model BIT shows a departure 
from the traditional BIT by not recommending most-favoured nation treatment and in terms of 
investor-state disputes, it does not recommend giving investors the right to initiate arbitration. 
 
Furthermore, unlike the CCIA, the SADC Model BIT requires exhaustion of local remedies before 
accessing ISDS: “the Investor or Investment, as appropriate, (i) has first submitted a claim before the 
domestic courts of the Host State for the purpose of pursuing local remedies, after the exhaustion of 
any administrative remedies, relating to the measure underlying the claim under this Agreement, and 
a resolution has not been reached within a reasonable period of time from its submission to a local 
court of the Host State . . . .”264 Thus, an investor is required to exhaust local remedies unless they can 
prove that “there are no reasonably available legal remedies capable of providing effective remedies 
of the dispute concerning the underlying measure” or the available dispute settlement mechanisms 
“provide no reasonable possibility of such remedies in a reasonable period of time.”265 The treaty also 
includes obligations on investors relating to environmental and social impact assessment (Article 13), 
minimum standard for human rights, environment and labour (Article 15), transparency of contracts 
and payments (Article 18), corruption (Article 10), compliance with domestic law (Article 11), provision 
of information (Article 12), investor liability (Article 17) and corporate governance standards (Article 
16). Non-compliance would mean that “the tribunal hearing such a dispute shall consider whether 
[the] breach, if proven, is materially relevant to the issue before it, and if so, what mitigating or off- 
setting effects this may have on the merits of a claim or on any damages awarded in the event of such 
 
 
261 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 5(1)(a), Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116; The 
objectives of the SADC are inter alia to “achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance 
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional    integration.”    Protocol    on    Finance    and    Investment    for    the    SADC    Free    Trade    Area 
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18/February 2017). 
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262 It should be noted, however that in Mike Campbell v. Zimbabwe (Case No SADCT 2/07), the Tribunal found 
the Government of Zimbabwe in breach of its treaty obligations and ordered it to protect the investments and 
pay the evicted farm owners a fair compensation. The SADC Tribunal was subsequently suspended. 
263 SADC Model BIT http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2017) 
264 SADC Model BIT http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2017), Article 29.4(b)(i). 
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award.” 266 Thus, the SADC Model BIT  offers a clearer  statement on the consequences  of non- 
compliance with the obligations imposed on investors as compared to CCIA. 
 
In addition, the SADC Model BIT contains an exception clause,267 which includes measures necessary 
for the protection of national security interests,268 tax measures269 and “non-discriminatory measures 
of general application taken by any public entity in pursuit of monetary and related credit policies or 
exchange rate policies.”270 These measures support the States right to regulate provided for under 
Article 20.1 which confirms that a State “has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure 
that development in its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, 
and with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives.” The goal is to limit the exposure of 
States to investor-state claims by arming them with certain defences. On compensation, the SADC 
Model BIT refers to ‘fair and adequate’ rather than ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation,271 
and “shall be based on an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of those 
affected, having regards for all relevant circumstances.”272 Again, this is a clear departure from the 
traditional BIT approach to compensation based on the Hull Formula.273 Thus, both CCIA and the SADC 
model BIT seek to promote Member States’ developmental objectives by departing from the 
traditional approach while preserving investors’ interests. 
 
Thirdly, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act on the Common Investment Rules for the Community was 
adopted in 2008.274 In addition to the customary BIT protections such as fair and equitable treatment 
and uncompensated expropriation, ECOWAS investors are guaranteed free transfer of assets including 
payments relating to investment. On dispute resolution, parties may refer their case to the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice, or to a national court or tribunal.275 The approach taken in the Supplementary Act of 
including a chapter on duties and obligations of investors marks a clear departure from traditional 
BITs. These duties and obligations include protection of human rights, labour rights (post 
establishment) and a social and environmental impact (pre-establishment). The Supplementary Act 
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273  Lorenzo Cotula, “The Regulatory Takings Doctrine” (2007) International Institute for Environment and 
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274 ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 on the Common Investment Rules. 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3266 (Accessed 18 January 2017). 
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also calls for Member States to review and renegotiate investment agreements that are not consistent 
with it.276 
 
Last but not least, the East African Community Model Investment Code was adopted in 2006, and 
although not legally binding, serves as a reference guidance for the design of laws and policies on 
investment in the region.277 The Code provides traditional investment protection standards such as 
non-discrimination, national treatment, uncompensated expropriation and the free transfer of assets 
as a means of improving the business climate in the region. On dispute resolution, the Code requires 
investors to apply for an investment certificate at a designated national investment agency, which 
would enable them to submit any disputes with the host State to international arbitration under the 
ICSID rules.278 However, the Code does not show a marked departure from the traditional IIAs. The 
inconsistent approach to investment policy at regional level can be overcome through regulatory 
harmonisation, a process which can be achieved following the CFTA. 
 
4.3 National regulatory framework 
At national level, African countries have made efforts to improve their investment climate through 
the signing of BITs and double taxation treaties. The first two African countries to sign a BIT were Egypt 
and Somalia in 1982, by then 110 BITs had already been signed with non-African states.279 These first 
generation BITs with non-African countries were largely motivated by the need to protect strategic 
economic interests in former colonies. To African countries, the BITs were a form of sovereignty 
statement as opposed to investment protection to serve the legitimate economic concerns of a newly 
independent state. Thus, African BITs signed between 1960 and 1980 were largely politicised and only 
in the 1990s did such agreements gain recognition as a tool for attracting investment and fostering 
development in the region. 280 Similarly, the signing of double taxation treaties between African 
countries began in 1956 with an agreement between Zambia and South Africa.281 These were also 
viewed a means of newly independent States to assert their sovereignty while allowing for the 
repatriation of capital without double taxation. Based on the UNCTAD statistics, of 2750 BITs, 783 
were concluded in Africa (145 intra-African) as well as 459 double taxation treaties (60 intra-African) 
out of 2894.282 Despite that, although Africa commands a large share of the global BIT network, African 
countries have done little to influence the development of international investment law. 
 
 
 
 
276 ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 on the Common Investment Rules.  
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3266 (Accessed 18 January 2017), Article 32(5) 
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277 East African Community Model Investment Code  
https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/EAC/EAC%20Model%20Investment%20Code%202006.pdf 
(Accessed 18 February 2017). 
278 East African Community Model Investment Code  
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(Accessed 18 February 2017) part II. 
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280 Michael E. Dickstein, “Revitalizing the International Law Governing Concession Agreements,” (1988) 6 Int'l 
Tax & Bus. Law. 54, 59. 
281 Generally see Martin Hearson, “Tax treaties in sub-Saharan Africa: a critical review” Tax Justice Network 
Africa, 2015). 
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Having examined the investment regulatory framework in Africa, it is evident that, at regional level, 
African countries are turning away from the traditional approach to investment protection, by seeking 
to rebalance international investment agreements in favour of host States. They also command a large 
share of the global BIT network, containing protections that are designed to promote investment. 
However, and perhaps the biggest challenge to Africa’s reform of international investment law, is the 
continued reliance on ISDS. It is therefore recommended that Africa’s economic goals cannot be 
achieved while still relying on traditional ISDS mechanisms. Rather, a RIC should be strongly 
considered as a way forward to accompany regional integration and regulatory harmonisation on the 
continent. However, such a paradigm shift in international investment policy requires strong 
justification, especially on the impact the current ISDS system has had on African countries. The 
relationship between ISDS and African countries is examined next. 
 
 
5. African participation in ISDS 
The total number of global ISDS claims crossed the 690 mark in 2015283 with a majority of new cases 
brought under BITs pursuant to investment protection standards such as Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(FET) and expropriation.284 However, the historical disparity in investment policy between developed 
and developing countries continues. Of the seventy investment-treaty based cases brought in 2015, 
less than twenty per cent of the claims were brought by investors from developing countries.285 
Despite a rise in claims against developed countries, the majority of cases (sixty per cent) were brought 
against developing countries. 286 Between 1972 and 2014, 111 cases accounting for a fifth of all 
documented investment-treaty based cases were against African countries.287 In terms of caseload, 
among African countries, Egypt has been a respondent in the most number of cases (twenty-five, 
ranking third globally), followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (eight cases). ICSID has been at 
the centre of these disputes by handling 107 of the 111 cases. Most of the disputes arose from 
economic sectors such as Oil, Gas & Mining and Electric Power & Other Energy, which attract the most 
FDI in Africa.288 Furthermore, only two per cent of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc Committee 
Members appointed in ICSID and Additional Facility held cases are African neither have African 
countries as respondents been particularly interested in choosing Africans as arbitrators.289 Both the 
high number of ISDS claims and poor participation in investment arbitration offer support for a new 
investment dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
Determining the potential liability of a State is  also often  difficult and  subject to discretionary 
interpretation by the tribunals. A number of high profile cases, where a government’s right to regulate 
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in the public interest had been dismissed in favour of private investors’ interests, have left a stain on 
the ISDS system leading to countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela to withdraw their membership 
of ICSID. 290 This trend is likely to continue. For example, following a governmental review into 
investment risks, South Africa decided to terminate older BITs to be replaced with domestic legislation 
on promotion and protection of investment, due to fears that domestic measures would be challenged 
by foreign investors. These countries argue that arbitral decisions often appear arbitrary and 
unjustified, thus defeating the underlying objective of the BITs. Thus, there are two substantive issues 
with the ISDS system; i) the broad  investment  protection  standards that  provoke discretionary 
tendencies; ii) the lack of consideration for national public policy (regulatory space) in the decision 
making process. 
 
Furthermore, foreign investors can use the threat of a costly investor-state suit to deter States from 
carrying out policy decisions that conflict with their economic interests.291 The Republic of South 
Africa’s ISCID case over policy changes in the mining industry provides a canonical example of the 
unsettling relationship between private interests and national public policy. In 2004, South Africa 
enacted a Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) bent on redressing historical 
apartheid-centric inequalities in the mining industry.292 The new system terminated previously held 
mining rights and required companies to reapply for licences, and instituted a mandatory twenty-six 
per cent ownership stake in the industry for black South Africans. Subsequently, a group of Italian 
investors brought an investor-state claim against South Africa arguing that they  had unlawfully 
expropriated their investment and  treated  them unfairly.  Four years  later, the Italian  investors 
dropped their claims and were ordered to pay £290,000 towards South Africa’s legal costs. In the end, 
South Africa was left with over £3m in legal fees to pay and the pressure of the case forced the 
government to allow the Italian investors’ companies to transfer only five per cent of ownership to 
black South Africans. Subsequently, South Africa pushed forward plans to terminate a large number 
of old BITs.293 South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry commented on the growing impetus 
for change as follows: “[h]undreds of long-ignored investment treaties offer investors access to an 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, allowing them to take their disputes directly to 
international arbitration – leapfrogging domestic legal systems (and thus, any safeguards designed to 
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protect important public goods).” 294 Thus, South African has led  the African revolt against the 
international investment law regime. 
 
The lack regulatory space is compounded by a perceived lack of consistency and legitimacy in the 
arbitral decisions leading to some degree of uneasiness among African states. As a result, African 
countries are increasingly worried about the potential liability arising from existing agreements 
especially in the event of conflicts, knowing that they could be sued by investors for changes in 
economic and regulatory conditions that are necessary or even beyond the their control. On that 
background, African countries need to devise a strategy for investment regulation that would support 
a balance between investment protection and national regulatory space. 
 
6. The international investment law reform pathways 
The UNCTAD suggested five alternative paths to reforming the international investment law regime.295 
Firstly, by limiting investor access to ISDS through provisions requiring investors to exhaust local 
remedies.296 A small minority of IIAs require foreign investors to use domestic mechanism before 
bringing an investor-state claim, normally for a limited period of time.297 This proposal has been widely 
explored in academic literature with scholars such Tan and Bouchenaki doubting its practicality, 
especially in Africa, in the absence of viable legally enforceable alternatives to investor-state 
arbitration.298 Another academic, Matthew Porterfield, argues that the exhaustion of local remedies 
requirement could help to improve the decision making of investment tribunals by providing guidance 
on the relevant domestic law rather than leaving the tribunals to make a subjective judgement on the 
investors’ legitimate expectations.299 Furthermore, national court experience in settling investment 
disputes prior to ISDS, coupled with measures to curb abuse of governmental powers, shows that in 
developed legal systems, the standard of dispute settlement does not fall far below that provided 
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under international investment law.300 However, the biggest challenge with funnelling investor-state 
disputes through domestic courts in Africa is a general lack judicial legitimacy. This is likely to affect 
investor confidence in the dispute resolution system leading to a backlash against the inclusion 
exhaustion of local remedies provisions in IIAs with African states. 
 
Another suggested means of limiting investor access to ISDS is by restricting the subject-matter scope 
of ISDS claims. This has already been incorporated in the CCIA where a denial of benefit clause is used 
to limit access to ISDS for investors without a track record of job creation, inter alia, in the host State. 
Similarly, States can choose to limit the subject-matter scope for ISDS claims by excluding certain types 
of claims from international arbitration. For example, the Cameroon-Turkey BIT excludes claims 
relating to real estate and the Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement excludes 
claims relating to national treatment and performance requirements. In the context of Africa, limiting 
access to ISDS is seemingly unrealistic given the underdeveloped state of most legal systems, a general 
lack of judicial legitimacy, and a chronic lack of bargaining power during the treaty negotiation process 
with capital exporting States.301 On the latter, this might explain why, with the exception of South 
Africa, other African countries have shown a general reluctance to criticise the system. However, 
increased regional integration and regulatory harmonisation could improve African States’ bargaining 
power. 
 
Secondly, UNCTAD proposed tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs. This entails tailored 
modifications to aspects of ISDS in new IIAs. Procedural innovations highlighted in UNCTAD’s IPFSD 
include setting time limits for bringing claims in order to prevent the revival of old claims and to limit 
State exposure to claims.302 For example, both the SADC Model BIT and CCIA set a three year time 
limit for bringing a claim against a host State.303 Similarly, both CCIA and the SADC Model BIT provide 
for Fork in the Road clauses. Article 28(3) of the CCIA provides that the “election [of a fora] shall be 
definitive and the investor may not thereafter submit a claim relating to the same subject matter or 
underlying measure to other fora.”304 Equally, Article 29.4(c) of the SADC Model BIT provides that an 
investor must provide “a clear and unequivocal waiver of any right to pursue and/or to continue any 
claim relating to the measures underlying the claim made pursuant to this Agreement, on behalf of 
both the Investor and the Investment, before local courts in the host State or in any other dispute 
settlement forum.” These measures are designed to limit State exposure to investor-state claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
300 See Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration, The 
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Furthermore, UCTAD proposes supporting contracting parties’ role in interpreting IIAs by facilitating 
for binding joint party interpretations which would require tribunals to refer certain issues to treaty 
parties for determination, rather than tribunals making their own interpretations that may go against 
the treaty parties’ intentions. 305 For example, the SADC Model BIT preserves Member States 
interpretive role, stating: [j]oint decision of the State Parties, each acting through its representative 
designated for purpose of this Article, declaring their joint interpretation of a provision of this 
Agreement, shall be binding on any tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must apply 
and be consistent with that joint decision.” 306 Another measure is to establish a mechanism for 
consolidating related claims with the aim of reducing the cost of proceedings and increasing 
consistency of awards.307 For example, Article 29.18(a) of the SADC Model BIT states that “[w]here 
two or more claims have been submitted separately to arbitration … and the claims have a question 
of law or fact in common and arise out of the same underlying measure or measures or 
circumstances.” Furthermore, UNCTAD proposes providing a mechanism for an early discharge of 
unmeritorious claims in order to reduce wastage of resources.308 In order to increase transparency, 
parties could consider granting public access to arbitration and the participation of non-disputing (civil 
society organisation) in the dispute.309 For example, Article 28(5) of CCIA requires, “[a]ll documents 
relating to a notice of intention to arbitrate, the settlement of any dispute …, the initiation of an 
arbitral tribunal, or the pleadings, evidence and decisions in them, shall be available to the public.”310 
Similarly, Article 29.17(a) of the SADC Model BIT obligates states to “promptly publish, or otherwise 
make publicly available, its laws and  regulations of general application  as well  as international 
agreements that may affect the investments of Investors of the other State Party.” Thus, public 
involvement in the dispute resolution process could help to infuse the much needed transparency and 
legitimacy into the ISDS system. 
 
Encouraging public involvement through amicus curiae briefs could also provide a means of improving 
disclosure. For example, Article 28(8) of the CCIA states that “[a]n arbitral tribunal shall be open to the 
receipt of amicus curiae submissions.” A similar position is found in Article 29.15 of the SADC Model 
BIT, stating that the tribunal “shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”311 UNCTAD’s proposals should 
accompany changes to the wording of substantive protection provisions in IIAs such as full protection 
and security and fair and equitable treatment, by including limitations to reflect local realities in Africa. 
For example, countries such as Canada and USA limit full protection and security requirements to 
police protection thus reducing scope for liability and misinterpretation of the provision.312 However, 
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the bargaining power often lies with the capital exporting States and most African states would be 
unwilling to impose limitations that may deter foreign investment.313 Thus regional integration and 
regulatory harmonisation promises a unified approach to treaty negotiation and drafting for African 
countries. 
 
Thirdly, UNCTAD proposes the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) such as mediation and 
conciliation. Thus, African countries could rely on ADR as a means of reducing fully-fledged investor- 
state arbitrations. This could be achieved through the incorporation of treaty provisions for non- 
binding ADR methods in a multilateral investment agreement. For example, the SADC Model BIT 
provides that after submission of the Notice of Intent, “the Investor or the Host State may request 
mediation of the dispute, in which case the other disputing party may agree to such mediation.”314 
Similarly, the CCIA provides that where no alternative means of dispute settlement are agreed upon, 
“a party shall seek the assistance of a mediator to resolve disputes during the cooling-off period.”315 
These methods place little emphasis on legal obligations but rather on reaching a fair position in the 
view of both parties. In that vein, mediators are responsible for proposing and arranging workable 
solutions, while conciliators draw up agreements that represent a just compromise between the 
parties involved in the dispute. 
 
Although ADR methods could help to preserve a workable relationship, there is no guarantee that a 
solution would be reached. Furthermore, States may not deem ADR suitable for making a 
determination on national policy decisions, and where it is unsuccessful, the procedure could simply 
add to the costs of dispute resolution. It would also not stop access to international arbitration or 
resolve the underlying challenges facing the ISDS system such as lack of legitimacy and consistency.316 
Alternatively, a system of preliminary rulings could be introduced, where unclear questions of law in 
on-going proceedings are referred to a designated body. This could infuse desired consistency into the 
system. 317 It is suggested  that preliminary rulings are strongly considered in Africa’s reform of 
international investment law. 
 
Fourthly, UNCTAD proposes the introduction of an appeals facility (such as the one promulgated in 
the investment chapters of CETA and TTIP).318 The aim is to increase consistency of awards and 
enhance  predictability  of  the  law, while  correcting erroneous  decisions  of  the  tribunal  of  First 
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Instance.319 Decisions by the appeals tribunal would guide arbitrators in adjudicating future disputes, 
thus creating a system of precedent, but also help disputing parties in judging the strengths of their 
case before embarking on a costly dispute. The appeals tribunal should be staffed with permanent 
members, appointed by Member States, to make balanced  opinions in  a bid  to overcome the 
legitimacy concerns facing the current ISDS system. Thus, the appellate body would act as a 
supervisory body for the First Instance tribunal. 
 
However, it is unlikely that consistency would be achieved in a dispersed legal system consisting of 
over 3000 IIAs, with dissimilar provisions and regulatory context.320 At international level, via ICSID for 
instance, the appeals option would need wide support among signatories through an amendment of 
the ICSID Convention, which would be difficult to achieve. 321 It also faces a number of practical 
challenges: i) who elects members of the appellate body (who elects and how); ii) are appeals limited 
to points of law or are questions of fact included? iii) does the appellate body apply to current IIAs? 
iv) is it limited to ICSID or does it apply to other arbitration rules?; v) will it signal an end to national 
court review 322 and the ICSID annulment mechanism? The aforementioned questions over the 
selections of members, scope of the tribunals’ powers and the relevant rules, are somewhat 
minimised at regional level where a group of countries, subject to a multi-lateral agreement, condition 
the body to serve and take into account local realities. It should also be emphasised that an appellate 
body is a core fabric of the proposed RIC for Africa. 
 
Although actions have been taken at regional level in Africa to infuse development-oriented factors in 
investment agreements, African countries have generally failed to embrace the new generation of 
investment policies. For example, the CCIA is not operational, the SADC Model BIT is not binding and 
no country has taken steps to model their BITs on it. Although there are notable attempts to rebalance 
international investment agreements in favour of host States in both the CCIA and SADC Model BIT, 
African countries continue to rely on international arbitration as a mean of dispute resolution. These 
attempts include: (i) clarifying terms such as the meaning ‘investment’ thus limiting scope for 
expansive interpretation by the tribunals; ii) limiting access to ISDS by excluding some matters from 
dispute settlement iii) imposing obligations on investors in bid to achieve a balance of rights and 
responsibilities. These pro-State measures alone are however unlikely to achieve the desired change. 
Furthermore, the collapse of the SADC Tribunal following the Mike Campbell Ltd & others v. Zimbabwe 
decision clearly undermines any efforts to project dispute resolution in Africa as an alternative to 
international arbitration.323 For Africa to develop a tailored development-oriented investment system, 
African countries must play a greater role in the international investment law reform process. For 
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example, apart from South Africa, African countries have been absent from on-going debates on the 
future of ISDS and the reform pathways. Compared to Latin American countries324 and Asian-Pacific 
states,325 African countries appear to be rather content with the system having not criticised it and 
through the continued ratification of traditional investment treaties. 326 Despite the inaction, the 
pathways for reform should not be closed off; rather UCTAD’s reform proposal on creating a standing 
international investment court should be pursued.327 This reform proposal is explored below. 
7. The proposal for a Regional Investment Court 
UNCTAD proposes replacing ad hoc arbitral tribunals with an international court.328 The proposal, if 
implemented at regional level, is likely to sit well with African states for a number of reasons. First, it 
rests on the principle that private arbitration is not appropriate for handling matters involving national 
public policy.329 This calls for a mechanism that supports independence and impartiality of judges 
which can be achieved through tenured appointments to insulate judges from outside interests. Thus, 
the judges would be elected by States on a permanent basis thus saving on costs of searching for 
potential arbitrators. In doing so, the investment court system would be infusing consistency, 
transparency and legitimacy into ISDS. However, at international level, such a system requires a 
coordinated effort from a large number of countries, which would be difficult to achieve.330 Thus, to 
encourage participation, the designers of the system would need to include an opt-in mechanism for 
those States that may wish to join at a later stage. The court is expected to be consistent in interpreting 
and applying treaty norms as compared to arbitral tribunals. 
 
This proposal should, however, be pursued in a unified Africa rather than at sub-regional level. The 
recent standstill on the CCIA and SADC Model BIT clearly indicates that African states are unwilling to 
stand up to the pressures that powerful partners might exert on them if they choose to pursue a 
different policy direction.331 However, the CFTA negotiations present a good opportunity for a joint- 
African position on international investment policy. Essentially, the CFTA represents a new chapter in 
Africa’s endeavours to promote regional integration and competiveness by overcoming the colonial 
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326 Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, “Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique”, (2013) 35 Mich. J. Int'l L. 131. 
See also Sao Tome and Principe Ratifies the ICSID Convention, ICSID News Release (May 21, 2013). 
327 A far-reaching option is abandon ISDS altogether and returns to State-State arbitration; See for example the 
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (2006), the Australia-United States FTA (2004) and the 
Australia-Malaysia FTA (2012). 
328 UNCTAD, “Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap”, IIA Issue Note No. 2 (June 
2013) 9. 
329 Gus Van Harten, “A Case for International Investment Court”, Inaugural Conference of the Society for 
International Economic Law, (16 July 2008), 5-9. 
330   Edwardo   Zuleta,   “The   Challenges   of   Creating    a    Standing    International    Investment    Court” 
TDM 1 (2014). 
331 Tandon, Yash. Europe and the Challenge of African Integration. 2004. 
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legacy of fragmentation while harnessing the benefits of a large integrated market.332 Thus, the CFTA 
proposal presents a platform for a multilateral investment agreement that promises greater trade and 
intra-African investment. 333 A permanent regional investment court would handle investment 
disputes among CFTA Member States, but it would also be incorporated in future IIAs, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, involving CFTA Member States and third States. A common African position 
on IIAs would eradicate the foregoing practice where individual countries negotiate complex and 
confusing BITs, leaving themselves exposed to varying claims. Thus, a multilateral agreement on 
international investment presents African countries a path towards self-determination in international 
investment law.334 
 
However, the idea is not new and has recently begun to manifest in the EU reform of international 
investment law. In May 2015, the EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom, announced the EU 
Commission’s plans to replace international investment tribunals with a traditional court system.335 
These proposals were formally unveiled by the European Commission in November 2015. They include 
plans for a public investment court system with an appellate mechanism, composed of publicly 
appointed judges with qualifications comparable to those of members of the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO) appellant body or judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This 
mechanism has already been incorporated in CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
and has been taunted as the future of ISDS. Article 207 of the TFEU, arms the EU exclusive competence 
to conclude agreements covering investment with third States.336 For the proposed RIC to work, the 
African Union would need to be armed with the same competence. The RIC would be modelled on 
TTIP and similar approaches in other multilateral institutions as explained below. 
 
8. A question of design 
The proposal for a neutral and permanent international investment court in Africa calls for careful 
design in order avoid the mistakes of the SADC Regional Tribunal and learn from the criticism of 
 
 
332 Work Plan for the AU Commission for the Preparatory Phase of the CFTA Negotiations (2014). Bridges Africa, 
“The Continental Free Trade Area: What’s going on? “3(9) 2014. 
333 Paul Kalenga, “Critical Issues in the Negotiations of the Continental Free Trade Area” (2016) tralac, Working 
Paper No.S16WP02,; Isabelle Rambdoo,”Upgrading Africa’s Participation in Global Value Chains Requires 
International Rules to Evolve”, Great Insights, 4(6) December 2015/January 2016. 
334 Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, 
Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment(2013), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf (Accessed 
19 February 2017). 
335 European Commission Conceptual paper “Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform. Enhancing 
the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court”, published on 
the 5 May 2015. 
336 Article 207 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) “The common commercial policy shall 
be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common 
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action.” On the transfer of competence to the EU, see Sven L Johannson, The competence of the European Union 
for foreign direct investment under the Treaty of Lisbon (University of Halle-Wittenberg, 2009); Julien Chaisse, 
Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment (2012) Journal of International 
Economic Law, 15 (1): 51-84. 
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international investment arbitration. Thus, it is imperative to examine how the court would be 
created, structured, supplied and qualified. Indeed, ICSID’s experience, especially in the first two 
decades, presents a useful guide on how an organisation with few staff and no cases can rise to the 
centre of international law through educational and informational activities. Thus, the investment 
court is not expected to be a panacea nor a quick fix measure, rather it is a long-term strategy that 
would require commitment from all relevant stakeholders. 
First and foremost, the RIC should be formed following the CFTA regional block, under a multilateral 
investment agreement. However, creativeness is needed in order to arrive at solutions that offer 
fairness and support sustainable development. This includes the potential use of existing legal and 
institutional settings, whether it is WTO or ICSID, for logistical purposes. Thus, the features of existing 
arbitral institutions should feed into the design of the RIC for Africa. 
 
Secondly, on the question of jurisdiction, the RIC does not necessarily need to be linked to a certain 
substantive body of law, rather, like the ICJ, jurisdiction could be based an agreement among all 
parties involved to submit certain disputes to the court.  This  jurisdiction  could  be based  on a 
multilateral agreement, a BIT, say between the UK and Uganda, laws, notifications or presentation of 
a dispute, in line with the current practice. The Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital 
in the Arab States, which created the Arab Investment Court is a good example.337 Thus, for a RIC for 
Africa aimed at resolving investment-related disputes between investors and host States to work, it 
would require Member States to modify their IIAs, or merely provide a general acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the court. This would give the investment court jurisdiction over disputes relating to 
IIAs in Africa. In discharging its duties, the court would need to produce its own rules on arbitration, 
conciliation and the mediation procedure, as well as codes of conduct or ethics, rules on management 
and related documents. 
 
Thirdly, the investment courts would consist of publicly appointed judges instead of party appointed 
arbitrators. Treaty-based establishment of a roster of judges would overcome the problem of having 
public disputes handled by private arbitrators. The designers could borrow ideas from the Inter- 
American Commission of Human Rights338 where members are appointed on a roster for a period of 
time and cases are allocated in accordance with internal rules. Similarly, under the TTIP investment 
court proposal, judges would be allocated cases randomly thus disputing parties would have no 
influence on the three judges hearing their case. In the RIC, the judges would be randomly assigned 
cases in their subordinated tribunals thus parties would play no role in the appointing of judges. This 
would help to overcome conflict of interest concern with regards to a subordinate tribunal or judge 
because, where such issues arise, the case would be assigned to another subordinate tribunal or judge. 
 
Furthermore, given the rise in investor-state claims over breach of treaty commitments due to 
enactment of public laws and regulations, and not only on commercial matters pertaining to private 
or State contracts, it makes sense to promote a public dispute settlement mechanism over a private 
commercial system. The RIC proposal aims to achieve this without denying the right to individual or 
 
 
337 The Unified Agreement was signed on 26 November 1980 in Amman, Jordan, and entered into force on 7 
September 1981. 
338  The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights was created by a resolution of the Fifth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago, Chile, in 1959. 
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private action for foreign investors. The designers could learn from the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea which has several Special Chambers within thus enabling adjudicators to become 
experts in their own sub-field.339 This has the potential to create consistency, increased legitimacy and 
coherence in international investment law.340 The judges on a roster or designated tribunal would be 
appointed in advance by the dispute resolution body and called upon when a claim is filed. Article 
11(1) of TTIP which requires judges, once appointed to a particular case, to refrain from acting as 
counsel in any pending or investment protection dispute under TTIP or any other agreement or 
domestic law, should be implemented in the RIC agreement. Unlike judges in local courts, RIC judges 
would not receive a monthly wage rather they would be required to charge legal fees for cases they 
take up.341 The judges would also need to meet ethical and professional requirements including 
sufficient knowledge of international economic law.342 As result, investors would be satisfied with the 
competency of the judges and States would be satisfied with the transparency and predictability the 
system is likely to create. 
 
Fourthly, an arbitral award is meant to be final and binding, and perhaps this is the reason why there 
is no fully-fledged appeal body in our current ISDS system.343 The available annulment mechanism only 
deals with the procedural legitimacy of the tribunal’s decision while an appeals chamber deals with 
both any procedural improprieties and the substantive correctness of the decision. The proposed RIC 
would consist of a Tribunal of First Instance and an Appellate Tribunal. This means that the appeals 
body would be able to make a determination on whether the Tribunal of First Instance got it wrong.344 
The rationale behind an appeals body modelled along the lines of the WTO Appellate Body is to 
enhance predictability of investment rules and consistency without lengthening the legal proceedings 
or forcing investors to incur additional costs.345 
 
 
 
 
339 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent judicial body established by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
340 Nicolette Butler, “In Search of a Model for the Reform of International Investment Dispute Resolution: An 
Analysis of Existing International and Regional Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Reshaping the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement System”, Journeys for the 21st Century (Koninklijke Brill NV / Nijhoff International Investment 
Law Series, TDM, OGEMID, Feb 2015) 380; Hildegard Rondón de Sansó Vías sustitutivas del arbitraje 
internacional de inversión (Alternative ways to international investment Arbitration, Venezuelan Newspaper 
Quinto Día, 8 June 2012). 
341 TTIP proposes paying the judges a monthly retainer fee in order to ensure their availability; a measure that 
could be considered. 
342 TTIP proposes a Code of Conduct for the judges (in Annex II to the Proposal) with Article 5 stating that judges 
“shall not be influenced by self-interest, outside pressure, political considerations, public clamour, loyalty to a 
Party or disputing party or fear of criticism.” 
343 Johanna Kalb, “Creating an ICSID Appellate Body”, (2005)UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign 
Affairs, 10, 179; Santiago Montt, “State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (Hart Publishing, 2009)137.   
344 Ten Cate, “International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, Vol. 44 (2012), 1109; Andreas Bucher, “Is There a Need to Establish a Permanent 
Reviewing Body?”, in: Gaillard (ed.), The Review of international Arbitration Awards (Juris Publishing, Huntington, 
2010), 285; See Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1) paragraph 
23; Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4) , 
paragraph 97. 
345 David Gaukrodger and Gordon Kathryn, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the 
Investment Policy Community”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 2012/03,  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en (Accessed 30 January 2017) 59. 
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Fifthly, international investment law in its current state, without a multilateral agreement on 
substantive protection standards, leaves itself open to inconsistency. Both academics and the business 
community have criticised the ISDS system for its lack of guidance on the obligations under investment 
agreements due to unpredictable outcomes and chronic inconsistencies.346 The creation of a single 
regional investment agreement in Africa, with a large number of BITs and other IIAs falling under its 
umbrella (provided the relevant treaty signatories mutually grant consent), plus an appeals body to 
correct substantively wrong awards, could help bring about the much-needed consistency and 
standards that could be replicated elsewhere. Furthermore, Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)347 provide rules and a method of treaty interpretation tantamount to 
customary international law.348 Under the RIC, the first tribunal to interpret a given provision would 
apply the customary rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT. Subsequent decisions would follow 
the precedent, but there would still be an application of the rules of interpretation, as authoritatively 
fixed in the first decision. 
 
Sixthly, another advantage of a multilateral treaty on investment is the facilitation of a rights balance. 
The treaty would contain obligations on parties to seek mediated solutions and exhaust local remedies, 
in an effort to resolve disputes faster and at low cost. However, this does not overcome the contention 
that where mediation or local remedies are not successful, parties would incur additional cost. 
Furthermore, borrowing from the CCIA and the SADC Model BIT, future IIAs with CFTA Member States 
would contain public policy objectives in a bid to protect the balance between private and public 
interests.349 This would allow tribunals to explicitly refer to those objectives without looking beyond 
the investment agreement for wider interpretation. However, this cannot be achieved  without 
consistency in treaty interpretation. Tribunals have not always adhered-to binding international rules 
on interpretation but rather, followed a system of de facto precedent which is premised on path 
dependency and makes it easier to repeat mistakes.350 In such a system, the balance between private 
and public interests expressed in the relevant investment treaties may be misinterpreted and even 
replaced by one created by the tribunals. Thus, placing international dispute settlement in the public 
sphere could help to achieve a rights balance. 
 
Last but not least, on funding, lessons could be learnt from WTO and its dispute settlement body, both 
of which rely on contributions (gifts, voluntary contributions and donations) from Member States. The 
 
 
346 William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, “Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations”, (2010)Yale Journal of International Law, 35, 283. 
347 Lauge S Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha  and Jason W Yackee, “Costs and Benefits of an EU–USA Investment 
Protection Treaty”, report prepared for the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, April 2013 (LSE) 6.   
348 Ten Cate, “The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, (2013) Columbia Journal 
of  Transnational  Law,  51,  418;  Steffen  Hindelang,  “Bilateral  Investment  Treaties,  Custom  and  a  Healthy 
Investment Climate - The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited”, (2004) 
The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 5, 789; Christoph Schreuer and Mathew Weiniger, “Conversations 
Across Cases – Is There a Doctrine of Precedent in Investment Arbitration?”  
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/conv_across_90.pdf (21 January 2017) 1. 
349 Suzanne Spears, “The Quest for Policy Space in a new Generation of International Investment Agreements”, 
(2010) Journal of International Economic Law, 13, 1037. 
350 Gilbert  Guillaume, “The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators”, (2011) Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, 2, 5; Thomas Wälde, “Confidential Awards as Precedent in Arbitration: 
Dynamics and Implication of Award Publication”, in: Banifatemi and Gaillard (eds.), Precedent in International 
Arbitration Law, (Juris Publishing, 2008)113. 
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fact that financing the permanent tribunals could cost less than the amount paid in terms of fees and 
costs in international investment arbitrations should sit well with Member States. However, it would 
be necessary that Member States provide initial funding until the system gains a foothold where it is 
financially self-sustaining in relation to administration and maintenance costs. 
 
Having examined the operational challenges and features of the proposed RIC, it is clear that for the 
RIC to survive, reform through consensus and a coordinated African voice is vital. The investment court 
would be expected to compete, as an alternative, with existing dispute resolution options such as 
UNCITRAL and ICSID, but over time, the tribunal should gain a reputation of attracting cases. At that 
stage, after bolstering its reputation, States could consider formally granting consent to submit to the 
investment court only. Such a coordinated policy on investment protection and dispute resolution is 
likely to enhance Africa’s global competitiveness, strengthen Africa’s bargaining power in 
international investment, and ultimately lead to increased investment on the continent. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the end of colonial rule, African countries have pursued policies aimed at improving social- 
economic development to support their goal of self-determination and economic independence. 
UNCTAD’s statistics clearly indicate that Africa lags far behind Europe and Asia in terms of FDI despite 
commanding a sizeable share of the global BIT network. There is also an increase in the number of 
investor-state disputes involving African countries, and on a continent still waking up from a colonial 
legacy, national regulatory space is important to the goal of self-determination and social-economic 
development. Despite that, only South Africa has been able to place a critical hand on the system, 
which raises questions on whether other African countries are oblivious to these issues or fear the 
reprisal of their powerful State partners. At regional level however, both the SADC Model BIT and the 
CCIA, show evidence of collective discontent over the status quo, as evidenced by the notable 
departures from traditional BITs. However, individually, African countries have failed to give these 
progressive developments the mandate needed to spur change on the continent. This pro-regional 
approach is also evident in the foregoing plans for a CFTA, creating a union of trading blocs encircling 
fifty four countries. 
 
A RIC, borne out of the proposal for an investment agreement between CFTA Member States, would 
aim to balance regional realities while offering investors the necessary protection needed to invest on 
the continent. The investment agreement would incorporate some of the developmental provisions 
in the CCIA and the SADC Model BIT, with the support of the RIC. This paradigm shift in international 
investment policy, if pursued, would set African countries on a path to self-determination in 
international investment law and creates scope for sustainable social-economic development. The 
intention is to increase predictability through stable bodies and precedents, transparency through 
increased disclosure, legitimacy through an appeals mechanism and promotion of regulatory space 
through a centralised treaty negotiation and drafting process. The success of the investment court 
would be measured by a number of factors. First, the level of participation of African countries and 
the number of cases resolved, including the speed at which the cases are resolved. Participation and 
consent to the jurisdiction of the court by foreign investors from developing countries could also be 
considered a mark of success given Africa’s position in the international economic order. However, for 
Africa to emerge as a credible investment dispute resolution centre, policy, legal, infrastructural and 
institutional problems must be overcome. It remains to be seen whether African countries would 
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accompany South Africa in supporting the new generation of investment policies and effectively 
engage in the process of creating a RIC for Africa. 
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Panel 5: Chair 
Professor Emmanuel Gaillard 
 
Emmanuel Gaillard founded and heads Shearman & Sterling’s 100- 
lawyers International Arbitration practice. He has advised and 
represented companies, States and State-owned entities in hundreds of 
international arbitrations. He also acts as arbitrator and expert witness. 
Emmanuel Gaillard is universally regarded as a leading authority and a 
star practitioner in the fields of both commercial and investment treaty 
arbitration. A Professor of Law in France currently acting as a Visiting 
Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Emmanuel Gaillard has been 
appointed by France on the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators. He regularly acts 
as expert for the OECD, UNCTAD, and UNCITRAL. In 2010, he was 
appointed as expert by UNCITRAL for the drafting of the forthcoming 
UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the New York Convention. He chairs the 
International Arbitration Institute (IAI) and was the first President and 
one of the co-founders of the International Academy for Arbitration 
Law. 
 
Panel 5: Speakers 
Smrithi Ramesh is the Assistant Director and Head of Legal Services at 
the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA). At the 
KLRCA, Smrithi supervises and manages the administration of all ADR 
disputes in KLRCA and is involved actively in developing the legal 
philosophy and strategy of the Institution. She is also involved in 
spearheading development projects such as revision of the Arbitration 
Rules, maritime initiatives and other Alternative Dispute Resolution 
projects within Malaysia and for the region. She completed her LLB in 
India and thereafter completed an LLM from the University of California, 
Berkeley with focus on International Dispute Resolution. Prior to joining 
the KLRCA, Smrithi was practicing in India dealing with a variety of 
transactional, corporate, domestic and international arbitration 
disputes. She is also the lead contributor for the book “Law, Practice and 
Procedure of Arbitration ( Lexis Nexis 2nd edn) and an expert contributor 
for the book “ Arbitration in Malaysia ( Reuters). 
Ms Smrithi Ramesh 
Mr. Steve Finizio is recognized as one of the leading international 
arbitration lawyers in London in the Chambers UKGuide, named in 
the Euromoney Guide to the World's Leading Experts in Commercial 
Arbitration and recognized for his standing in the field of 
international arbitration in Legal 500, Chambers Global, Chambers 
Europe, Global Arbitration Review's Who's Who in International 
Arbitration, PLC Which Lawyer? and Legal Media Group's The Best of 
the Best Mr. Finizio's practice includes international arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution, general commercial litigation, and 
internal investigations, focusing on complex commercial and 
regulatory issues. Mr. Finizio also serves as an arbitrator. 
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Mr Steven Finizio 
Duncan is a barrister and a member of the international arbitration 
and Africa groups at Stephenson Harwood LLP. Duncan specialises 
in international arbitration and litigation in matters related to 
African, and global, projects and contracts. He joined Stephenson 
Harwood after spending three years as the Registrar of the LCIA- 
MIAC Arbitration Centre in Mauritius. He speaks English and French 
and works on cases relating to Francophone and Anglophone 
African jurisdictions. He has been recommended for international 
commercial dispute resolution in Chambers and Partners and the 
Legal 500 directories, and was named as a leading international 
arbitration practitioner under 45 in "Who's Who Legal: Future 
Leaders 2017”. 
Mr Duncan Bagshaw 
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Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise 
 
Ms. Meise represents and advises sovereign governments and 
private entities in preventing and resolving international investment, 
commercial, public international law, and human rights disputes in 
domestic, international, and ADR fora, including before arbitration 
tribunals, other local and international tribunals, the PCA, and the ICJ. 
She also teaches International Human Rights Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center and serves as a Fellow of the Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University. Before her legal 
career, Xander worked in finance and international political 
development. 
 
Mr Baiju Vasani is an international arbitration lawyer and arbitrator. 
He has served as counsel and arbitrator in international arbitrations 
involving ICSID, ICC, LCIA, ICDR, SIAC, UNCITRAL Rules, bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), the Energy Charter Treaty, NAFTA, DR- 
CAFTA, and public international law. He also has advised states on the 
negotiation and drafting of treaties and companies in investment 
structuring. 
Mr Baiju Vasani 
Luis specialises in international law, international trade and 
international dispute resolution, including investment treaty 
arbitration, international commercial arbitration and the resolution 
of state-state trade disputes. Luis has been listed in the Who’s Who 
Legal: Arbitration – Future Leaders 2017. Prior to joining Matrix, Luis 
worked for ten years at the Office of the General Counsel for 
International Trade Negotiations of the Government of Mexico. As 
Deputy General Counsel, he appeared as counsel and lead counsel 
for Mexico in investment treaty arbitrations under the NAFTA and 
BITs and legal advisor in the negotiation of the bilateral investment 
treaties with the United Kingdom, China, India, Spain, Panama, 
Ukraine and Russia. Luis has been an external consultant to UNCTAD 
and the Organisation of American States (OAS) on dispute settlement 
policy matters. 
Mr Luis Gonzalez Garcia 
International arbitration, as counsel, arbitrator or chairman, with 
particular focus on: international contracts (construction contracts, 
joint venture agreements, concessions, oil and gas contracts, 
contracts for supply of industrial plants, distribution, agency, sales, 
share purchase agreements, telecommunications 
contracts)international trade law in general, international investment 
law and related disputes. Advice to Italian and foreign companies 
investing abroad in the erection of industrial plants, construction of 
civil works, supply of machinery and equipment, construction of 
infrastructures and the like. 
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Chair: Chief Bayo Ojo, ICAMA, Abuja 
 
Mr Mostafa El Bahabety, Egyptian Vice Minister of Justice for Arbitration Affairs 
Mr Abubakar Malami, SAN, Attorney-General & Minister of Justice, Nigeria 
Prof Githu Muigai, SC, Attorney-General , Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
158 
 
Panel 6: 
Response from Attorney – 
Generals & Government Ministers 
  
 
Panel 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
159 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
160 
Panel 6: Chair 
Chief Bayo Ojo 
Bayo Ojo, Senior Advocate of Nigeria was called to the Nigerian Bar 
in 1978 and later admitted as a Solicitor in England and Wales.  He is 
a former Attorney General and Minister of Justice of Nigeria, during 
which time he initiated key reforms in the justice sector. He is a past 
President of the Nigerian Bar Association and past Chairman of the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Nigeria Branch. He is a member of 
the Board of Trustees of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, 
London, former member of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, 
Washington, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Hague and the 
United Nations International Law Commission in Geneva. He is 
currently the President of the African Users’ Council of LCIA and 
Alternate Chairperson of the UNESCO Appeals Board in Paris. He is a 
Chartered Arbitrator who has acted as counsel, sole arbitrator and 
member of panel in numerous domestic and international 
commercial arbitrations. 
Panel 6: Speakers 
Judge Mostafa El Bahabety 
Judge Elbahabety is currently deputy Minister of Justice for 
Arbitration and international  disputes and  head  of the Technical 
secretariat in both, the High Committee International Arbitration and 
the Ministerial Committee for Settlement of Investment Contract’s 
Disputes in Egypt. He is a court member of the International court of 
arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce since 2005 on 
behalf Egypt.Judge Elbahabety succeeded in the settlement of many 
international Arbitration disputes on behalf of the Egyptian 
government, in addition to representing Egypt in cases held before 
the ICSID.He presided and was member at numerous arbitration 
panels in private arbitration disputes. He Conducted a lot of research 
and attended many courses and conferences in the field of 
arbitration. He started his career as a public prosecutor and 
promoted to be a chief prosecutor at the supreme public assets 
prosecution then moved to the judiciary and worked as judge at the 
court of first instance till he became a chief justice at the court of 
appeals.Judge Bahabety holds a post graduate degree in Public law, 
economic and finance from Ain Shams University. 
Hon. Professor Githu Muigai 
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Prof. Githu Muigai is the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya 
from 2011. Prior to becoming Attorney General, Prof. Githu Muigai 
served in the defunct Constitution of Kenya Review Commission and 
at the United Nations as Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms 
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. 
Prof. Githu Muigai was an associate professor of public law at the 
University Of Nairobi School Of Law. He also serves as a managing 
partner in the Kenyan law firm of Mohammed Muigai Advocates, 
where he specializes in commercial litigation and arbitration, as well 
as in constitutional and administrative law. Prof. Githu Muigai is a 
lawyer, Associate Professor at the University of Nairobi. He is currently 
on leave of Absence in order to serve as the AG. He has researched 
and published extensively in the areas of international law, 
constitutional law and human rights and has previously worked as a 
consultant to various international organizations, including the 
African Union, UNDP, the World Bank and the ICRC. Hon, Prof. Githu 
Muigai assumed office 27 August 2011 as the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Kenya. The Attorney General is the Principal Legal Adviser 
to Government of the Republic of Kenya. 
Mr Abubakar Malami, SAN was sworn in as the Minister for Justice and 
Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF). In 2014, Malami contested 
for the governorship ticket of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 
Kebbi state but lost to Mr Atiku Bagudu who is now the incumbent 
governor of the state. Abubakar Malami was conferred with the 
distinguished rank of the Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) in 2008, 
about 16 years after he was called to the Nigerian Bar. At 48, he is also 
presently the youngest member of the federal executive council. Mr 
Malami, SAN will now have the onerous task of reforming Nigeria’s legal 
system to ensure justice for all and sundry, regardless of their standing 
in the society. 
Mr Abubakar Malami 
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at the Foundation for a Unified System of Business Law (FUBLA) and 
a regular consultant for the Association for the Unification of 
Business Law in Africa (UNIDA) and ACP Legal, both which are non- 
governmental organisations promoting legal integration in Africa 
and the Caribbean. Author of several articles on OHADA law, Jean 
Alain Penda is regularly invited to speak at conferences and 
represents its association in most events worldwide. 
Dr Jean-Alain Penda 
Dr Councillor Ndudi Olokotor is a Barrister and Solicitor of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree 
from the University of Benin, Nigeria and, a Master of Laws (LL.M) 
degree from the University of Glamorgan (now University of South 
Wales), United Kingdom. In 2012, Prince was appointed a research 
assistant at SOAS, University of London for a research project on: “The 
Multi-door Court House (MDC) Scheme in Nigeria – A Case Study of 
the Lagos MDC”. He recently completed his PhD research, on the 
recognition and enforcement of transnational commercial  arbitral 
awards in England and Nigeria, at SOAS, University of London. 
Dr Councillor Ndudi Olokotor 
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Report 
 
Dr Jean-Alain Penda Matipe and Dr Prince Olokotor 
 
The conference started with a welcome reception on the evening of 3 April sponsored by 
WilmerHale LLP. 
DAY I 
 
Welcome addresses 
 
The conference started with a warm welcome address by Dr Ismail Selim, Director of the Cairo 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). Dr Selim introduced the institution 
and identified the need for the conference to be used as a tool to build bridges and demolish artificial 
walls by African arbitral institutions connecting and collaborating with each other irrespective of their 
location and language. 
 
This message was reiterated by the next speaker, Dr Nabil El Araby, President of the Board of Trustees 
of CRCICA. Dr El Araby focused his comments on state-to-state arbitration in boundary disputes in 
Africa; with a recommendation to African governments to enforce arbitral awards made by arbitrators 
to whom they have submitted themselves and their disputes. 
Ambassador Mahmoud Nayel, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech, identified Egypt as 
an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. He noted that this is an important contributing factor, not only for 
business and the legal system in Egypt, but also as a tool to form new ties and foster cooperation on 
the continent. 
In her welcome address, Dr Emilia Onyema gave an overview of the research project that led to the 
series of SOAS Arbitration in Africa conferences; introduced the purpose and objectives of the Cairo 
conference as articulated in the Discussion Paper. She challenged the attendees to join forces to 
develop the law and practice of arbitration on the continent and promotion of Africans in arbitration. 
She also mentioned some of the outcomes of these conference series which included the list of 
arbitration institutions operating in Africa and the book published by Kluwer, The Transformation of 
Arbitration in Africa: the Role of Arbitral Institutions, which will be launched later this evening. 
This was followed by the keynote address by Judge Mohammad Amin El Mahdi, the Vice President of 
CRCICA Board of Trustees. Dr Mahdi noted that Africa is the future and we that are in the present 
should stand for the future we seek for Africa. On foreign direct investment, Dr Mahdi noted that we 
need more than one method resolving disputes. We cannot therefore only recommend arbitration 
(even with all its advantages) as the only method for resolving such disputes at the expense of the 
courts and judiciary. He noted that we need both effective arbitrations and judiciaries since both 
processes are interlinked. He discussed two examples: (1) of countries that changed their penal code 
to provide for the imprisonment of arbitrators that lack impartiality. In this situation, he noted that 
the arbitrator, being a human being, may make mistakes and asked who should decide the issue. (2) 
is inappropriate judicial intervention in the arbitral process by empowering judges to impose criminal 
penalties on arbitrators who make an award in the absence of an arbitration agreement. On this, he 
concluded that support of arbitration is not a goal in itself but supporting its elements to improve the 
(foreign and domestic) investment climate.   Finally, he noted that arbitral institutions need to be 
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independent of the state/government. Using CRCICA as a model, he advocated for the establishment 
of sub-regional arbitral institutions as one solution to the threat of interference from 
states/governments. He concluded by stating that he “sees a  prosperous Africa that embraces 
development; that is safe and peaceful”. 
The first panel discussions gathered the following regional arbitration institutions: LCIA-MIAC 
(Mauritius), AFSA/CAJAC (South Africa), Ghana Arbitration Centre (West Africa), Kigali International 
Arbitration Centre (East Africa), CRCICA in Egypt and Casablanca International Mediation and 
Arbitration Centre (CIMAC) in Morocco (North Africa). This panel was chaired by Ms Alexandra Meise. 
After an overview presentation from the previous discussion held at the Lagos conference, the 
speakers went on to describe their current activities and the concrete support given, or not, by their 
respective governments in support of arbitration. 
Dr Dalia Hussein of CRCICA, on their recent activities, discussed the set up of the Advisory Committee 
for collegial decision making on important matters such as arbitrator challenge. She also mentioned 
CRCICA’s Practice Notes on the basis of the arbitrator challenges; and publication of summaries of 
awards made under CRCICA for public availability in Arabic with English translations in the works; and 
their activities to promote diversity of their arbitrators by widening their pool of arbitrators. She also 
disclosed that in the future they will publish a Practice Note on their initial decision on whether or not 
to accept a reference. Mr Hicham Zegrary of CIMAC noted that CIMAC is part of the Moroccan 
Financial Centre Initiative of the Moroccan government. The Centre was launched in 2010 and enjoys 
strong support of the Moroccan government and the King of Morocco. It will launch its new arbitration 
rules (of 2017) in November and it is developing itself as a hub for arbitration in the region. 
The Kigali International Arbitration Centre shared data on the increase of its caseload which has led 
to the appointment of a higher number of arbitrators. The institution is presently engaging more in 
marketing its services and partnerships with other arbitration institutions. Dr Fidele Masengo 
acknowledged the support KIAC received from the Rwandan government such as facilities related to 
accessibility and security, the country’s international reputation in the ease of doing business rankings, 
state leadership and the country’s pro-arbitration regime. He noted that KIAC has now administered 
55 cases (with 13 of these international). In the same fashion Ms Ndanga Kamau noted the support 
of the Mauritian government for LCIA-MIAC  and the wider  government initiative of promoting 
Mauritius as a hub for international business in Africa. She noted that the Centre has administered 
one adhoc arbitration and one mediation; and continues to conduct trainings. She also disclosed that 
Mauritius is exploring ways of better engaging with the rest of Africa and making itself more relevant 
in and to the continent. Mr Kizito Beyuo noted that the Ghana Arbitration Centre (GAC) is a private 
initiative without any form of support from the government of Ghana though such support will be 
welcomed and will help the GAC extend its services and training initiatives. He disclosed that the GAC 
since June 2015, has organised one arbitration conference, one workshop and launched its 
Distingusihed African Arbitrator Speaker series. 
Ms Deline Beukes discussed the recent CAJAC project (an African-Chinese joint arbitration institution). 
CAJAC now has a panel of 20 arbitrators from South Africa and 20 arbitrators from China. It has 
expanded to include institutions in Beijing and Shenzhen in China and Nairobi. They also provide 
training in arbitration in collaboration with the University of Pretoria; and the long awaited South 
African International  Arbitration  Bill  has  now  been published.  This  partnership  is  inviting  other 
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institutions in Africa to participate with the expectation that more arbitration institutions across the 
continent will join the partnership. The institution administers arbitration for disputes emanating from 
African-Chinese business relationships. Ms Beukes pointed to the inexistence of efforts by the South 
African government in supporting the partnership initiative, with the hope that the bill presently in 
parliament will soon pass and that the Johannesburg Action Plan will be honoured and implemented. 
The entire panel recognised the efforts by the institutions to work and publish in more than one 
language of the continent. At the question and answer session, the panel rejected the idea of 
government interference in arbitration institution affairs after receiving their support, but instead 
recommended that more support be given to help jurisdictions become more efficient arbitration- 
friendly environments. 
The second panel was chaired by Judge Edward Torgbor and was composed of Ms Maryan Hassan 
(Somalia), Dr Tunde Ajibade (Nigeria), Dr Nagla Nassar (Egypt), Dr Gaston Kenfack (Cameroon), Prof. 
David Butler (South Africa) and Mr Bakri Mohammed Abakar (Sudan). 
Professor David Butler opened the panel discussion by describing the South African (SA) legislative 
and executive trend in creating a legal environment for arbitration. On the new SA arbitration bill, Prof. 
Butler noted some peculiarities, for instance, those related to confidentiality where arbitration will 
systematically be held in public whenever a government agency is involved and kept confidential when 
it concerns two commercial parties. The new law provides for arbitrator immunity, and also fully 
implements the New York Convention (1958). 
Dr Tunde Ajibade brought a practitioner’s perspective which basically aimed at encouraging states to 
help expand arbitration because it takes away the majority of legal costs for private parties; promotes 
local bar association members and the country’s business climate; creates job opportunities and is a 
direct source of revenue for the country given the impact on tourism and business activities. Dr 
Ajibade later suggested that the conference should provide benefit-related statistics of arbitration to 
cities such as London, Paris, Hong Kong and New York to make an economic case to African 
governments to support arbitration. 
Ms Maryan Hassan shared her experience as assistant to the government of Somalia in helping them 
rebuild their legal infrastructure post conflict and the impact of young western-educated returnees 
and how they can influence the thinking of their governments. Dr Nagla Nassar shared from her 
experience as a legal practitioner both in Egypt and for the World Bank. She gave an overview of the 
arbitration development trend in Egypt, followed by examples of direct and indirect efforts of the 
Egyptian government to achieve a pro-arbitration initiative conducive to a stable business 
environment, a modern legal environment and, therefore, a prosperous economy. 
Dr Gaston Kenfack Douajni, discussed the position in the OHADA member-states, whose Uniform Act 
of Arbitration can be said to be a modern arbitration regime. He then delivered a brief and accurate 
description of the OHADA arbitration regime. Despite the state’s pro-arbitration regime, Dr Douajni 
made it clear that arbitration nevertheless remains the only OHADA subject area lagging behind in 
terms of capacity development and training both of judges and legal practitioners. 
Mr Bakri Mohammed Abakar closed this panel discussion with a thorough description of the Sudanese 
arbitration regime and the support from the government, particularly the legislative branch. The 
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Sudanese government is presently undertaking progressive reform and change on several levels by 
reviewing, for instance, international treaties and conventions which need to be equipped with the 
necessary instruments to modernize the country's arbitration regime, among other things. 
Day 1 closed with the launch (and a drink reception) of the recently published edited collection, The 
Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: the Role of Arbitral Institutions, (2016) published by Kluwer 
Law International. This collection was from the Addis Ababa conference and was edited by Dr Emilia 
Onyema. 
 
 
DAY 2 
 
The day started with an announcement that as a result of the challenge from Dr Onyema to delegates 
to consider what they can do to support the development of arbitration in Africa, Dr Nagla Nasser 
offered to host an arbitration graduate for a period of internship in her firm NasserLaw, in the summer 
in Cairo. Dr Onyema gave our appreciations to Dr Nagla Nasser and promised to announce the offer 
for selection. 
The 3rd panel was a roundtable discussion on the engagement of with United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) with Africa. Dr Emilia Onyema moderated the discussions with 
Dr Gaston Kenfack Douajni, Mr Timothy Lemay, Dr Mohammed Abdel Raouf, Mrs Doyin Rhodes-Vivour, 
Dr Kennedy Gastorn and Mr Jonathan Ripley-Evans as panellists. The key questions the panel 
examined were: how can UNCITRAL better engage with arbitration practitioners in Africa? and is it 
desirable for African States to engage with UNCITRAL and adopt their arbitration texts? 
Mr Timothy Lemay started the discussion by briefly outlying what UNCITRAL does, its rules and how 
African arbitrators can engage with UNCITRAL. He noted that UNCITRAL is made up of 60 member 
states of which 14 are African countries. Arbitration and dispute resolution is one of the many subjects 
that UNCITRAL deal with in the sphere of private international law. He then gave some statistics on 
the adoption of the Model Law and New York Convention (1958). To this end, Mr Lemay made a case 
for African countries to engage more with UNCITRAL in respect of arbitration legislations. He also 
noted that UNCITRAL has ways of assisting states, including but not limited to maintaining a body of 
case law as a global reference to support uniform interpretation  and application  of UNCITRAL 
instruments (CLOUT). Unfortunately, he said that, only a small number of those judgments are from 
African jurisdictions, hence the need for Africa to engage more with UNCITRAL was further stressed. 
Finally, Mr Lemay noted that UNCITRAL provides technical assistance to states in terms of, but not 
limited to, reviewing draft legislation, assistance with drafting legislation, treaty ratification and treaty 
adoption. 
Dr Gaston Kenfack Douajni commented on the issue of UNCITRAL engaging with African States. He 
stated that though 14 African States are members of the current composition of UNCITRAL, more 
needs to be done by African States if Africa is to take its rightful place in international arbitration. 
Hence, he called on African states to make provisions for delegates to attend the working group 
sessions of UNCITRAL to bridge the gap of Africa’s under-representation in UNCITRAL activities. 
However, he stated that African’s lack of presence has not limited UNCITRAL from engaging with 
African States. He noted that presently, UNCITRAL has concluded a collaboration agreement with 
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OHADA aimed at sharing expertise with OHADA in international trade law sphere. Further to that, he 
also stated that UNCITRAL has decided to create a regional centre/office in Africa as it did in Asia 
(Korea). 
For Mrs Doyin Rhodes-Vivour, the UN and its specialised agencies have made some remarkable 
progress in terms of capacity building in Africa. She recounted how the UN and its specialised agencies, 
like UNCITRAL and United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations provided trainings for African 
arbitrators in other to narrow any knowledge gap in the field of international trade and investment 
law. However, she questioned what African States with such trained arbitrators have done to improve 
arbitration regimes in Africa. She identified the lack of political will by various African States and 
governments as a problem limiting economic development. Mrs Rhodes-Vivour then stated that the 
way forward is for African governments to appreciate the relationship between economic 
development and effective means of dispute resolution. To this end, she urged African States and 
governments to improve their infrastructures and security concerns in order to attract African 
arbitration to be conducted in Africa. Finally, she made a case for African arbitration institutions to 
start African arbitration moot as a means of transferring necessary arbitrator skills to young African 
arbitrators. 
Dr Mohammed Abdel Raouf, the former director of CRCICA, shared his experiences with regards to 
arbitration institutions applying UNCITRAL Rules. According to him, at least 8 arbitral institutions in 
Africa have their rules based on the UNCITRAL Rules. He remarked that the advantages of having an 
institutional arbitral rules based on UNCITRAL Rules ranges from wider scope of party autonomy to 
flexibility of the conduct of arbitral proceedings. He added that the UNCITRAL Rules have contributed 
to the creation of a more favourable climate for amicable dispute resolution because the Rules 
promote respect for the legitimate expectation of the parties, the award. On the issue of how 
UNCITRAL can engage with African arbitration practitioners, Dr Raouf proposed that there should be 
a dialogue between UNCITRAL and African arbitrators, with SOAS as moderator, to share knowledge, 
and consolidate on their gains. Finally, he also proposed a mentoring programme between UNCITRAL 
and young African arbitrators to be administered by arbitration institutions in Africa. 
Prof (Dr) Kennedy Gastorn discussion centred on the activities of the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organisation (AALCO) from an African context. He noted that AALCO is an inter-governmental 
organisation, with 47 member states across Asia and Africa, with headquarters in New Delhi, India. In 
terms of activities, he said that AALCO is an external adviser on matters of international law to its 
member states. Prof Gastorn also stated that AALCO is a platform where matters of common concerns 
are discussed and communicated to the UN, particularly through the International Law Commission. 
He further said that through the efforts of AALCO, Afro-Asia concerns are promoted in international 
law making. He also remarked that the participation of African States is barely present in many 
international law making bodies. He stated that given the wide range of powers vested on AALCO, it 
deals with a lot of issues ranging from human rights to business law, arbitration matters inclusive. He 
noted that the work of UNCITRAL in the field of international trade law, is one of the mandates of 
AALCO. He also hinted that through engagements with UNCITRAL, AALCO was instrumental in the 
establishment of regional arbitration centres, like CRCICA and LRCICA. Prof Gastorn then posed the 
question: “what can these regional arbitration centres do to promote arbitration as an effective way 
of resolving disputes in Africa?” He concluded by proposing that the regional arbitration centres 
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should engage and negotiate with multilateral organisations like UNCITRAL to promote arbitration in 
Africa. 
Mr Jonathan Ripley-Evans discussed the experience of South Africa in adopting the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in its new arbitration bill. He noted that if Africa wants to be regarded as a Model Law continent, 
it needs to be an obvious Model Law continent by adopting the Model Law substantially. Thus he 
concluded that if African States adopt the Model Law as its sine qua non for international commercial 
arbitration, the advantages of the UNCITRAL Model Law will attract and promote African States as 
viable seats for international arbitration. 
Panel 4 examined the legal environment for investment arbitration in Africa. It was chaired by Ms 
Rose Rameau while Mr Tsegaye Laurendeau, Ms Rukia Baruti, Dr Chrispas Nyombi, Mr Ike Ehiribe, 
Prof (Dr) Walid Ben Hamida, Dr Jimmy Kodo and Mr Jimmy Muyanja were panellists. The discussions 
by the speakers focussed on the legal regime for investment arbitration in Africa. This question was 
approached from the context of the World Bank ease of doing business rankings, the environment for 
investment and the engagement of African States in investment arbitration. The Chair remarked that 
the laws regarding the legal environment for investment arbitration in Africa are fragmented. She 
called on African states to form a common bloc with regards to investment agreements and arbitration 
laws that will promote the use of African arbitrators and African States as arbitration seats. 
Mr Tsegaye Laurendeau’s presentation focused on ‘state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a tool for 
African States to engage with and promote the use of arbitration’. He asserted that SOEs are better 
placed to drive economic growth in Africa because they have direct access to the State, particularly 
the executive branch of government. He cited Eskom as one of the biggest SOEs in the world, Ethiopian 
Electric Power which sits on 45,000 megawatts of just hydropower as examples. To this end, Mr 
Laurendeau reasoned that African SOEs are agents for promoting the use of and Africanising 
arbitration. This according to him gives African States a further fundamental tool to effect change in 
Africa. 
Ms Rukia Baruti’s presentation, ‘Shaping Investment Arbitration: The Experience of COMESA and 
SADC’, considered the role of African States in shaping the development of international investment 
arbitration in Africa. Ms She discussed how Member States of the Common Market for Southern and 
Eastern Africa (COMESA) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have responded to 
the issues of arbitral practice in investment treaties. She reviewed the development of international 
investment arbitration and the experiences of COMESA and the SADC Member States with investment 
arbitration. Ms Baruti concluded by suggesting that investment arbitration developed in response to 
the need to protect foreign investors and their investments and not the States. This protection 
according to her was achieved by establishing ICSID to provide an effective forum for the resolution 
of investor-state disputes. Furthermore, she asserted that ICSID have not been favourable to COMESA 
and SADC Member States who have had to defend a relatively high percentage of ICSID arbitrations. 
In response to the failings of BITs as a tool for attracting FDI and the need to prevent the rise of 
investment arbitration claims, Ms Baruti posited that COMESA and SADC members concluded regional 
investment instruments which demonstrates the changing role of African States in international 
investment regime from mere observers to participants keen on shaping and developing African 
investment arbitration. 
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Dr Chrispas Nyombi’s paper considered “A case for a Regional Investment Court (RIC) for Africa”. Dr 
Nyombi stated that since the end of colonial rule in Africa, African States have sought self- 
determination, both on national and international spheres. However, their involvement in the 
international economic order has been, according to him, at best, abysmal. He remarked that in a 
recent wave of international investment laws, progressive steps have been put in place in Asia, the 
Latin American States have denounced the Investor-State dispute resolution mechanism, at least to a 
large measure, while the European Union is working towards establishing an investment court system. 
He contended that save, South Africa, African States have been largely unmindful to these 
international investment policy changes. He further stated that Africa’s economic aspirations cannot 
be achieved through inaction, instead by developmental actions which seek to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and at the same time preserve domestic regulatory spaces. However, he conceded 
that: (i) Africa has already embraced the new generation of trade and investment policies that strike 
a balance between investors’ interests and domestic public policy, (ii) Africa is also undergoing a 
process of regionalisation in an effort to promote greater economic collaboration and synchronisation 
in trade and investment. He cited the African Union’s effort for a Continental Free Trade Area as 
example. After a review of issues ranging from the investment landscape in Africa to African 
participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement system, Dr Nyombi suggested that the regional 
integration and regulatory harmonisation at regional level created a unique opportunity for the 
establishment of a Regional Investment Court (RIC). After assessing contending reform proposals, Dr 
Nyombi made a case for RIC as the way forward, stating that RIC serves Africa’s current social- 
economic developmental aspirations particularly now that institutions of international investment law 
are under increased scrutiny. 
Mr Ike Ehiribe presented a paper titled, “The Legal Environments for Investment Arbitration in African 
States: Identifying and Circumventing Investor Misconduct”. Mr Ehiribe’s presentation examined the 
lessons from the jurisprudence of investment treaty cases arising from African States. His discussion 
focussed on the kind of practices African States and Arbitrators should avoid or embrace for purposes 
of sustaining attraction of FDI into African States. He gave a judicial definition of investor’s misconduct 
citing Gustav FW Hamester GmBH Co KG v Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No ARB/07/24, Award dated 
18 June 2010, were the arbitrators identified 6 main investor misconducts or investor wrongdoings. 
The first is lack of good faith, second is corruption, third is fraud, fourth is deceitful conduct, fifth is 
misuse of the system of investment protection, and lastly violation of the host State law. According to 
Mr Ehiribe, African States must avoid any investor that engages in any of the 6 identified misconducts, 
because Africa and its people are the victims that suffer the consequences of such bad practices. He 
concluded that not only will Africa and its people suffer the effect of such wrong-doing, it also 
demeans the States as incapable of good governance. With regard to what should be done going 
forward, Mr Ehiribe proposed that those who advise investors and in-house counsel for host States 
should be trained on how to identify and stop investors that are likely to engage in investment 
misconduct from investing in any African State. To this end, he stated that the ICC Guidelines of Agents, 
Intermediaries and other Third Parties published in 2010 will serve a useful purpose for identifying 
investors that have tendencies described as investors’ misconducts. 
Dr Jimmy Kodo’s presentation focused on OHADA Member States as parties to arbitral proceedings 
and the examination of the legal framework of the OHADA Member States. With respect to the former, 
Dr Kodo provided and discussed available statistics relating to arbitral proceedings involving OHADA 
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Member States, while in the later, he examined OHADA arbitration legal framework. Dr Kodo said that 
between 2006 and 2015, there were more than 74 arbitration cases conducted under the OHADA 
arbitration regime. He noted that OHADA arbitration is in two fold; the institutional arbitration which 
is regulated by the OHADA treaty itself and the general arbitration which is governed by the Uniform 
Act on Arbitration. He further stated that majority of the arbitration cases, were institutional 
arbitration. For the claimants, 20 cases were from OHADA non-Member States while 59 cases were 
from OHADA Member State countries. For the respondent, 7 cases were from non-OHADA Member 
countries. Regarding arbitral awards, Dr Kodo stated that in 2015, 43 awards were rendered under 
the OHADA arbitration instrument. 10 cases were withdrawn by the parties themselves and in 12 cases, 
arbitrators found that they lacked jurisdiction. In 6 cases, arbitrators did not proceed with the 
arbitration because of lack of payment by the parties. With respect to party appointed arbitrators, 31 
arbitrators were appointed from non-OHADA States and 90 from OHADA States. For arbitrators 
appointed by OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, 7 were from non-OHADA States and 
18 were from OHADA Member States. For annulment cases, the court rejected about 64.4% of setting 
aside applications, annulled about 24.5% arbitral awards and remitted about 11% cases to the 
arbitrators. On the issue of conducting investment arbitration under the current OHADA arbitration 
framework, Dr Kodo was positive the treaty covers this. He concluded that arbitration under the 
OHADA framework is efficient and friendly. 
Mr Jimmy Muyanja’s presentation was on the submission clause in the arbitration agreement. He 
discussed investment arbitration from the viewpoint of Uganda. He also examined the Ugandan State 
contracting process and the impact it has on investment arbitration. Mr Muyanja identified the issue 
of State (in)capacity as a major problem when it comes to the Ugandan State entering into investment 
arbitration contract with foreign investors. According to him, because Uganda is not a party to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Traeties, the question of determining State (in)capacity to contract 
BITs is a constitutional matter in Uganda. He stated that by the Uganda constitution, the mandate to 
negotiate any agreement which binds the Republic of Uganda is vested in the President of Uganda or 
a person appointed by the President for that purpose. Mr Muyanja further stated that the 1995 
Constitution vested the ratification power of any such agreement on the parliament, or the Attorney 
General’s office, or the cabinet. According to him therefore, the impact of the contracting process is 
problematic, because there are scarcely any BITs that has been ratified by the authorities designated 
to do so. He then concluded by suggesting two solutions. First, is for the Ugandan government to 
review all its current BITs; and secondly, foreign investors should conduct due diligence check to 
ensure that the State has the capacity to contract BITs. 
Prof. (Dr) Walid Ben Hamida’s discussion focused on investor-state arbitration under the Organisation 
of Islamic Conference (OIC). He examined the difficulties foreign investors face in initiating arbitration 
under the OIC instruments. After reviewing the structure and some instruments of the OIC, Prof (Dr) 
Hamida narrowed his discussion to the Islamic Agreement on Investment (IAI), an instrument created 
by the OIC for investment protection and investment dispute resolution within its Member States. 
According to him, one of the problems of the IAI is that it provides for ad hoc arbitration, which 
sometimes makes it difficult if not impossible for the constitution of arbitrators. Thus, he concluded 
by suggesting that arbitration under the IAI should be institutional for ease of appointment of 
arbitrators. 
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Panel 5 gathered arbitration practitioners from outside Africa. Members of the panel shared their 
experiences from a comparative perspective of the attitude of non-African States and governments 
towards arbitration. The panel was chaired by Prof Emmanuel Gaillard and the speakers were Ms 
Smrithi Ramesh, Mr Duncan Bagshaw, Mr Steven Finizio, Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise, Mr Baiju 
Vasani, Mr Luis Gonzalez Garcia and Prof. Antonio Crivellaro. 
Mr Luis Gonzalez Garcia discussion gave an overview of arbitration frameworks in Central America, 
Latin America and South America. He discussed various State government efforts in supporting 
arbitration in those regions. Mr Garcia said that most of the countries in the regions have adopted and 
modernised their arbitration laws in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006. One of the 
outcomes of such modernisation, he said, is the creation of arbitration courts, and in order to promote 
arbitration in the regions they have also legislated to include arbitration clauses in public contracts. 
Prof Antonio Crivellaro shared his experiences of governments’ support of arbitration or otherwise 
from an Italian perspective. After a brief review of arbitration framework in Italy, Prof Crivellaro stated 
that before 2006, investors had genuine perception of some legal and technical problems regarding 
the Italian arbitration regime. Nonetheless, the situation has changed considerably after the country 
reformed its arbitration law in 2006, Prof Crivellaro remarked. He concluded that the court’s attitude 
towards arbitration has also changed significantly, citing as example that between 2005 to 2012, the 
Milan Court of Appeal heard 38 applications for recognition and enforcement of international arbitral 
awards, out of which 35 applications were granted, while 3 were refused. 
Ms Alexandra (Xander) Kerr Meise shared her experience of government support of international 
arbitration from a United States of America (US) and North American perspectives. She discussed the 
current US government reform positions on Investor-State Dispute System (ISDS), North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the issue of the State protecting its sovereignty. Ms Meise said 
that though it is still early to determine whether the US President will keep his election promises of 
denouncing some investment treaties and trade agreements like NAFTA, it seems the US government 
is stepping back on those promises. However, she said that what may come out from those promises 
might be a reform of the treaties and ISDS in line with global concerns of those trade and investment 
instruments, which is not likely to affect the use of arbitration as a dispute resolution tool in the US. 
Ms Smrithi Ramesh related her experiences on the role arbitral institutions play in bringing about 
change in Kuala Lumpur jurisdiction, in particular, and in Asia, in general. She said that a lot of the 
positive changes that came about in the Asian arbitration spectrum was because of the role of the 
arbitral institutions in the region. Citing Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) as 
example, she stated that up to 2010, KLRCA had only 22 cases from its establishment in 1978. However, 
she said that all that changed from 2010 noting that between 2010 and 2016, KLRCA had about 618 
cases. She further stated that this happened because of the focus of the KLRCA on the local needs of 
arbitration users. Ms Ramesh pointed out 3 innovations that brought about the rapid change in the 
use of arbitration by domestic investors and traders in the region; (i) harmonisation of domestic and 
international arbitration principles, (ii) engaging with domestic arbitration users to provide solutions 
to their concerns, and (iii) the need to legitimise arbitral institutions, whether they are set up by 
government or not. By legitimacy, she said it means the institutions being independent and neutral 
from those that set them up. She also mentioned capacity building of domestic arbitrators as key to 
the KLRCA success. 
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Mr Duncan Bagshaw shared  his  experience as counsel in  the recognition and  enforcement  of 
international arbitral awards from an English perspective. He stated that the issue of enforcement of 
awards in England is important in the context of the theme of the conference. According to him, many 
African awards from African States are usually sought to be enforced in England, or many African 
States or companies are usually the respondent in enforcement proceedings in England. Citing the 
case of NNPC v IPCO, Mr Bagshaw said that the question of principle that calls for determination would 
be: at what point, if ever, should the courts of the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought seek to 
impose its views on matters that should be properly resolved at the seat, when it is an African seat, in 
an African case, by African arbitrators applying African law. He stated that the English courts are quite 
indulgent on such matters, but will in cause of waiting very often order that security should be given 
either in full or in part under article VI of the NYC. He concluded by questioning whether such practice 
is right, if yes, where should the court draw the line to balance the interest of the parties. 
Mr Baiju Vasani’s discussion focused on the appointment of African arbitrators. According to him, 
nearly 25% of ICSID cases have African parties, yet the number of African arbitrators with African 
passports appointed by parties in those cases is only 5%. Again he said that parties to ICC arbitrations 
between 2014 and 2015 appointed less than 1% of African arbitrators even when many of those cases 
involved African parties. He therefore remarked that such trend is unacceptable and thus questioned 
the objective legitimacy of international arbitration. Mr Vasani then suggested (borrowed from Jan 
Paulsson) that to fix the anomaly, appointment of arbitrators should be done by institutions rather 
than by the disputing parties. According to him, this is because parties in appointing arbitrators in 
cases involving African States or companies usually consider prejudices, like African and non-African, 
old and young, weak and young or even colour. On the contrary, Mr Vasani said that these prejudices 
are at least inconsequential or non-existent in institutional appointments of arbitrators. He cited the 
ICSID annulment committee which is done by the Secretary-General as a model to copy. 
Mr Steven Finizio focused on developing capacity and shared from the perspective of the USA where 
the civil justice reform offered ADR in place of litigation, especially in small claims. In addition, was the 
ADR Act (USA) which forced government agencies to use ADR. He supported the view of Gary Born for 
bilateral arbitration treaties between states. 
Panel 6 was chaired by Bajo Ojo who moderated Mr Mostafa El Bahabety, Egyptian Vice-Minister of 
Justice for Arbitration Affairs, and the only present panellist. Chief Bajo introduced the panellist and 
extended the words of regret from absentees. 
Mr Mostafa El Bahabety described his role in the government, what the government is doing to 
support arbitration and the CRCICA activities. He made it clear that his department is continuously 
working to ensuring Egypt’s Arbitration Law provide a relatively straightforward and easy to use 
framework for arbitration in Egypt, which is enacted based on international standards contained in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration. This effort is bearing fruit as Egypt 
is increasingly used as venue. He shared the steps taken by the Egyptian government, for instance, 
the Investment Dispute Settlement Ministerial Committee presided by the Minister of Justice was set 
up since the Arab revolution to ensure effective and efficient arbitration system. This most recent 
committee is competent to negotiate amicable settlements for disputes arising out of investment 
contracts to which the government or an affiliated (public or private) government entity are parties. 
Thus, the 2011 revolution have motivated the Egyptian government to constitute more flexible and 
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expeditious fora for settling investor-state disputes. As a factual example, the economic difficulties 
that Egypt has encountered since 2011 have rendered Egypt more susceptible to international claims 
before the ICSID. 
During the Q and A, Mr Mostafa El Bahabety admitted that efforts on the side of the government are 
needed for an Egyptian arbitrator to be appointed whenever there is a dispute involving the 
government of Egypt. He also admitted that there is a proliferation of arbitration institutions in Egypt 
with most, unlawfully operating or unregistered. He confirms that CRCICA is the main and official 
arbitral centre in Egypt and endorsed by its government. 
The day and conference concluded with a closing dinner sponsored by ICAMA (Abuja) which was very 
well attended. 
The 2018 SOAS Arbitration in Africa conference will be hosted by the Kigali International Arbitration 
Centre (KIAC) from 14 to 16 May 2018 in Kigali. 
END 
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Appendix 
Table 1: African Countries: Status of Arbitration Laws and Conventions 
 
No Country National Legislation New York 
Convention 
ICSID 
Convention 
1 Algeria Arbitration Law No 08-09, 2008 8 May 1989 22 March 
1996 
2 Angola Voluntary Arbitration Law 2003 12 August 
2016 
- 
3 Benin Republic OHADA UAA 14 Aug 1974 14 Oct 1966 
4 Botswana Arbitration Act, 1959 19 Mar 1972 14 Feb 1970 
5 Burkina Faso OHADA UAA 21 June 1987 14 Oct 1966 
6 Burundi Civil Procedure Code 2004 21 Sept 2014 5 Dec 1969 
7 Cameroon OHADA UAA 19 May 1988 2 Feb 1967 
8 Cape Verde Arbitration Law of 2005 - 26 Jan 2011 
9 Central Africa Republic OHADA UAA 13 Jan 1963 14 Oct 1966 
10 Chad OHADA UAA - 14 Oct 1966 
11 Comoros OHADA UAA 27 July 2015 7 Dec 1978 
12 Congo, Republic of OHADA UAA - 14 Oct 1966 
13 Cote d’Ivoire OHADA UAA 2 May 1991 14 Oct 1966 
14 Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
OHADA UAA 3 Feb 2015 29 May 1970 
15 Djibouti Code of International Arbitration 
1984 
27 June 1977 - 
16 Egypt Arbitration Law 1994 (amended 
1997) 
7 June 1959 2 June 1972 
17 Eritrea Book IV, Civil Procedure Code 1965 - Signed 21 Sept 
1965 
18 Ethiopia Civil Procedure Code of 1991 - Signed 21 Sept 
1965 
19 Equatorial Guinea OHADA UAA - 19 Nov 1978 
20 Gabon OHADA UAA 15 Mar 2007 14 Oct 1966 
21 Gambia ADR Act 2005 - 26 Jan 1975 
22 Ghana ADR Act 2010 8 July 1968 14 Oct 1966 
23 Guinea OHADA UAA 23 April 1991 4 Dec 1968 
24 Guinea-Bissau OHADA UAA - Signed 4 Sept 
1991 
25 Kenya Arbitration Act 2005 amended 
2009 
11 May 1989 2 Feb 1967 
26 Lesotho Arbitration Act No 12 of 1980 11 Sept 1989 7 Aug 1969 
27 Liberia Arbitration Law, Chapter 7 
Commercial Code 2010 
15 Dec 2005 16 July 1970 
28 Libya Code of Civil Procedure 1953 - - 
29 Madagascar Arbitration Law 98-019 of 2 Dec 
1998 
14 Oct 1962 14 Oct 1966 
30 Malawi Arbitration Act of 6 Nov 1967 - 14 Oct 1966 
31 Mali OHADA UAA & Arb Code 2000 7 Dec 1994 2 Feb 1978 
32 Mauritania Code of Arbitration No 2000-06 30 April 1997 14 Oct 1966 
33 Mauritius International Arbitration Act No 37 
of 2008 
17 Sept 1996 2 July 1969 
34 Morocco Code of Civil Procedure 1947 
(modified in 2007) 
7 June 1959 10 June 1967 
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 35 Mozambique Law on Arbitration, Conciliation 
and Mediation No 11/99 of 8 July 
1999 
9 Sept 1998 7 July 1995 
36 Namibia Arbitration Act No 42 of 1965 - Signed 26 Oct 
1998 
37 Niger OHADA UAA 12 Jan 1965 14 Dec 1966 
38 Nigeria Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
1988 
15 June 1970 14 Oct 1966 
39 Rwanda Arb & Conciliation in Commercial 
Matters Law No 005 of 2008 
29 Jan 2009 14 Nov 1979 
40 Sao Tome & Principe Voluntary Arb Law No 9 of 2006 18 Feb 2013 19 June 2013 
41 Senegal OHADA UAA 15 Jan 1995 21 May 1967 
42 Seychelles Commercial Code 1977 & Code of 
Civil Procedure 1920 
- 19 April 1978 
43 Sierra Leone - - 14 Oct 1966 
44 Somalia Civil Procedure Code, Book III, 1974 - 30 Mar 1968 
45 South Africa Arbitration Act No 42 of 1965 1 Aug 1976 - 
46 South Sudan - - 18 May 2012 
47 Sudan Arbitration Act 2005 - 9 May 1973 
48 Swaziland Arbitration Act No 24 of 1904 - 14 July 1971 
49 Tanzania Arbitration Act 1931 revised 2002 11 Jan 1965 17 June 1992 
50 Togo OHADA UAA - 10 Sept 1967 
51 Tunisia Arbitration Code, Law No 93-42, 
1993 
15 Oct 1967 14 Oct 1966 
52 Uganda Arbitration & Conciliation Act 2000 
(amended 2008) 
12 May 1992 14 Oct 1966 
53 Zambia Arbitration Act No 19 of 2000 12 June 2002 17 July 1970 
54 Zimbabwe Arbitration Act No 6 of 1996 28 Dec 1994 19 June 1994 
OHADA UAA = OHADA Uniform Arbitration Act 11 March 1999 
Sources: https://arbitrationinafrica.com/countries/;  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html; 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx; http://ohada.org/. 
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Table 2a: Sub-Sahara African Countries: World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking (2017) 
 
No Country Global 
Ranking 
(2016) 
Ranking 
in SS- 
Africa 
Starting 
a 
business 
Getting 
Electricity 
Protecting 
minority 
investors 
Trading 
across 
borders 
Enforcing 
contracts 
1 Mauritius 49 (32) 1 4 4 2 4 1 
2 Rwanda 56 (62) 2 8 7 12 6 10 
3 South Africa 74 (73) 3 22 5 1 25 16 
4 Botswana 71 (72) 4 32 11 5 3 21 
5 Kenya 92 (108) 5 19 3 8 9 8 
6 Seychelles 93 (95) 6 26 15 13 5 20 
7 Zambia 98 (97) 7 15 23 10 31 22 
8 Lesotho 100 (114) 8 20 21 15 2 9 
9 Ghana 108 (114) 9 17 9 7 29 17 
10 Namibia 108 (101) 10 38 10 4 17 11 
11 Swaziland 111 (105) 11 33 25 20 1 40 
12 Uganda 115 (122) 12 36 28 14 22 4 
13 Cape Verde 129 (126) 13 14 17 39 13 2 
14 Tanzania 132 (139) 14 25 1 35 40 3 
15 Malawi 133 (141) 15 30 33 19 15 27 
16 Mozambique 137 (133) 16 24 32 18 10 46 
17 Mali 141 (143) 17 16 22 34 7 32 
18 Cote d’Ivoire 142 (142) 18 5 13 26 27 13 
19 Gambia 145 (151) 19 37 24 42 12 15 
20 Burkina Faso 146 (143) 20 7 42 30 8 35 
21 Senegal 147 (153) 21 12 29 21 19 24 
22 Niger 150 (160) 22 11 31 33 20 29 
23 Sierra Leone 148 (147) 23 10 37 9 35 12 
24 Togo 154 (150) 24 21 20 36 14 25 
25 Comoros 153 (154) 25 35 14 29 11 43 
26 Benin 155 (158) 26 6 35 31 21 38 
27 Burundi 157 (152) 27 1 44 24 30 28 
28 Zimbabwe 161 (155) 28 44 30 11 26 37 
29 Mauritania 160 (168) 29 9 19 17 23 7 
30 Guinea 163 (165) 30 23 27 32 32 18 
31 Ethiopia 159 (146) 31 41 12 43 34 6 
32 Madagascar 167 (164) 32 18 46 16 18 33 
33 Gabon 164 (162) 33 31 26 38 33 42 
34 Sao Tome & 
Principe 
162 (166) 34 2 8 46 16 44 
35 Sudan 168 (-) 35 34 6 47 44 26 
36 Nigeria 169 (169) 36 27 41 3 41 23 
37 Cameroon 166 (172) 37 29 2 25 46 34 
38 Guinea Bissau 172 (178) 38 39 43 22 28 36 
39 Congo, 
Republic 
177 (176) 39 40 39 28 42 31 
40 Liberia 174 (179) 40 3 38 44 45 41 
41 Angola 182 (181) 41 28 34 6 43 47 
42 Chad 180 (183) 42 43 40 37 36 30 
43 Equatorial 
Guinea 
178 (180) 43 46 18 23 38 14 
44 Congo, Dem 
Rep 
184 (184) 44 13 36 40 47 39 
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 45 Central African 
Republic 
185 (185) 45 47 45 27 24 45 
46 South Sudan 186 (187) 46 42 47 45 39 5 
47 Eritrea 189 (189) 47 45 16 41 37 19 
48 Somalia 190 (-) 48 45 48 48 30 16 
2016 ranking is in bracket. 
 
Source:  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
 
 
 
Table 2b: North African Countries: World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Ranking (2017) 
 
 
No Country Global 
Ranking 
(2016) 
Ranking 
in MENA 
Region 
Starting 
a 
business 
Getting 
Electricity 
Protecting 
minority 
investors 
Trading 
across 
borders 
Enforcing 
contracts 
1 Morocco 68 (75) 4 3 6 5 3 2 
2 Tunisia 77 (74) 5 8 3 10 7 7 
3 Egypt 122 
(131) 
11 2 11 8 15 19 
4 Algeria 156 
(163) 
15 13 14 17 19 8 
5 Djibouti 171 
(171) 
17 19 19 18 12 20 
6 Libya 188 
(188) 
20 20 16 20 9 17 
2016 ranking is in bracket. The MENA region comprised of 20 jurisdictions. 
Source:  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
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List of Participants 
 
No. First Name Surname Country 
1 Timothy Lemay Austria 
2 Ilham Kabbouri Belgium / Morocco 
3 Tulio Di Giacomo Toledo Brazil / Italy 
4 Krystle Lewis British 
5 Yasmin Sebah British 
6 Riccardo Rovati British 
7 Jean Alain Penda Matipe Cameroon 
8 Gaston Kenfack Douajni Cameroon 
9 Freddy Mulamba Democratic Republic of Congo 
10 Louise Munga Mesozi Democratic Republic of Congo 
11 Mbuy-Mbiye Tanayi Democratic Republic of Congo 
12 Mohamed Negm Egypt 
13 Meseret Seyoum Egypt 
14 Tihut Kassa Egypt 
15 Mostafa Abdel Moez Egypt 
16 Steven Mathate Egypt 
17 Mohamed Hafez Egypt 
18 Hatem Gabr Egypt 
19 Mohamed Moustafa Kamal Egypt 
20 Mohamed Talaat Hussein El Bolaki Egypt 
21 Sameh Kamal Abdelaziz Egypt 
22 Samer Badran Egypt 
23 Sarah Sameh Abdelaziz Egypt 
24 Yasmeen Atef Egypt 
25 Yasser Attia Sayed Attia Egypt 
26 Yousria El Gamal Egypt 
27 Karim Ramses Egypt 
28 Omar El Zorkany Egypt 
29 Abdallah El Nokaly Egypt 
30 Haytham Ali Egypt 
31 Ahmed El Kosheri Egypt 
32 Borhan Amrallah Egypt 
33 Yasser Mansour Egypt 
34 Mohamed El Nokaly Egypt 
35 Heba Roshudy Egypt 
36 Mona Roshdy Egypt 
37 Ahmed Abd El Aziem Egypt 
38 Mohamed Shoaib Egypt 
39 Soaad Hossam Egypt 
40 Ali Rifaah Egypt 
41 Mahmoud Badran Egypt 
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 42 Dalia Hussien Egypt 
No. First Name Surname Country 
43 Ismail Selim Egypt 
44 Mahmoud Nayel Egypt 
45 Mohamed Abdel Raouf Egypt 
46 Mohammad Amin El Mahdi Egypt 
47 Mostafa El Bahabety Egypt 
48 Nabil Elaraby Egypt 
49 Nagla Nassar Egypt 
50 Menna Sadek Egypt 
51 Tarek Badawy Egypt 
52 Nadim Magdy Egypt 
53 Salma Lotfy Egyptian 
54 Ahmed Sharaf Eldin Egyptian 
55 Fatma Khalifa Egyptian 
56 Tsegaye Laurendeau Ethiopia / France 
57 Rouwaida Abdou France 
58 Hayet El Aouadi France 
59 Sarah El-Gindi de Miollis France 
60 Emmanuel Gaillard France 
61 Mahutodji Jimmy Vital Kodo France 
62 Fui Sokpoli Tsikata Ghana 
63 Matilda Phyllis Idun-Donkor Ghana 
64 Kizito Beyuo Ghana 
65 Rose Rameau Ghana 
66 Edward Torgbor Ghana 
67 Antonio Crivellaro Italy 
68 Ali Al-Khasawneh Jordan 
69 Lawrence Ngugi Kenya 
70 Wachia Kilei Kenya 
71 Phyllis Wangwe Kenya 
72 Collins Ongore Kenyan 
73 Leyla Ahmed Kenyan 
74 Smrithi Ramesh Malaysia 
75 Ndanga Kama Mauritius 
76 Luis Garcia Mexico 
77 Hicham El Jazzari Morocco 
78 Olusola Adegbonmire Nigeria 
79 Olufunke Adekoya Nigeria 
80 Babajide Ogundipe Nigeria 
81 Babatunde Ogunseitan Nigeria 
82 Bayo-Ojo Busola Oluwakemi Nigeria 
83 Chim Emuchay Nigeria 
84 Ikpeme Bassey Nkebem Nigeria 
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 85 Bayo Ojo Nigeria 
86 Doyin Rhodes-Vivour Nigeria 
87 Tunde Ajibade Nigeria 
No. First Name Surname Country 
88 Emilia Onyema Nigeria 
89 Gakuba Thierry Ngoga Rwanda 
90 Fidele Masengo Rwanda 
91 Maryan Hassan Somalia 
92 David Butler South Africa 
93 Deline Beukes South Africa 
94 Jonathan Ripley-Evans South Africa 
95 Abdelgadir Mustafa Sudan 
96 Ahmed Sharf Bannaga Sudan 
97 Bakri Mohamed Abakar Mohammed Sudan 
98 Nadia Mahmoud Abdelrahman Sudanese 
99 Moawia Osman Alhdad Sudanese 
100 Noon Kashkosh Sudanese 
101 Kennedy Gastorn Tanzania 
102 Rukia Baruti Tanzania 
103 Lise Bosman The Netherlands 
104 Khawla El Zatagui Tunisia 
105 Walid Ben Hamida Tunisia 
106 Deo Kalikumutima Uganda 
107 Jimmy Muyanja Uganda 
108 Roderick Cordara United Kingdom 
109 Sandip Patel QC United Kingdom 
110 Eunice Shang-Simpson United Kingdom 
111 Ndudi Councillor Olokotor United Kingdom 
112 Baiju Vasani United Kingdom 
113 Chrispas Nyombi United Kingdom 
114 Duncan Bagshaw United Kingdom 
115 Ike Ehiribe United Kingdom 
116 Steven Finizio United Kingdom 
117 César Ternieden USA 
118 Cole Agar USA 
119 Alexandra (Xander) Meise USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOAS/CRCICA Arbitration Conference, 2017 
185 
SOAS Arbitration in Africa Conference Series 
Extract from Delegates’ Feedback at the Conference 
 
Below are the verbatim responses from delegates from the question, Please tell us 
what you will change in your practice as a result of this conference? 
 
"relationship between arbitration centre and government (win vs win situation)” 
 
“If the opportunity to appoint an arbitrator present itself, I would rather give priority to young 
arbitrators and African.” 
 
“I will strive to bring more vigor and hope in international arbitration practice as an African youth” 
 
“It is early days, as I do not have a practice at the moment, but the learnings will inform my actions 
as I set off along this Arbitral path.” 
 
“I will also have a role model to emulate if I am asked to Chair a Panel discussion.” 
“Develop skills to promote arbitration in Africa” 
“I will research, engage and publish more.” 
 
“As stated for day one, it is still early days for me. I will definitely keep in touch with the contacts 
made and seek to learn from the best whilst carving out a practice for myself, including collaborating 
when the opportunity arises.” 
 
Comments on usefulness of conference 
 
“It was focused on the view that have specialist from outside of the engagement of the african states 
to promote international arbitration.” 
 
“The topics touched were all relevant.” 
 
“I am always interested in perceptions and learning from others.” 
 
"Straight to the point.” 
“They master their topic.” 
“Very pragmatic and also very progressive in his insistence that Africans should take their place in 
international arbitration.” 
 
General comments 
 
“Applause to CRCICA & SOAS for this progressive and energetic international cause.” 
 
“I also liked the fact that there were papers submitted which gave more background information” 
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